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This is a study of Korean presidential elections.  Its purpose is to determine how
Koreans voted in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections and to examine the factors that
contributed to winners.  In addition, the study compares the two elections by developing
three models: candidate choice, voter turnout and political interest models.
Using post election data from the Korean Social Science Data Center a
multinomial logit regression was used in the candidate choice model.  It shows that
Korean voters selected their candidates mainly in terms of interest in the elections, age,
orientation toward the governing or opposition parties, the regional effects of the
Southwest (Honam) and the Southeast (Youngnam), and the evaluation of merged parties
in 1992 or a united candidacy of parties in 1997.  A Monte Carlo simulation was also
employed to test the traditional assumption of candidate strength.  It indicates that Kim
Young-Sam had a more cohesive support from his older supporters in the 1992 election
while Kim Dae-Jung had a greater cohesive support from his older supporters in the 1997
election.  Both Kim Young-Sams and Kim Dae-Jungs loyalists were crucial to the
winning candidates in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.
How did people vote?  To address this question a logit analysis of voter turnout
was employed.  Comparing the 1997 election to that of 1992 the findings suggest that
low-probability voters in 1997 had: low efficacy, a negative evaluation of the Central
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Election Management Commission, claimed to be independent, young, and lived in areas
other than Youngnam and Honam.  Their lower turnout was a significant factor in the
opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jungs election.
Finally, since political interest is closely related to political participation, an
ordered logit model of political interest was developed.  The results showed that the
media and popularity of major candidates significantly contributed to Korean voters'
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND KOREAN POLITICS
Introduction
This is a study of Korean presidential elections.  Korea is a nation in transition
from a closed political system under the control of the military to one of open democratic
elections.  This study examines the past two presidential elections and three components
that affected theminterest in the presidential elections, voter turnout, and candidate
choice.  By investigating the past two elections it is hoped that patterns of citizen
behavior in the electoral process can be distinguished and that these patterns will help
explain the tradition underway in Korean politics in general and presidential politics
specifically.
There have been fifteen presidential elections in the modern Koreas history.  The
first Korean president, Rhee Syngman, was elected by the Korean National Assembly in
1948.  According to H. Choi (1996), the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections were mobilized
by the government to re-elect Rhee.  The March 1960 election was ultimately cancelled
after his election due to severe fraud and later students violent protest.  Several months
later, Yoon Po-Sun was elected as president in the National Assembly.  The next three
presidential elections, 1963, 1967, and 1971 elections, were held under the military
government of Park Chung-Hee.  H. Choi asserts that since there was little hope for
change under the military regime, turnout rates in these elections were lower than earlier
elections.  Figure 1 on p. 208 confirms this assertion.  There were four elections (1972,
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1978, 1979, and 1981) between 1971 and 1987 in which presidents were elected at the
National Conference for Unification (NCU) according to newly created Yusin
authoritative constitution.  Park was automatically elected both in 1972 and 1978, but
was assassinated in 1979.  The NCU elected Choi Kyu-Ha, his Prime Minister, the 11th
president in 1980, and Chun Doo-Hwan the 12th president one year later due to many
political crises.1  Among 15 presidential elections, there were American-style
competitions among candidates from different parties in only eight (1952, 1956, 1963,
1967, 1971, 1987, 1992, and 1997) and the remainder of elections was non-democratic.
Only the most recent 1987, 1992, and 1997 elections were open and free democratic
elections.
These three elections were completely different from other presidential elections
held before 1987.  In June 1987, the nationwide Democratic Movement pushed the Chun
Doo-Hwan military government to accept a new Constitution that provided for free and
open presidential elections.  The new Constitution also set the term of a president to a
single five-year term.  The term was restricted to avoid past presidents attempts to
maintain the presidency.  The past presidents attempts became a major reason for earlier
political unrest and insecurity.  The 1987 presidential election was the first presidential
election in which the electorate could decide its leader freely, although Roh-Tae-Woo,
the co-leader of the 1979 military coup with former president Chun Doo-Hwan, was
elected.  Later two elections have increasingly represented the publics attitudes and
opinions of the government, political parties, candidates, and issues.  Finally, in the 1997
                                                          
1 For more information, please see the later part of this chapter.
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election an opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung was elected, and was the first peaceful
transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party.
Scholars of Korean politics, however, were not prepared for the sudden 1987
direct presidential election.  Therefore, except for several polls conducted by the media
before the election, there is a dearth of academic polls to describe or explain the
electorates voting behavior in the 1987 presidential election.
In the 1992 election, however, political scientists Lee Nam-Young, Cho Jung-Bin,
and others, with the assistance of Central Election Commission (CEC), conducted its first
post-election, academic surveys.  These surveys were modeled from ones conducted in
America, Canada, Britain, or other Western countries.  These scientists repeated their
surveys in the 1997 presidential election.  Lee, Cho and others efforts have resulted in an
increase of interest in behavioral research and electoral studies in the 1990s (C. Park and
G. Cho 1994).  These authors assert, despite their own efforts and research, that most of
the studies on Korean electoral studies are not systematic, empirical, or theoretical
because of the short history of the study of behaviorism by Korean political scientists.
Data
The data used in this study are from post-election surveys of the 1992 and 1997
Korean presidential elections conducted by the Korean Social Science Data Center.  The
data were gathered by telephone interviews of 1,200 random voters by using stratified
random sampling and excluding Jeju Island.  They represent the most comprehensive and
academic post-election data available on Korean presidential elections.
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Selection Criteria
Currently in Korea the focus of electoral studies is on voter choice (J. Cho 1993a;
J. Chung 1996; Y. Chung 1993; W. Kang 1998; H. Kim 1993a, 1993b; H. Lee 1998; N.
Lee 1998; S. Lee 1998; C. Park 1993; S. Park 1989): why a candidate was elected in
presidential or congressional elections or why one party obtained more votes than other
parties.  After 1995, which marked the first full-fledged local elections, several authors
focused their attention to candidate and party choice in local elections (B. Ahn, I. Kim
and J. Seo 1995; S. Ahn 1996;J. Kim 1993).  Currently, Accordingly, there are many
studies on voter choice in the Korean literature.
Thus, this study has selected independent variables based on both American and
Korean literature about candidate choice (Chapter 2).  Most electoral theories were
developed half a century ago by American scholars (Campbell et al. 1960; Lazarsfeld et
al. 1944).  Their arguments confirming candidate choice have been tested by later
scholars both in America or other countries.  Korean scholars have also applied their
theories to investigate voter choice (K. Cho 1996).  While theories were being applied to
Korean voters, however, certain conceptualizations had to be adjusted and some theories
were not applicable due to specific Korean political context.  For instance, there have
been more than 90 political parties formed and disbanded since Koreas independence.
As a result, Korean voters do not clearly identify with a particular party.  Party
identification, an important variable in Western voter choice literature, has not been
useful in studies of Korean electoral behavior.  Instead, Korean scholars have been forced
to use general orientation toward the governing parties or opposition parties (C. Park and
G. Cho 1994).  Although many parties have appeared in the Korean political arena, fewer
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than five were seriously competing with each other at any given time.  The governing
parties have been conservative in orientation and major opposition parties have been
progressive.  The Korean voters attachment to the parties is understood within two broad
psychological orientations: those who have orientation toward governing parties and
those who have orientation toward opposition parties.  This diluted version of party
identification is more convincing because there was no change of government in Korea
until the 1997 presidential election.  Prior governments were changed only by military
coups, and were similarly conservative with different persons in power.
Another unique characteristic of Korean politics is the strength of a few political
leaders.  For example, the three KimsKim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-
Pilhave dominated Korean politics for nearly four decades.  The first two Kims have
long been opposition leaders, fighting for democracy against military governments.
Their political power originated from their charisma, devotion to democracy and an
electoral system in which they were responsible for the nomination of the congressional
candidates of their parties.  Kim Jong-Pil was the second strong man following the coup
of 1961.  He was the founder of the Korean CIA and represented conservative voters for
years.  His political strength has remained stable, even after another coup in 1979.
Influence of the Kims has been intensified by Korean regionalism.  While the
Southeast (Youngnam) has produced four presidents and has been the center of
industrialization, the Southwest (Honam), an agricultural area, did not produce a
president until 1997.  The two regions difference became more complex after the 1987
presidential election.  The election was the first direct one after a long military rule.  The
major candidates that ran for the presidency also happen to represent the important
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regions of the country.  Roh Tae-Woo was from the northern part of the Southeast
(Youngnam), Kim Young-Sam was from the southern part of that region (Youngnam),
Kim Dae-Jung was from the Southwest (Honam) and Kim Jong-Pil was from the Central
area (Chungcheong) of Korea, as shown in Figure 2 on p. 209 of the Korean map (K. Lee
1997).  Each candidate claimed that he was fighting for the demolition of Korean
regionalism, but in reality each was its captive and consciously or unconsciously made
use of it in his electoral strategy.
Severe regionalism also affects electoral theories applied to the Korean electorate.
Regional cleavage is so strong that sociological cleavages are minimal (S. Bae 1995; N.
Lee 1993; D. Shin 1999).  These authors assert that gender, education, or income does
not matter in Korean electoral behavior.  D. Shin, who is one of the best-known scholars
of Korean politics in America, maintains that on the whole, Korea is still a nation
disjointed by high levels of particularism and clientelism (258).  Accordingly, many
sociological variables that are commonly used in other countries are not used in this
study.
A major goal of this study is to determine how Koreans voted in the 1992 and
1997 presidential elections and to determine why the winners were chosen and to
compare these two elections.  Because an opposition candidate won in the 1997 election
for the first time, this study attempts to determine the factors behind this novel event.
Because this study is restricted to only two recent elections, any difference between the
1992 and 1997 elections may not fully elucidate the dynamics surrounding the first win
of an opposition candidate.  Theoretically one would longitudinally study all past
presidential elections for a complete understanding of Korean voting behavior.  However,
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since candidates could not compete freely until recent elections, studies of elections
before the 1987 Democratic Movement are not possible due to the lack of data.  Data are
only available for the elections of 1992 and 1997.
The goal of this study is to develop three models from the post election survey
data for the Korean elections of 1992 and 1997.  These models are candidate choice,
voter turnout, and political interest models.  Chapter 2 seeks to improve the
understanding of Korean electoral behavior by analyzing votes for the major candidates
in these two elections.  By using multinomial logit regression, the candidate choice model
explains candidate choice in terms of voters interest in elections, the voters orientation
toward the governing or opposition parties, the regional effects of the Southwest
(Honam) and the Southeast (Youngnam), and the evaluation of merged parties in 1992 or
a united candidacy of parties in 1997.  In addition, considering strong leaders influences
on Korean politics, it is reasonable to imagine that support for the past candidates was
carried over to the choice of the next candidates in consecutive elections.  The
sociological variable, age, is employed since most studies on Korean voting behavior
confirm its significance on voter choice.  Since interpreting multinomial estimates is
usually complex, Chapter 2 employs many figures including histograms, odds ratio plots,
and ternary plots.  Histograms disclose strong regional impacts on the candidate choice
and the odds ratio plots represent estimates of multinomial logit regressions.  Ternary
plots demonstrate how those who had voted for Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, the
most famous and strongest leaders, in an earlier election, voted for them in later elections
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through the use of Monte-Carlo simulations.2  Odds ratio plots vividly indicate effects of
all independent variables on the choice of each candidate.  In addition, considering that
economic variables constrain voting behavior significantly, Chapter 2 also investigates
their impacts on the choice of Korean presidential candidates.  By using a reward-
punishment theory, the chapter examines how subjective evaluation of living standards,
family economy and national economy worked during the two elections.
This study investigates Korean voter turnout to find a clue to the choice of
candidates.  Many studies have argued that voter turnout clearly decides who wins in
presidential elections.  For instance, Herron (1998) maintains that Clinton benefited
substantially by the low voter turnout of 50.1% in the 1996 American presidential
election.  An inspection of who voted and who did not is necessary in examining
candidate choice in the Korean elections as well.  Table 1 on p. 189 shows that South
Koreas recent turnout rates were 89.2%, 81.9% and 80.6% in the 1987, 1992, and 1997
presidential elections, respectively.  One of the most interesting aspects of Korean turnout
is its pattern of decline.  Although the turnout of the 1987 election is not examined here,
this study examines why turnout decreased in 1997 and how this affected the candidate
choice.  The difference between the winner (40.3%) and the second candidate (38.7%) in
the 1997 election was only 1.6% or 390,000 votes.  This small difference is significant in
explaining the first change of government.
  In order to solve the puzzle related to turnout in Korean elections, Chapter 3
employs the logit model and has identified several indicators as significant: the voters
orientation toward the governing or opposition parties and interest in the presidential
                                                          
2 Ternary plots have long been used in geology and incorporated in political science to present voting
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elections, the regional effects of the Southwest and the Southeast, the fairness of the
Central Election Commission (CEC), democratization of the Korean politics (1992 only),
political efficacy (1997 only), and finally the effects of rural areas.   These factors have
significantly affected voter turnout of the two elections, and the findings help to explain
why the Korean electorate voted for the candidates in 1992 and 1997.  Moreover, two
sociological factors, age and education, are added to the model. Compared to the
empirical studies involving candidate choice, there are only a few studies of Korean
turnout (K. Kim 1986; W. Kim 1998; N. Lee 1993).  All of these studies found age to be
very significant, and it has almost linear relationship with Korean voter turnout.
Therefore, the turnout model in Chapter 3 includes age.  The model also includes another
key sociological variable, education.  Education is included in the turnout model because
all the studies on American turnout unanimously agree that education is the single most
important factor on American turnout (Conway 1991; Jackson 1995; Powell 1986).3  In a
separate economic model of voter turnout, this chapter also investigates influences of
several subjective past evaluation of economic conditions on voter turnout.  Economic
indicators used in the model are levels of standard of living, family economy and national
economy.
It is well known in studies of turnout that voting rates of survey data are over-
reported compared to those of official data (Abramson and Claggett 1984; Belli et al.
1999).   Over-reporting data may not describe the real picture of how Koreans voted.  The
1992 and 1997 election data do not include variables that adjust the turnout rates of
                                                                                                                                                                            
patterns.  For more information, see Johnston and Pattie (1996).
3 Considering disagreeing arguments on the relationship between education and turnout, as found in other
countries, it is tested by two-tail t-test.
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survey data.  Chapter 3 creates weighted variables to determine how much they are
different, if any, in explaining variances of voter turnout between the original survey data
and the weighted data.
Moreover, Chapter 3 divides respondents into three different groups: High-
probability respondents, Average-probability respondents, and Low-probability
respondents.  Respondents are divided by major independent variables.  For instance, in
1997, High-probability respondents are assumed to be those who regard the CEC as
being fair, are older, are living in the Southeast and Southwest, and so on, while Low-
probability respondents are those who regard electoral commission as being unfair, are
younger, are living in regions other than in the Southeast and Southwest, and so on.
Average-probability respondents are created by holding all independent variables at
their mean.  Different effects of these three groups on turnout are shown as the interest
in election changes from low to high.
Finally, there are many studies that articulate that political interest is closely
related to political participation, political knowledge, and other political activities (Booth
and Seligson 1979; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-3; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46-8; Van Deth
1990; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
1995).  If political interest is indeed a factor that effects political activities, it should be
very useful in investigating what causes voters political interest in the Korean
presidential elections.4  Empirical studies on political interest are nearly nonexistent in
                                                          
4 Some scholars (Dalager 1996) have studied political interest generally, while others (Lazarsfeld et al.
1944; Brody 1978; Miller and Shanks 1996) have studied political interest specifically in elections.  In this
study, interest in elections is examined.
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Korean scholarship.  Even when political interest is studied, it has used it as an
independent more often than as the dependent variable.
Different types of political factors are cited to influence political interest in
election: partisanship, media influence in terms of presidential debates on television,
television speeches by candidates or their supporters, and campaign ads on television.
Considering the influences of major leaders on politics, the popularity of major
candidates, such as Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang, should also
increase voters interest in the presidential elections.  Based on theories developed in
America and other countries, respondents with a higher sociological status are more
likely to become highly interested in politics than respondents of lower status.
Studies have found these sociological variables are interrelated when affecting
respondents political interest (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Van Deth 1990).  Chapter 4
employs their interaction terms in addition to the sociological variables.  To test more
thoroughly the impacts of these sociological variables and their interaction terms on
political interest, Chapter 4 conducts bivariate significance tests as well as the joint Wald
test for complex hypotheses.
Finally, Chapter 4 assumes that Korean political interest was most significantly
affected by massive outdoor stump campaigning in 1992 and by the presidential debates
in 1997.5  The influences of stump campaigning and presidential debates on political
interest are investigated in relations to changing sociological status.
                                                          
5 Stump campaigning was popular in 1992 and was outlawed due to high cost and violence in later
elections.  Presidential debates were first introduced in the 1997 election.  Thus, chapter 4 examines how
stump campaigning and presidential debates affected political interest in the 1992 and 1997 presidential
elections respectively.
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Political interest in elections has received less attention than voter choice or
turnout in the election literature in Western countries and has barely been studied in
Korea.  This study, by using the ordered logit model, will examine what factors were
associated with Koreans' interest in the elections of 1992 and 1997.  Political interest
should offer significant insights on both voter choice and voter turnout.
Methodology
One cannot simply employ linear regression analysis in the models of this study.
Each model employs a different method depending on its dependent variable such as
multinomial, binomial, or ordered logit (Long 1997; Whitten and Palmer 1996;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  When a dependent variable is binary, as used in the
turnout model, one uses a binary response model such as logit to avoid violating major
assumptions of the linear regression analysis.  It is also important to apply a multinomial
logit to the candidate choice model, whose dependent variables are multi-nominal.  There
are three categories (1=Lee, 2=DJ, and 3=Rhee) in the 1997 election, and there are also
three categories (1=YS, 2=DJ, and 3=Chung) in the 1992 election, as shown in Table 1.
In this sense the multinomial logit model can be a binary logit, which simultaneously
estimates all possible comparisons among the outcome categories.  The political interest
model employs ordered logit since the political interest variable has four different,
ordered categories: very interested, somewhat interested, not much interested, and not at
all.6  SPSS 10, Stata 6 and Micro Soft Excel 2000 are main statistical packages used for
analyzing and describing the three models of this study.
                                                          
6 Compared to observations of the other categories, that of not at all of the dependent variable, interest in
the election, is too small (19 in 1992 and 22 in 1997).  The dependent variable has variance problem in both
years.  The difference between minimum and maximum predicted probabilities are so small that further
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Strength of the Study
Unlike most studies on Korean electoral behavior, this study compares the two
most recent presidential elections by using the most comprehensive data available.
Findings confirmed in one election are tested in later election.  The study develops
models of turnout and electoral interest to aid in explaining Korean voter choice.  This
study chooses the same variables, or conceptually similar ones in the absence of identical
independent variables, for both elections, to explain Korean candidate choice, voting
turnout, and political interest.  By using appropriate methods, the variance of presidential
candidate choice is explained not only by its independent variables but also by the other
two models.  The three models are shown at Figure 3 on p. 210.
Note on Names
Following customs in the uses of personal names, this study presents American or
Western surnames first, and their given names follow in the text and notes.  Yet, Korean
and Asian names are reversed: their surname or family names come first, and given
names follow them (D. Shin 1999).  In the case of authors names, their first initials and
last names are used because there are many common surnames among Koreans.  In the
references, however, presentation of names is the same, regardless of whether it is an
Asian or Western name.  Names in the references are noted according to the Style Manual
for the American Political Science Association (Lane, Lindenfelser and Powell 1993).
Before moving examining each model, it is essential to have background information on
                                                                                                                                                                            
analysis cannot proceed with the original four different categories of the dependent variable.  Accordingly,
the political interest variable is recoded in such a way that not at all category is merged with its adjacent
one, not much interested.
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recent Korean politics and society.  Some events are directly related to the 1992 and 1997
Korean presidential elections and others are indirectly related.
Background to Korean Politics
First Coup: Soldiers in Politics
For more than thirty years, from the 1960s to the early 1990s South Korea was
under a military regime.  The military had long dominated all sectors of Korean society.
To better understand the elections held in the 1990s, one needs to understand the 1960s
when Korean military culture started, and major current political actors started their
political careers, sometimes competing against each other and sometimes cooperating.
General Park Chung-Hee directed a coup on May 16 of 1961 against the Chang
Myon government.  From that date until 1992 the military dominated Korean politics,
economics, and culture.  In response to military rule, students and opposition fought for
democracy against the military.  Recent and current Korean politics is the result of
controversy between these military rulers and the opposition leaders.  When General Park
headed the first coup, he announced that he had to abolish the Chang Myon civilian
government because the leadership was incompetent, bureaucracy was severely corrupt,
and the economy was in a poor condition.  According to Keon (1977), Park regarded
economic growth as the only way to justify his coup and as the only modernizing force
able to lift the country from misery.  In fact, as Rao (1979, 15) indicated, Koreas per
capita income in 1961 was less than $100.  In order to achieve his economic goal, Park
had three major organizations created right after the coup.
The first organization was the Economic Planning Board (EPB).  It has
coordinated Korean economic planning and development until recently (Hahm and Plein
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1997).  Its minister was a deputy Prime Minister who led all economy-related ministers.
The EPB equipped with all the advisory power in hand, propelled immediate economic
development by promoting export.  The second organization was the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA).  The KCIA was mainly organized by Kim Jong-Pil, Parks
nephew (Huer 1989; M. Keon 1977).  It was Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-Pil who
prepared all the steps of the coup and strategies that might appeal to the public.  Huer
(1989) indicates that the KCIA was supposed to be created for national security and
military information, but actually, it made political surveillance and control of the
military and opposition possible.  The third organization was the Democratic Republican
Party (DRP), created in January of 1963.  Huer also maintains that, although the KCIA
controlled Korean politics, the military junta needed a more official and legal agency to
govern opposition and domestic politics and the DRP became that means.  There were
many young colonels in the army who became active in politics, resulting in the DRP
quickly dominated by young officers.
With these three powerful agencies truly under control, Park in 1962 formulated
and directed the first Five-Year-Economic Development Plan (1962-66).  The first plan
became the model of later economic growth plans and more carefully planned successive
onesthe second (1967-71), the third (1972-76), the fourth (1977-81) and later ones
were conducted based on success of the previous plans (H. Lee 1996).  The economic
plans included tax concessions, preferential loans for exports, local letters of credit, waste
allowances, minimum export requirements for licensed traders, and government support
for overseas marketing activities (K. Kim 1991, 108).  Park himself presided over export-
promotion meetings with ministers and business leaders every month, and suggestions
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and solutions to increase exports were discussed and reflected in the immediate economic
policies.  In terms of economy, Park showed strong leadership, by providing a
cooperative and elaborate planning necessary for the Korean economic growth.
Because he was economically successful, Park was an elected president in 1963.
After the coup, he in fact was elected over popular opposition candidates (Pae 1992,
240).  He defeated Yun Po-Son from the Civil Rule Party (CRP) in October of 1963, and
again in 1967 defeated Yun, who this time represented the New Democratic Party (NDP).
Park barely won in 1963, with a margin of 156,000 votes, but he easily won reelection in
1967, by more than a one million votes.
Yet there were still many that did not like Parks rule.  Although he was formally
elected, his victories were partly accomplished by strong funding and manipulating the
KCIA (Her 1989; Macdonald 1988).  Intellectuals such as journalists, students, and
professors did not fully accept his authoritarian rule and did not believe in Parks
democracy that was dominated by the military.
Forced Change of Constitution: Parks Third Run for the Presidency
After winning the 1963 and 1967 elections, Park could not run for the 1971
election because of the constitutional two-term limit.  Many members in the governing
DRP hoped Kim Jong-Pil would succeed Park (C. Kim 1976, 39).   However, Park and
his strong supporters in the party, the government and the military still wanted Park to
become the next candidate despite constitutional constraints.
Several military confrontations with North Korea helped Park and his followers to
proceed with their idea of amending the constitution in order for Park to run for a third
term.  For instance, North Korean commandos raided the presidential house in January
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1968, and North Korea seized the U.S.S. Pueblo a few days later (Y. Kihl 1984, 51).
These consecutive military and national security-related accidents intensified Parks
supporters insistence that they needed a powerful president who had strong leadership
skills with a military expertise, so that the country would be safe.  Another argument of
his supporters was that Korea had established an excellent economic record.  For
instance, from 1961 to 1976 Koreas economy grew about ten percent per year (Rao
1979).
On September 14, 1969, the DRP-drafted amendment was passed by the National
Assembly (C. Kim 1976, 35).  The voting and passage was secret, excluding all
opposition lawmakers and ruling party members who did not support the amendment.
The amendment was thus approved by a popular referendum held in the next month.
Park was the ruling party candidate of the 1971 presidential election, and Kim
Dae-Jung (46 years old) became his opponent from the New Democratic Party (NDP).
Kim Dae-Jung won the NDP primary election over Kim Young-Sam after complex
factional maneuverings.  Announcing that this election would be his last bid for
presidency, Park won over Kim with a margin of slightly less than a million.  This margin
was smaller than the 1.2 million differences in 1967.  A foreign news analyst has written
that Park Chung-Hee was stunned by the large vote for his opponent (Keon 1977,
119).  His support had shrunk because many voters, although impressed by the economic
success, were dissatisfied with his amending constitution and running for a third time.
Considering Parks enormous advantage in campaign funds, assistance of the media,
police, and the KCIA, Kim Dae-Jung announced after the election that he had been
cheated of victory and that he would be the nations spiritual leader.
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H. Choi (1996) maintains that modern regionalism originates from the 1971
presidential election.  Two regionsSouthwest and Southeastsimilar in terms of the
number of people and size of land, produced major presidential candidates, Kim Dae-
Jung and Park respectively.  K. Lee (1997) argues that Korean regionalism deteriorated
as each candidate resorted to regional characteristics as part of their campaign tactics, the
government suppressed Kim as a main political opponent after the election, and
government officials, military solders, and even business from the Southeast were
abnormally favored by government policies over those of the Southwest.
Yusin Constitution
The governing DRP, however, lost 16 seats in the National Assembly election
held in the next month, although it still enjoyed majority (C. Kim 1976, 39).  That
prevented the ruling DRP from changing the constitution.  On October 17, 1972, Park
suddenly proclaimed martial law throughout Korea (S. Pae 1992).  According to the
martial law, all political parties were banned, press was severely censored, and all
colleges were closed.  Soldiers and tanks were stationed throughout the country and the
National Assembly was dissolved.  The most important content of the newly drafted
constitution, the Yusinmeaning revitalizing reformConstitution, was that Park was
not constrained by any term-limit.  Now he could run for presidency after his third term
ended in 1975.  Park could be re-elected indefinitely under the new constitution.  Park
worried about the reduced gap between him and the Kim Dae-Jung in the 1971 election
compared to the 1967 election.  The Yusin Constitution thus cancelled the direct
presidential vote and created an indirect presidential election system.  The electoral body,
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named the National Conference for Unification (NCU), would be composed of 2,359
deputies directly elected by the public (S. Pae 1992, 295).
Another characteristics of the Constitution was that the President would dissolve
the National Assembly whenever necessary and would nominate one-third of the
lawmakers (S. Choi 1976).  This group of lawmakers was called Yujonghoe, meaning
Political Fraternity for Yusin. Yujonghoe constituted a strong supporting group for the
government and the ruling party.  Park called this system Korean-style democracy, but
in reality it ended democracy in Korea.  The Yusin Constitution was proposed to
permanently solidify Parks power with the excuse of promoting national security,
reunification, and social stability.
While suppressing anti-government groups with force, Park had absolute power
(Macdonald 1988).  No opposition leaders could compete or argue with him.  Kim Jong-
Pil, who gave up his efforts to become presidential in the 1969 election, became Prime
Minister in Parks government.  He was dubbed as permanent number two.  Kim Dae-
Jung, after being defeated in the 1971 election, traveled to Japan and the U.S. denouncing
Park and his government, calling it military dictatorship by tyranny.  Finally the KCIA
kidnapped Kim Dae-Jung from a Tokyo hotel and attempted to kill him on a boat off the
Japanese coast in 1973 (Cummings 1997).  He survived with the help of American CIA
and the protest of the Japanese government.  Kim, acting as an active dissident, was
involved in many anti-government demonstrations and joined with other prominent
dissidents such as Yun Po-Son, Ham Sok-Hon, Moon Ik-Hwan and others.
Another opposition leader was Kim Young-Sam, the chairman of the largest
opposition party, the NDP (S. Pae 1992).  Kim Young-Sam was strongly convinced that
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Parks iron rule was arousing dissention rather than unity and vehemently denounced
Parks authoritarian rule during the 1970s.  Finally, Kim Young-Sam called for Parks
resignation and asked the American government, in his interview with The New York
Times on September 16, 1979 to pressure the Park regime on human rights (Hinton
1983).  Several days after the report, Kim was evicted from the Assembly and put into
jail.  His eviction was first time in Koreas parliamentary history that a congressman lost
his seat by force.  Hinton documents that the political turmoil led to the voluntary
resignation of all of the opposition legislators.  Their attempt to resign as lawmakers
reflects the peoples resentment toward the ruling party in general, and specifically Parks
eviction of Kim from the Assembly.
End of Parks Era
College students across the country took to the street, calling for more freedom,
and staged anti-government rallies.  It was Pusan, Kim Young-Sams hometown, where a
full-fledged student demonstration erupted in September 1979 (Lie 1998).  Students
protested Kim Young-Sams expulsion, asked for the removal of KCIA agents from
campus, and demanded more freedom on the campus and in the press.  Many citizens
joined the students, battling riot police who used tear-gas.  In response, the government
declared martial law in the Pusan area on October 17 of 1979, but it could not stop
student and citizen uprisings (Hinton 1983).
As political unrest increased, discipline in the ruling circle broke down and
different opinions on how to deal with the crisis surfaced.  In the end, even some strong
followers of Park disliked his political methods.  Finally on the night of October 26 of
1979, during a party in the presidential house at which Park, his chief bodyguard Cha
21
Chi-Chol, the Chief-of-Staff Kim Ke-Won, and the KCIA Director Kim Jae-Kyu were
present, Kim Jae-Kyu assassinated Park and Cha (Clifford 1998; Hinton 1983; Y. Kihl
1984).  Clifford argues that the immediate given reason for the assassination of Park and
Cha was the KCIA Directors failure to predict and stop the turbulence in Pusan and its
nearby cities, and the agencys naive dealings with the activists.  However, according to
Clifford, the real reason was that Kim Jae-Kyu thought Parks hard-line policy would be
even tougher in the future and that the eighteen years of Parks absolute rule should be
stopped.
Seoul Spring
With Parks death, his 18 years of tight reign ended.  According to the Yusin
Constitution, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-Hah became the tenth President from the NCU in
December 1979.  He was the only candidate and obtained more than 95% of the electoral
votes two months after the assassination (Lie 1998).  The new President promised in his
inaugural address that the current Yusin Constitution would be replaced by one that
would be approved by the public vote in approximately a year.
Koreans expected a direct presidential election first time since 1971, and they
expected a free election for the first time in Koreas modern history.  This euphoria was
called Seoul Spring.  President Choi released hundreds of students, political prisoners,
farmers, and workers, including Kim Dae-Jung and famous poet named Kim Chi-Hah,
and former President Yun Po-Son from house arrest (Hinton 1983).  Hinton (1983, 50)
reports that Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-Sung issued a manifesto that politics is
outside the realm of the armed forces.
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Right after the new Presidents inaugural address, however, the NDP Chairman
Kim Young-Sam and the National Coalition for Democracy and Unification, formed by
Kim Dae-Jung, accused President Choi of becoming president by using the Yusin
Constitution.  The two Kims denounced Choi for extending the Yusin rule for over a
year, a decision that was not supported by the opposition or by the people.
Meanwhile, the governing DRP was shocked by the death of its Chairman Park,
but after the Chois address, the party chose Kim Jong-Pil as the partys new Chairman.
They would later select him as the partys presidential candidate for a next presidential
election (Macdonald 1988).  Politics seemed to be back to normal.
Since the military had been the final decision-makers in politics since Parks 1961
coup, and martial law was being declared across the country after Park died, no persons
other than high military officers had an important impact on the transitional politics.
There were two groups of officers in the army (Clifford 1998).  One group, represented
by the then Martial Law Commander Chung Sung-Hwa, had a more moderate attitude
toward civilian politics.  This group wanted the Yusin Constitution replaced by a more
practical and democratic one.  The other group, represented by Major General Chun Doo-
Hwan, still wanted to retain the Yusin Constitution.
While most functions of the important military factions stopped after the
assassination of Park, Chun and his supporters increased their influence in the army and
in the political arena.  The KCIA, which had controlled significant information and had
wielded great power, was involved in the assassination of the President and in endless
debacles.  Chung Sung-Hwa, a senior officer, happened to be having dinner at a
restaurant only 50 yards from the place of the shootings.  Chung was a close friend of the
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assassin, Kim Jae-Kyu, and had been invited to the restaurant by Kim.  Whether General
Chung knew of Kims conspiracy or not, he was under suspicion of the conspiracy (Lie
1998, 120).  As head of the Defense Security Command, a military intelligence body,
Chun was investigating the shooting and his power suddenly became beyond that of any
other persons in the country.
Continued Participation of Soldiers in Politics
On the evening of December 12 of 1979, about two months after the shooting,
several generals, including Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo and others, ordered their
troops to arrest the Martial Law Commander Chung (Clifford 1998).  After a gun battle
between Chuns soldiers and Chungs bodyguards, Chung was arrested.  Another 16
generals, including Commander of the Capital Garrison Major General Chang Tae-Wan,
Commander of the Third Army Lieutenant General Lee Kon-Yong, who were friendly to
General Chung, were also arrested at the army headquarters and the Defense Ministry.
The incident is called the second coup in the Koreas history (Kihl 1984).  With this
coup, the influence of the insurgent generals spread, and the authority of President Choi
was further eroded.  Chun took over the KCIA and became its Acting Director.  Chun
now held two powerful posts the Defense Security Command that controlled the
military and checked its loyalty, and the KCIA that controlled civilians and politicians.
He was almost ready to assume the leadership of the country.
However, Chuns monopoly on power, together with the slow progress of
democratization by the government, angered students who took to the streets across the
country.  Tens of thousands of students called for Chuns resignation from all his posts
and the cancellation of the martial law (Y. Kihl 1984).  Police and troops arrested leading
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student activists and politicians, including Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Jong-Pil, former KCIA
Director Lee Hu-Rak and others, mainly because the police and the government believed
these corrupt politicians were responsible for social unrest and the student
demonstrations.
Among the most disastrous skirmishes between students and civilians, and the
military was what was called later the Kwangju Uprising (Clark 1987).  The bloody
uprising lasted for nine days in the Southwestern city of Kwangju, hometown of Kim
Dae-Jung, where officially hundreds of students and civilians (unofficially thousands of
them) were killed by the Special Paratrooper Forces wielding bayonets.  The people in
Kwangju asked for speedy democratization and instant release of their hero, Kim Dae-
Jung.  Broadcasting stations, police stations and other government buildings were burned
or demolished by the angry citizens.  This upheaval was the fiercest confrontation in
South Korea since the Korean War.
Suppressing the Kwangju Uprising, the military stressed the importance of social
stability and national security and devised a new constitution on September 29 of 1980
(Y. Kihl 1984).  As the new Constitution was issued, all the existing political parties were
dissolved and the National Assembly was banned.  Y. Kihl further observes that political
Renovation Committee, composed of 9 military officers, announced a list of 567 major
politicians and activists.  They were purged because they were believed to be responsible
for arousing political and social corruption.  These politicians included some of the most
prominent in Korea, who intended to join the presidential race without the military
obstruction: Kim Jong-Pil of the governing DRP, Kim Young-Sam, Chairman of the
largest opposition NDP, and Kim Dae-Jung, who was even under a death sentence.  The
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ban of their activities had lasted for more than seven years, until the 1987 Democratic
Movement.  According to Y. Kihl, only obedient parties were allowed to be organized
later in 1980: the army-backed new ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), and major
opposition Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and other small opposition parties.  Several
well-known politicians were involved in opposition parties, but most of them were more
subservient to the government than Kim Dae-Jung or Kim Young-Sam.
During his seven-year term, Chun curbed activities of students and workers with
more restrictive labor laws and national security laws.  The Kwangju tragedy and the
Southeastern (Youngnam) generals in the government, including Chun Doo-Hwan and
Roh Tae-Woo, aggravated regionalism that had been instigated by the former Park
regime (K. Lee 1997).
President Chuns era was full of clashes by students and parents who wanted the
release of their children from the police (S. Pae 1992).  Among the demands of the
students and their parents was the release of the political prisoners, a full investigation of
the Kwangju Uprising, popular and direct election of the president, and changes in the
Constitution.  Kim Young-Sam began a 23-day-hunger strike that triggered a nationwide
democratic movement (S. Pae 1992).  The largest student demonstration occurred at
Konkuk University on October 28 of 1986 and lasted for several days (C. Kim 1987, 68).
Approximately 20,000 riot police threw tear gas canisters endlessly at the estimated 2,500
students.  Describing the students as radical leftists and pro-North Korean Communists,
the police cracked down on the university students.  The National Coalition for a
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Democratic Constitution (NCDC), headed by Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung,7 also
demanded constitutional amendment.
Despite such demands, President Chun named Roh Tae-Woo as the Chairman of
the ruling DJP on February 23 of 1987 and designated him as the partys indirect
presidential candidate.  The governing candidate was almost certain of being elected by
the electoral college that was mostly pro-government.  Nonetheless, designation of Roh
as the ruling party candidate infuriated students and politicians.  Activists, politicians,
and leaders of religion, education, and women launched a pan-national campaign for the
constitutional amendment (S. Pae 1992).  The government mobilized almost all riot
police available to curb the illegal campaign.  Despite government constraint, pro-
democracy forces demonstrated in nearly all the major cities, including Seoul, Kwangju,
and Pusan at the same time in June of 1987.  Citizens on the street offered food,
emergency medicine, and sodas to the demonstrators, and some offered hideouts in case
of a police search.  More than one million people participated in these skirmishes late
June of 1987 (S. Han 1988).  With his back against the wall, the governing candidate for
the indirect presidential election Roh Tae-Woo announced, in the name of June 29
Declaration, that Roh would ask President Chun to cancel his candidacy, and instead he
would ask for direct presidential elections, the re-establishment of civil rights of all
politicians, a new constitution, and other democratic measures.  This request was the first
time of the countrys history that the majority of the ruling circle joined with those
involved in the democratic movement, and it affected the democratization of other Asian
                                                          
7 Kim Dae-Jung worked for Korean democracy in Japan, the USA and other countries and just returned
back to the country.
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countries such as the Philippines where Marcos would later step down.  This uprising was
eventually called the June Democratic Movement.
Democratization: the 1987 Presidential Election
A direct presidential election was to be held in the middle of December 1987.  As
Chun and Roh expected when they accepted the direct presidential election and other
democratization polices, neither Kim Young-Sam nor Kim Dae-Jung could win because
they split the opposition-oriented voters.  Democratic and civilian leaders who
participated in the democratization movement with the two KimsKim Young-Sam and
Kim Dae-Jungagainst the Park and Chun military regimes strongly recommended to
the two Kims that there should be a single candidate for the opposition (S. Han 1988).
Yet, each Kim thought he could win, and thus neither would yield.  Roh eventually won,
assisted by the advantages of the governing party such as abundant campaign funds and a
national organizationnot to mention a divided opposition.  With Kim Jong-Pil standing
for the Central area, candidates represented major regions of the nation: Roh Tae-Woo
from northern Youngnam (Southeast), Kim Young-Sam from southern Youngnam
(Southeast) and Kim Dae-Jung from Honam (Southwest) (K. Lee 1997).  Massive
outdoor stump campaigning was common and hundreds of thousands of people would
gather to see and hear the candidates attack each other and arouse regional animosity.
Fighting occurred between supporters of different candidates, and some native people
hurled stones at visiting candidates.  Some candidates consciously or unconsciously made
regionally antagonistic remarks to boost support in their areas and to attack opponents.  A
great number of paid voters were mobilized to the stump campaigns, becoming a
financial burden for candidates as well as the seeds for political corruption.  There were
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severe intra-party conflicts among major presidential hopefuls, but the hopefuls never
broke away from their parties.  Yet after the Democratic Movement, the tacit agreement
of cooperation was broken.  The division between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung
was the main reason for the ruling candidate Rohs winning with only 36.5% of the votes
(K. Lee 1997).
Rohs inauguration was the first peaceful transfer of power since the first modern
governments establishment in Korea in 1948, although the transfer took place within the
same party.  Despite this positive historical significance, his presidency also provided
negative implications.  Roh himself had participated in the military coup in December of
1979 and was more accustomed to giving orders than making negotiations that are
necessary in the democratic process.  In addition, two-thirds of the electorate still did not
support him, and this resulted in the defeat of the ruling DJP in the National Assembly
election, held several months after the presidential election.
Merger of the Three Parties
Unlike the past Assembly elections in which all the ruling parties enjoyed
majority, Rohs DJP got more votes than any of the opposition parties but failed to
achieve a majority, receiving 125 out of 299 seats in the 1988 Assembly election, the first
held since the 1987 Democratization Movement (S. Han 1989).  This percentage may
indicate that the electoral process and system were much more fair after the June
Declaration.  However, the small ruling party in both special committees and full plenary
caused difficult times for Roh, whose presidential power was reduced by the new 1987
Constitution.  Government-proposed bills could not easily pass in the Assembly due to
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both reduced number of ruling legislators and the lack of experience of dialogue and
negotiation.
Workers whose wages and benefits had been sacrificed for the growth-first policy
during the Park and Chun administrations demanded their due piece of the pie in the new
democratic era (H. Lee 1996, 27-28).  The number of unionized workers skyrocketed.
Walkouts and strikes occurred frequently and violently.  Only one year after the Rohs
inauguration, the problems of bubble economyinflation of land price and consumer
pricesoccurred, due to the 1987 presidential election, 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and
aggressive democratic wage negotiations (H. Lee 1996).  He reports that reduced
productivity of the nation obstructed later economic growth.  Many medium-sized and
small companies went bankrupt, and the unemployment rate accelerated.
Rohs government was also experienced student demonstrations.  Students wanted
to know the true story of the Kwangju Uprising of 1980 and, more specifically, Chun and
Rohs roles in the Uprising.  Tens of thousands of students and workers participated in
the student protest.  Some students even burned themselves to death with paint thinner in
an attempt to dramatize the cause of their demonstration.
Amidst this turbulence, many of middle class and conservative Koreans began to
resent the oppressive control of the Assembly by the opposition and the ineffective
minority government.  Several parties noticed this public mood and realigned each other
after calculating their roles or the possibility of success in the upcoming 1992 presidential
election.  The governing DJP merged with Kim Young-Sams Reunification Democratic
Party and Kim Jong-Pils New Democratic Republic Party on January 23 of 1990 (Y.
Kihl 1991).  These three parties turned into a new coalition party, the Democratic Liberal
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Party (DLP), and composed 217 of 299 seats in the Assembly.  The realignment was the
most conservative coalition since Roh and Kim Jong-Pil stood for conservative and
stability-oriented Koreans.  However, Kim Young-Sam was severely criticized for his
involvement with coalition.  Although Kim Young-Sam had been a lifetime opposition
leader against the military regime, many commentators and people regarded Kim Young-
Sam as shameful since Kim Young-Sam joined with Roh and Kim Jong-Pil who were the
military dictators Kim Young-Sam had long fought against.  This inconsistency was
explained by Kim Young-Sam and his close supporters as his great decision to save the
country.  Without the merger, Kim thought the next presidential election would be won
by another governing candidate.  That is, military regime would rule the country
permanently.  Kim Young-Sam still saw the peacefully elected Roh government as a
military government since Roh was a former four-star general and participated in the
1979 coup, and many of his ministers and advisers had been in the army.  In short, Kim
Young-Sam compared his merger decision to the old Korean saying, entering a tigers
den to capture the tiger.
Kim Jong-Pil, whose party obtained only 35 seats of 299 seats in the Assembly in
the 1988 election, almost gave up hope of becoming president by himself (H. Cho 1996,
376-79).  As a chairman of the smallest major party, a merger was the best way to
increase his and his partys status in Korean politics.  Except for several stubborn
members in the Kims parties, most lawmakers of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Pil
followed their leaders and joined the merged party.  The merger once again showed
Korean politics was still personal and without an ideological axis.  These leaders had
formed, disbanded, or merged their parties depending on the situation and personal or
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party advantage.  In Korean politics, they were referred to politics-9th dan, following
martial arts highest level when they showed the ability to create or disband political
parties.
Nonetheless, many of Kim Young-Sams loyal supporters felt betrayed, and the
only opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung, severely attacked the merger and Kim Young-
Sam as illicit connection and unprincipled political maneuver.  The unpopularity of the
merger was proved at the next National Assembly election on March 24 of 1992.  The
merged ruling DLP claimed only 149 of 299 seats, one vote shy of the majority (H. Cho
1996, 382).  The party lost 68 seats since it had controlled 217 when the three parties
merged each other, about two years before this.  Their loss was a gain for the opposition
parties.  H. Cho further points out that Kim Dae-Jungs Democratic Party garnered 97
seats, 15 seats more than before the election.  The new Unification Peoples Party was
organized by Chung Joo-Young, Chairman of the largest business group, Hyundae, only
two months before the election.  Chung calling himself economy-9th-dan, compared to
the politics-9th-dans of the other Kims, relayed to the voters that his expertise and
experience in economics could invigorate the countrys failing economy.
Consolidation of Democracy: the 1992 Presidential Election
The December 1992 presidential election was significantly different from the past
ones.  Due to the single-term of presidency, the incumbent President Roh could not run
again.  All three major hopefuls were civilians.  They did not worry about the potential
military intervention in the election (H. Lee 1993).  Many top military officers announced
publicly their neutral stance on the presidential election and stressed its proper role of
defending the country from external invasion.  Even Kim Dae-Jung, who had once been
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regarded as leftist or Communist, was welcome by the military if he was elected.  This
openness indicated a more open election than the 1987 election, where some general
vowed to throw grenades at Kim Dae-Jung if he were elected.
Kim Young-Sam secured his candidacy in the ruling DLPs primary (J. Shim
1992). The primary was first held in the ruling parties.  The DLP held the primary
election in order to reduce any criticism of the merged party for its illicit union by many
students and democratic leaders.  In fact, after Kim was nominated, anti-governing party
rallies were chanting anti-Kim and resignation of Kim as Chairman and presidential
candidate of the DLP.  Kim Dae-Jung, presidential candidate of the largest opposition
Democratic Party asserted that Kim Young-Sam betrayed the publics democratic zeal
that culminated in the 1987 peoples revolution.
Another opposition candidate, Chung Joo-Young also criticized the ruling partys
failure on the economy and vowed to restore the fallen economy (Steers 1999).  Chung
was Koreas version of Ross Perot.  Chungs candidacy from the newly created United
Peoples Party represented the friction between business circles and the government.  It is
true that big businesses were the engine of the Korean economy in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, and they led in the development of science and technology of industries.  In
addition, they provided medium-sized and small business with incentives and jobs.
However, it is also true that their encouraging of economic success was directed by the
government (Clifford 1998).  The Economic Planning Board created by President Park
right after his coup was the center of Korean economic growth.  Yet, as countrys
economy grew rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s, economic initiatives and directions of
the government officials were no longer effective for businesses that had been
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increasingly more internationalized and larger in size (H. Lee 1996).  The economy was
aided in the transition from a state economy to a more private economy.  Big businesses
regarded the governments orders and direction as intervention in the business, and
government regarded businesses resistance as disloyal.  Businesses deep antagonism was
expressed in Chungs bid for presidency.  In addition, Chung called for the overthrow of
the two Kims (H. Choi 1996).  This was based on the fact that, although Kim Young-Sam
and Kim Dae-Jung had long contributed to democratization of Korean politics more than
any other politicians or civil activists, they also symbolized personalization,
Machiavellism, and absolute power inside their parties.
Another important issue of the 1992 election was regionalism.  Most of the
Southeast (Youngnam) voters chose Kim Young-Sam while most of the Southwest
(Honam) voters chose Kim Dae-Jung.  The final ballot count showed that Kim Young-
Sam garnered a substantial margin of 41.9 percent compared to Kim Dae-Jungs 33.8
percent and Chungs 16.5 percent of the vote (H. Choi 1996, 280).  Kim Dae-Jung
accepted his defeat after the official electoral tally, congratulated the other Kim, and
announced that he would quit politics since he was already 67 years old and the 1992 bid
for presidency was his third.
Kims Reform
After inauguration, the first thing President Kim Young-Sam did was to purge the
military.  Although the army got away with much of its praetorianism, there were still
unofficial organizations in the army that had enjoyed the preferential benefits of their
members against non-members.  One of them was called Hanahwoe, meaning One
Association, organized by Chun Doo-Hwan.  In the early 1960s, after Parks coup,
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Captain Chun and his classmates from the Military Academy organized Hanahwoe,
including Roh Tae-Woo, Kim Bok-Dong, and Chong Ho-Yong (C. Lee and H. Sohn
1994).  Chun was the Chairman of the association, and its members regularly met secretly
at his Seoul home.  These core members recruited smart young Academy graduates.
They shared politically important intelligence and other information on promotions and
assignments.  This kind of private organization was illegal in the army, which stressed
unity of all.  Yet members of the association increased and wielded their power within the
army.  Finally, members of the association were the main officers who attacked and
seized the senior officers on December 12 of 1979, after the death of Park.  President
Kim found that Hanahwoe members still had an important position in the army, and it
was necessary to get rid of them.  He disbanded all private associations in the military
and most political generals were demoted, dismissed or retired by force (C. Lee and H.
Sohn 1994).  Those involved in suppressing the Kwangju Uprising were especially
damaged.  The military was returned to normality and was under strong civilian control.
Cleansing the military was the most important of all the reforms President Kim
implemented (C. Lee and H. Sohn 1994).
President Kim realized that Korean politics was more underdeveloped than the
economy.  The reason for the political backwardness was that political leaders accepted
slush funds or ruling funds from the businesses in return for offering special legal,
commercial, monetary, or policy benefits.  Slush funds have been used since President
Parks era to win elections, manage partisans and parties, placate opponents, manipulate
public opinion, or exalt military prestige (D. Shin 1999).  According to D. Shin, it was
this exchange of slush funds with benefits that was the seeds of political backwardness
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and government corruption.  In order to cut the mutual exchange, President Kim
disclosed all the assets of his family, including his old fathers and his sons to the public
first and then pressured others to follow his initiatives.  In addition, Kim changed the
name of the ruling party from the DLP to the New Korea Party (NKP) to represent a
clean break with the authoritarian past in 1995 (D. Shin, 203).
Since the 1987 presidential election, Korean elections have been quite fair.
Unlike elections under the military governments, most election results have been
accepted by both the winning and defeated candidates, and most results were reported
quickly on television. However, astronomical amounts of money were spent during the
campaigns, especially on the massive street campaigns.  It is without saying that the
regulation of the amount of money should positively affect the mutual exchange of illegal
benefits between candidates and those who want some kind of benefits after the election.
The 1994 Election Malpractice Prevention Law limits the amount of campaign spending
per candidate and increases electoral subsidies to parties and candidates (C. Lee and H.
Sohn 1995).  Candidates who spent more than the limit would be penalized, and the
winners would be denied their electoral victory.  The law, however, had intrinsic
problems.  It is very difficult to determine the exact amount of money spent during an
election.  Another problem was prosecutors usually were lenient to the governing
candidates and harsh to the opposition candidates.  Despite these problems, the law
significantly contributed to the purifying of all of the electoral process.
The year 1995 was an important one for Korean democracy.  The country
restarted local elections that had to be interrupted 34 years earlier by the military coup.
H. Choi (1996) asserts that local governments for the first time were able to rule
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themselves without much of central control, providing a symbol of Korean
democratization.  Despite President Kims efforts and interest in the democratization of
Korean politics, his party was severely defeated in the 1995 local elections.  His DLP
obtained only 33% of the total votes, compared to the 40% of the Democratic Party, and
the opposition won in Seoul area.
One of the major reasons for the low support of the DLP was decade-old
regionalism (H. Choi 1996).  Most President Kims candidates running in his hometown,
the Southeastern area, won their elections, while in the Southwestern areas the
Democratic Party prevailed, supported by Kim Dae-Jung, and the Central areas (Chung-
Chung) were secured by United Liberal Democrats, headed by Kim Jong-Pil.  Only a few
candidates could win outside their own regions.
The second reason for his defeat was Kims personality.  Although he fought for
democracy for a long-time, he himself became undemocratic while fighting against an
authoritarian, military regime.  He became arrogant and self-righteous and made
decisions by himself, without consulting with advisers.  He changed ministers not when
their abilities were discredited, but when fresh sentiments about politics were needed.
Anti-Kim Young-Sam sentiments were rampant by 1995.  His popularityover 90% in
his first year of presidency declined severely (Schuman 1996).  The Korean governing
parties traditionally have received support from conservative and stability-oriented
voters, such as businesses and the military government officials.  Yet, President Kims
cleansing of the military, real-name transactions,8 and ethics law for the government
                                                          
8 Financial transactions have long been committed under borrowed or false names in Korea.  Because of
such transactions, huge amounts of untraceable monies have circulated, and become one of the reasons for
37
officials, did not appeal to this segment of his traditional support base since those reforms
reduced the benefit and privileges of the military.
After Kim Dae-Jung was defeated in the 1992 presidential election, he spent a
year in Britain studying Korean reunification, wanting for the best time to return to the
domestic politics (J. Shim 1995).  The 1995 Local elections provided the best opportunity
for him to return to Korea without serious suspicion.  He organized the Asia-Pacific
Peace Foundation and argued for regional equal rights (K. Lee 1997).  His insistence
was because his Southwestern region had been discriminated against by the former
presidentsPark, Chun, and Rohand incumbent President Kim, whose political base
was in the Southeastern areas.  He argued that it was time to end this political and
economic discrimination.  He further argued political parties that won the local election
should be responsible for local politics in the regions and contribute to reducing
regionalism.
 No one opposed his newly packaged arguments.  Opposition to the renewal of his
politics was not strong at the time of local elections.  Although he still officially denied
that he had returned to politics, Kim Dae-Jung was ready for the 1996 local election, the
1996 National Assembly election, and even the 1997 presidential election.  His return
became successful when Cho-Soon, former minister of the Economic Planning Board,
was elected as the Mayor of Seoul with Kim Dae-Jungs and the Democratic Partys full
support.  Kim Dae-Jung was the practical winner of the 1995 local election, with Cho-
Soons win as Seouls Mayor (B. Koh 1996).
                                                                                                                                                                            
illicit collusion between politics and big business (J. Oh 1999).  All financial transactions had to be made
under real names after President Kims emergency order in August 1993.
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President Kim recruited many younger and new aspirants to the party for the 1996
National Assembly election.  Lee Hoi-Chang, who was a former Supreme Judge and
Prime Minister during the beginning of Kim's tenure, joined the party as Chairman of the
campaign headquarters for the Assembly election.  Although he was a political novice, he
had an unblemished image since he made many independent decisions not influenced by
the military government when he was a judge, and he attempted to act as a true Prime
Minister according to government organization laws.  He did not consider the President's
attitude or response.  His activities infuriated President Kim, and he resigned before he
was fired.  Lee was recruited to the ruling party again, after a special meeting with the
President several months before the election.  President Kim seriously needed Lee's fresh,
clean image and popularity to win the upcoming National Assembly election, while Lee
needed to have electoral experience since he was known to be a presidential hopeful in
the 1997 presidential election (C. Lee 1997).  President Kim also recruited other well-
known scholars or popular politicians in his party such as Park Chan-Jong, Lee Hong-
Koo, and many young, new candidates.
Corruption and Failure of Reforms
In contrast to the readiness of the governing party for the Assembly election, the
opposition was in disarray.  After the victory of the 1995 local elections, Kim Dae-Jung
successfully returned to the politics and organized his own party, the National Congress
for New Politics (NCNP).  While he was in Britain after his presidential failure in 1992,
his party supporters remained in the Democratic Party (DP), headed by Lee Ki-Tack.  Lee
was a manager of the party instead of Kim, not a leader of the party, during Kim's
absence.  After the local elections, however, Lee would not yield to Kim as Chairman and
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attempted to become the next presidential candidate by himself.  Kim Dae-Jung, who
wholeheartedly contributed victory of the DP in the local election, created his own party,
and Kim's old supporters joined Kim's party.  The NCNP became the largest opposition
party, and the DP and its head, Lee Ki-Tack, damaged their political influence.  Kim and
Lee's fighting once again proved lack of ideology and the importance of a strong boss in
Korean parties and politics.
In an effort to embarrass President Kim's clean politics and keep his vow that he
would not accept even a cent from any others including businesses, the NCNP disclosed
that Chang Hak-Ro, the Presidents current personal assistant, and confidant for 20 years,
had received approximately 60 million won ($73,000) in bribes (B. Koh 1997).  The
President's strong denial of acceptance of money propelled business circles to look for
strong men who could take care of their business problems in return for money.  The
revelation of the bribe indicated both how deep the corruption in politics was and how
widespread financial scandals in Kim's government were.  Despite severe electoral
damage from the disclosure to the governing party, other issues such as North Korean
military maneuvers or regionalism, decided the 1995 local elections.  Hundreds of armed
North Korean soldiers marched to the northern section of the truce village of Panmunjom
six days before the Assembly Election, showing the significance of national security (B.
Koh 1997).  In short, oppositional division, national security, regionalism, younger
generations of candidates, and the new faces in the leadership of the ruling party were the
main reasons for the victory of the 1996 Assembly election, despite corruption in the
government.  Electoral failure of the parties led by Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Jong-Pil, and Lee
Ki-Taek stressed unity for the future electoral strategy.
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Economically Korea has been in a difficult situation since the later half of 1996.
Korea could not meet most requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as import-
export liberalization, free-trade policies, and far-reaching international standards
(Clifford 1998).  As opposition criticized the government's joining the OECD after it
reached $10,000 GNP per person in 1995, it might have been premature for the Korean
economy to meet all requirements.  To make matters worse, Asian monetary problems
began at the same time.  President Kim's government ascribed Korean economic
difficulty to labor and attempted to regulate labor unions.
Finally, early in the morning of December 26, 1996, labor bills were passed
without any opposition lawmakers present (Economist Jan 18, 1997).  It was similar to a
military operation. All ruling party members were bussed into the Assembly at 5:56 in
the morning, from four downtown hotels, and passed the bills at 6:00 in the morning
without debating any of them.
The government was, however, under severe attack by the media, the public, and
the opposition for its reckless and undemocratic maneuvering.  Eventually, after
extensive talks with prominent public figures, including Stephen Cardinal Kim Soo-
Hwan, the President had the Assembly nullify the original labor law and passed more
moderate labor laws in March 1997 (Schuman and I. Kim 1997).   For example,
management would no longer have to pay striking workers.  However, even with passage
of the revised law, the country's economy had been on the downward slope.  The Hanbo
Steel Industry, the country' second largest steel maker, went into bankruptcy in January
of 1997 (Clifford 1998).  Hanbo's bankruptcy signaled both economic turmoil for Korea
41
and political difficulty for the ruling party.  Chung Tae-Soo, the Hanbo President, was
soon prosecuted for bribing higher government officials, party leaders, President Kim's
close confidants, and his second son, Kim Hyun-Chol.  Little Kim, as was known, was
summoned by the prosecutors, questioned at the National Assembly hearings, and later
jailed.  This kind of ordeal for a presidential family was unthinkable under the former
governments.  Kim Hun-Chol's imprisonment may ironically indicate the degree of the
incumbent government's democratic maturity, media freedom, and the independence of
the court system.  Despite these long-term positive connotations, the incident surely
indicated Kim government's continuation of corruption, and the failure of his reform
movement.  Kim's approval ratings of 90 percent at the beginning of his tenure
plummeted to a record low of 13 percent in the last year of his tenure at that time
(Economist Feb 15, 1997).  Kim was a lame duck, and the opposition parties led the
politics until the December presidential election.
As both the economy and Kim's popularity continued to fall, competition to be
nominated in the primary election of the ruling NKP was fierce among seven hopefuls,
known as "seven dragons."  Final counting of the delegate voters showed Lee Hoi-Chang
received more votes but failed to achieve a majority.  In a run-off ballot Lee received
about 60 percent and Rhee 40 percent.  Lee was announced as the NKP's presidential
candidate for the 1997 election on July 22, 1997 (Holley 1997).  At that time, Lee was
widely believed to be the next president, and some even called his wife first lady since
no governing candidate had ever been defeated in past presidential elections.  This
euphoria, however, disappeared when the opposition NCNP disclosed that Lee's two sons
had evaded compulsory military service.  Most men and their parents were angry at the
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news of the evasion by the seemingly healthy young men.  Lee's popularity plummeted.
One survey showed Lee ranked third among four potential candidates (New York Times
Sept 7, 1997).  With his popularity increasing, Rhee who could not run in the next
election if he stayed in the party left the NKP and created his own party, New Party of the
People (NPP), and announced that he would run for the presidency on September 14,
only three months before the election (Economist Nov 8, 1997).  The Economist also
reported that his popularity was 27 percentonly 7 percent lower than that of Kim Dae-
Jung and 11 percent higher than that of Lee late October.  At 49, Rhee was the youngest
candidate and sought support from younger voters.
However, Rhee In-Je could not avoid the harsh criticism for breaking rules (Y.
Kim 1998).  He pledged, with other candidates at the governing party primary election,
that he would accept the outcome, but instead he defected from the party and became a
candidate by creating his own party.  His opponents argued that democracy is based on
trust of each other and therefore whatever he asserted about future promises for Korean
democracy should be suspected.  His higher popularity declined as the election date came
near.
Alliance of Two Kims and the First Inter-party Transfer of Power
Kim Dae-Jung, candidate of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) and
Kim Jong-Pil of the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), both realized that this election
would be their last and that neither could easily win the election by himself.  Despite
unprecedented unpopularity of President Kim and his party, many voters also did not like
the two old Kims, who also had played a part in demagoguery, Machiavellism, and
corruption.  The only chance to increase their electability was an alliance (D. Shin 1999).
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Their simple calculation for winning the election was that Korean politics had been
subjected to severe regionalism.  One single candidate should be supported by the parties
representing the two main regions.  A similar strategy was proved by the election of Kim
Young-Sam in the 1992 presidential election.  Since Kim Dae-Jungs party had 79
legislative seats and Kim Jong-Pils 49, and because the popularity of Kim Dae-Jung was
higher in most national surveys, Kim Dae-Jung became the candidate.  Kim Jong-Pil,
instead, was guaranteed to become prime minister after changing the Constitution from a
presidential system to parliamentary one around the mid-point of the new government.
Kim Jong-Pil was a wholeheartedly pro-cabinet-system.  His assertion was based on the
fact that the underdeveloped Korean politics was partially due to too much power of
presidents, and that all had ended unhappily.  The first President Rhee was evicted from
the office by student uprisings in 1959.  President Park was killed by his close confidant.
Presidents Chun and Roh were in jail due to their actions of the Kwangju Uprising and
the use of slush funds.  Despite their winning strategy, however, the two Kims single
candidacy drew severe criticism.  The criticism was similar to the criticism Kim Young-
Sam received before the 1992 presidential election.  Among the most important was the
fact that Kim Jong-Pil was the founder of the Korean CIA that later had kidnapped Kim
Dae-Jung in August 1973 and attempted to kill him in the sea (Clifford 1998).  His
opponents, Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je, accused Kim Dae-Jung of an unprincipled
alliance.
There were many issues and events during the campaign, such as a disclosure of
the hardly provable but widely believed political habit of slush funds by Kim Dae-Jung
and the disclosure by the Agency for National Security Planning, the successor to the
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KCIA, that Kim Dae-Jung received political funds from North Korea.  These stories
became sensational during the campaign but did not damage Kim's popularity.  Many
voters were rather sick of these kinds of old tricks and the same menus.  Instead, Kim
Dae-Jung's popularity was consolidated through several debates on television.  Television
debates by candidates were introduced for the first time in Korea in 1997 in order to
replace massive street rallies that were very expensive and uncontrollable (J. Shim 1997).
Unlike other candidates, Kim Dae-Jung showed to the nationwide voters his deep
knowledge of economy, precise solutions to the current economic crisis, eloquence, and
good responses to the questions.  His eloquent manner on television significantly diluted
his decades-old image as a leftist or hardliner, both to the conservative voters and the
undecided voters.  Televised debates, together with television commercials and speeches
by nationally famous figures, proved his party's catchwords, "ready president," that had
originally been created to camouflage Kim Dae-Jung's fourth run for president.  In the
election, Kim Dae-Jung obtained 40.3 percent, only 1.6 percent more than Lee, while
Rhee received 19.2 percent (T. Park 1998).  Kim Dae-Jungs margin of victory is the
smallest winning margin ever.  Kims victory, the first peaceful transfer of power
between parties in Koreas modern history, is compared to that of Nelson Mandela of
South Africa and Lech Walesa of Poland.  D. Shin contends that Kims win stands for
beginning of overcoming consistent regionalism in Korea because Kim Dae-Jung came
from a regionally discriminated areathe Southwest.  Whether it was a split vote of the
Southeastern area between Lee and Rhee or lack of a native Southeastern candidate that
reduced regionalism in the 1997 election, it is hoped that lateral transfer of power will
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reduce decades-old conflicts between the two regions, and the country will be more
harmonized in the future.
This study assesses candidate choice, turnout, and interest in elections in the 1992
and 1997 presidential elections.  The study attempts to further the understanding of
Korean presidential electoral behavior.
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CHAPTER 2
CANDIDATE CHOICE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Introduction
This chapter analyzes Koreans electoral behavior in an effort to explain why the
electorate chose certain candidates in the past two presidential elections and what factors
were involved in the transfer of power in 1997.  As shown in Table 1 on p. 189, the
dependent variable expressed in this chapter is preference for the three major candidates
in the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections.  There were six candidates in the
1992 election, and Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Chung Joo-Young obtained
82.2 percent of the total votes.  There were six candidates in the 1997 election, and Lee
Hoi-Chang, Kim Dae-Jung, and Rhee In-Je obtained 95.4 percent of the votes.  Thus, the
dependent variable, candidate choice, has three categories: Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-
Jung, and Chung in the 1992 model, and Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in the 1997
model.  By employing multinomial logit models and Monte Carlo simulations, this
chapter examines what constrained the choice of candidates in the two presidential
elections.
Literature Review
Political Orientation: Governing and Opposition
Campbell et al.s (1960) seminal book, The American Voter, analyzed the 1952
and 1956 American presidential elections and found the electorates party identification
to be the most significant variable in explaining ones voting behavior.  Although public
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attachment to parties has declined since the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Meier
1975; Miller and Shanks 1996; Nie et al. 1976; Teiseira 1992), it remains an important
variable in American and other countries elections (Campbell et al. 1966; Clarke,
Stewart and Whiteley 1997; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1984; Miller and Shanks
1996; Stewart and Clarke 1998).
Despite the importance of political identification in the United States and other
nations, it is not a meaningful factor in explaining Korean elections (J. Cho 1993b; K.
Kang 1998; H. Kim 1993a; C. Park 1993; K. Park 1994; Lee and Glasure 1995).  Studies
of Korean parties assert that they are formed and disbanded so often that political
identification is not formed among Korean voters.  While comparing Taiwanese and
Korean political parties, Huang (1997, 153) maintained that the discontinuity of political
parties contributed to the weakness of political parties and the party system in Korea.
No party could survive long enough because party leaders have often been purged after
uprisings, coups, or demonstrations.  As C. Park and K. Cho (1994) indicate, while ones
political party identification in Western literature refers to the loyalty to a specific party,
the Korean electorate has shown coherent support for either the governing party or one or
two of the major opposition parties, regardless of the number of different parties.  A
voters leaning toward the governing or opposition parties in Korean politics is the
closest similarity to party identification in Western politics.  For instance, K. Cho (1996,
1998) studied the 1992 Korean presidential election and the 1992 general elections and
reported that the governing/opposition orientation was statistically significant in the
presidential election and in the general election.   She concludes that those who have
governing-party orientation tend to vote for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, while
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those who have opposition-party orientation tend to vote for major opposition parties.
Thus, one may hypothesize that the governing/opposition party orientation of the Korean
voters should significantly affect the votes of the two Korean presidential elections.
Merger
Issues have been major indicators in explaining electoral behaviors and attitudes
in the Western voting literature (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Clarke and Stewart 1984,
1995, 1998; Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 1997; Clarke et al. 1992; Converse et al.
1969; Crewe 1985, 1992; Key 1966; Lewis-Beck 1991; Miller et al. 1990; Page and
Brody 1972; Yeric and Todd 1996).  Unemployment, inflation, defense, and other social
issues have been among some of the issues studied.  The rise of issue orientation has been
related to the downfall of parties.  As new issues gained public attention in the United
States in the 1960s, political parties did not always respond with answers for the
electorate (Miller and Levitin 1976; Nie et al. 1976).  For instance, race differed from the
other social problems and it could not be neatly divided along the existing party lines.
The Democratic Party enjoyed support both from Whites and African Americans and,
therefore, was in a position where the party could not easily represent the demands of
either group.  The Republican Party, whose tradition included Lincoln and until the 1930s
had enjoyed electoral support from African American voters, sought to increase its appeal
to this segment of society.
While issues have been major indicators in American literature for several
decades, they are a recent phenomenon in Korea.  Before the 1987 election, authoritative
regimes proposed, developed, and executed policies without any responsibility to the
public (J. Cho 1993b; T. Kim 1995).  Therefore, issues were not major factors in Korean
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electoral behavior.  However, after the 1987 election, issues such as the economy,
democratization, and corruption became significant factors in Korean voting behavior.
One newspaper survey in 1992 found that the political environment had changed
regarding these issues.  According to the survey, the public expressed its opinions about
reducing exports (32.5%), high consumer prices (25.6%) and the lack of confidence in
politics (21.6%) (Y. Jung 1993).  Jung Yong-Tae (1993) concluded that the economy,
consumer prices, political stability, and corruption were the main reasons that voters
voted as they did in the 1992 presidential election.  K. Park (1993), however, asserts that
economic variables were not significant in his electoral choice model, while Kim Young-
Sam personal evaluation, regionalism, party orientation and age were significant.
According to K. Park, the major reason that economic issue variables did not matter on
party choice is that Korean economic policies were generally initiated and executed by
government branches, not by politicians.  Influences of ruling parties on economic
performance were weak.  H. Lee (1998) also claims that due to the strong effects of
regionalism on electoral choice, economic variables were not important factors.
The most important factor in the 1992 Korean presidential election was the role of
Kim Young-Sam, a leading opposition hopeful.  Kim Young-Sam merged his party, the
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), with the ruling Democratic Justice Party (Kim
Dae-Jung) and Kim Jong-Pils small New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) in 1990.
Kim Young-Sam, who is usually referred to as YS, endured years of house arrest for his
opposition to the military regimes and once staged a 23-day hunger strike to obtain more
liberty in Korea.  His thirty-years of political life stood for activism against authoritative
governments (J. Lee 1995; Pae 1992).  Nonetheless, after his defeat in the 1987
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presidential election, Kim Young-Sam began to think that although the government had
been somewhat democratized, his chance to win in the next election was slim.  The
government remained in strong control of political, social, and economic systems.  Based
on an old Korean saying that if you want to catch a tiger, you have to enter the tigers
den, Kim Young-Sam joined President Roh Tae-Woo in 1990 (Sanger 1992).  Kim
Young-Sam thought that he needed electoral support from the other regions to win the
presidency in the 1992 election (Clifford 1998).  Although he was the leader of the
southernmost Southeast region (Youngnam), his support was limited in the north of the
Southeast because the current president, Roh, came from this area.  Since the Korean
political system does not allow an incumbent president to seek a second term, Roh
wanted someone from his own area elected.  Kim Young-Sam, contending that he was
the only candidate to equally represent both the southern and northern Southeast,
received Rohs aid and support to merge their parties.  Besides the Southeast area, Kim
Young-Sam needed help from a leader in another area to secure his win.  He chose the
Central region.   Kim Jong-Pil, known as JP, was the leader of this area.  Kim Jong-Pil
eventually accepted Kim Young-Sams initiative because of the knowledge that he could
not become president by himself.  It was better for him to accept the second post in a new
Kim Young-Sam administration, thereby positioning himself for the governing party
candidacy in the 1997 election.
Above all, Kim Young-Sam justification for the merger was that South Korea
had suffered severe regional animosity among the three largest areas: the Southwest, the
Southeast, and the Central area.  During non-election times, serious regional animosities
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are minimal.  However, during the elections each region wants its leader to be elected so
intensely that other candidates personality, issues, and parties are diminished.
With the current president and Kim Jong-Pils support, Kim Young-Sam believed
he could easily win against Kim Dae-Jung, the only remaining major candidate in the
1992 election.  Kim Dae-Jung, known as DJ, was surrounded by the tripartite merger.
The merged camp saw many positive developments.  Kim Young-Sams grand plan to
become the next president almost guaranteed his victory in the 1992 election.  After
completing the merger in 1990, President Rohs Democratic Justice Party that had been a
minority in the National Assembly became the largest party.  The coalition, the
Democratic Liberty Party (DLP), controlled 220 seats in the 298-member single-chamber
house (Clifford 1998).  Kim Jong-Pil, whose party was the smallest before the merger,
hoped to become the official presidential candidate in the 1997 election.
Their joining, however, was considered to be like mixing oil and water by some
commentators.  Kim Young-Sam had fought against conservative, authoritative, and
military governments all his life.  The other, President Roh, was a four-star general and a
classmate of former president Chun Doo-Hwan.  Both Roh and Chun were known to be
responsible for the 1980 Southwest massacre.  The union was further complicated by the
inclusion of Kim Jong-Pil, the founder of the Korean CIA who carried out the military
coup in 1961 with the former president Park Chung-Hee.
Moreover, there were many voters who did not like Kim Young-Sams abrupt
change from a thorny but purely democratic activist to a comfortable, pragmatic
politician.  This change was because the governing camp was still militaristic and
perceived as the enemy of democracy.  The publics distaste for the merger resulted in the
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defeat of the merged DLP in a by-election held a few months after the merger.  The
coalition was defeated in Kim Jong-Pils home region (J. Shim 1990a).  Opposition to the
coalition was strong throughout the country.  Kim Dae-Jung and others opposing the
merged coalition called the merger a hedge marriage and organized rallies; one was
attended by approximately 300,000 people (J. Shim 1990b).  The opposition to the
merger resulted in violence and unrest.  The coalition lost the general election two years
later, which caused a severe loss of seats in the National Assembly (Clifford 1998).
Therefore, the merger of the three parties was regarded as a significant factor in the 1992
election.
This issue of a merger repeated itself in the 1997 presidential election (T. Park
1998; D. Shin 1999).  This time, Kim Dae-Jung, who was the accuser in 1990 and who
had suffered from the merger, initiated coalition.  He made a deal with Kim Jong-Pil.
The merger was not identical in composition to the 1990 merger, but it did result in one
united candidate from two different parties.  After Kim Young-Sam was elected in the
1992 election, Kim Jong-Pil became the chairman of the merged DLP as scheduled.
However in 1995, when several big accidents occurred, such as a gas explosion, the
collapse of the Sungsu Bridge, and the Sampoong Department Store, President Kim
Young-Sams popularity dropped from 90 percent to 30 percent (S. Yoon 1995).  The
ruling DLP was then involved in a fierce controversy of how to restore the Presidents
and the partys popularity and stabilize the political situation.  Kim Jong-Pil was the DLP
chairman, but his job was largely symbolic.  He was in the minority and too conservative
compared to the majority of the DLP members.  In the spring of 1995, the DLP attempted
to resolve political unrest at the sacrifice of Kim Jong-Pils resignation as chairman and
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his defection (B. Ahn 1997; S. Yoon 1995).  Kim Jong-Pil then organized the United
Liberal Democrats (ULD), based on the Central region of the country, the Chungcheong
Province.  Kim Jong-Pil once again became the party leader in that area.
At this politically turbulent moment, Kim Dae-Jung realized that his chance of
becoming president in the 1997 election would be his last.  He was 76 years old and it
was his fourth attempt at the presidency.  Therefore, he struck a deal with Kim Jong-Pil
about 50 days before the election that Kim Dae-Jung would be the candidate representing
both parties.  The arrangement also included that, once elected, together they would
change the political system from a presidential to a cabinet system during Kim Dae-
Jungs early years in office (J. Kim 1997).  This arrangement would mean that, around
the year 2000, Kim Jong-Pil might become the first Prime Minister in the new
parliamentary system.
Kim Dae-Jung believed that the deal would provide him with enough votes to win
the election because of his electoral strength in his own area, the Southwest, combined
with Kim Jong-Pils regional support, according to J. Kim.  Kim Dae-Jung's grand plan,
known as DJP united candidacy, to become a next president seemed more feasible due to
division of Kim Dae-Jungs main rival region, the Southeast area.  The voters from the
Southeast area split their votes between Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je.  Neither Lee nor
Rhee was born or lived in the Southeast, but they were associated with President Kim
Young-Sam and, therefore, considered acceptable candidates to voters of the region.
This was the first time in Koreas electoral history that the Southeast did not produce a
presidential candidate directly from its region.  This change was due, in part, to the
Constitution that limits incumbent presidents to one five-year term so that President Kim
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could not run again.  A second factor contributing to the change was that the ruling party
split its votes in the primary election.
Despite the Kim Dae-Jungs strategy, many of his followers did not like the idea,
as Kim Young-Sams plan had been criticized seven years before.  The criticism was
similar to the criticism Kim Young-Sam received.  Among the most important criticism
was the fact that Kim Jong-Pil was the founder of the Korean CIA and a chief adviser of
the past Park Chung-Hee administration that had kidnapped Kim Dae-Jung in August
1973 and attempted to kill him in the sea (Clifford 1998).  Kim Dae-Jung was twice
accused of a shotgun wedding by his competitors, Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je.
Voters were suspicious because Kim Dae-Jung led the opposition to the merged party in
1990, similar to his 1997 united candidacy.  Accordingly, in both the 1992 and the 1997
elections, the issues of a merger and united candidacy were important.  Therefore, one
may hypothesize that the issues of a merger and united candidacy were very important to
the voters choice in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.
Interest in the Election
Participation in elections can be either active or passive.  Active interest in the
political process focuses on citizens activities that attempt to influence the structure of
government, selection of government authorities, or politics (Conway 1991; Parry et al.
1992).  These activities may either support or oppose existing policies, authorities, or
structures.  Passive participation includes attending ceremonial or supportive activities or
paying attention to what is happening in polities but does not include overt action to
remedy the situation (Conway 1991; Dye 1994).
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Political interest has been shown to be cyclical among U.S. voters (Cappella and
Jamieson 1997; Weaver et al. 1981).  Weaver et al. indicate that fewer than half of the
panel respondents showed a high interest in presidential politics prior to the primary
season.  Their political interest continued to build during the primary season, and by July
of election year, more than half of the voters expressed high interest in the presidential
campaign (1981).
In addition, Jon Dalager (1996) asserts that political interest is a major factor
affecting the voters ability to correctly identify the issues.  Using data from Senate
campaigns, he found that, among more informed voters, political interest was positively
related to correctly identifying the issues.  Among the uninformed voters, the impact of
the political interest was negatively related to identifying important issues.  He concluded
therefore that voters accept or interpret political event differently depending on their level
of interest in politics.  Many authors have examined interest in elections (Brody 1978;
Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Miller and Shanks 1996).  For instance, The Peoples Choice
(1944) examined the 1940 American presidential election with panel data from 6,000
voters who resided in Erie County, Ohio.  Lazarsfeld et al. asserted that people with
higher levels of interest in the elections had more opinions on issues, were involved more
in the election, participated more in election events, and exposed themselves more to the
political communications.  Lazarsfeld et al. also maintained that many non-voters stayed
away from the polls deliberately because they were thoroughly unconcerned with the
election.   Non-voters, according to their study, were 18 times as likely not to vote
because of their less interest as voters who were highly interested in election.  In this
chapter, the role of political interest in the elections of 1992 and 1997 and its affect on the
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vote were examined.  Testing the effects of electoral interest on the voter choice is
exploratory, and there is no theoretical or specific reason to believe that these patterns
should not be applied to choice of candidates in the presidential elections of Korea.1
Prior Vote
In countries where party affiliation has a significant effect on voting, voters select
candidates based largely on their party label in succeeding elections (Campbell et al.
1960; Denver and Hands 1997; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1984).  When Denver
and Hands analyzed the impact of constituency campaigning on challengers and
incumbents in the 1992 British general election, they found a strong influence of how the
electorate voted in 1987 on its vote in 1992.  For example, the 1987 vote for the
Conservative Party was strongly associated with a vote for the Conservative Party in
1992.  The association between the Labor Party vote in 1987 and 1992 was nearly
identical.  This means that in Britain, most voters who voted for one party in prior
elections voted for the same party five years later.
In western countries, where parties are formed along ideology lines, (Epstein
1986; Reiter 1987) forming, disbanding, or merging/uniting of parties can hardly depend
on the leaders and a few of their aides.  In a country with newly emerging democratic
norms and where parties have yet to be deeply rooted in the political system, however,
identification with a single party is weak.  Weakened parties in Korea boosted the status
of a handful of leaders (T. Huang 1997).  Instead the electorate identifies with the
candidates or their successors.  Currently in Korean politics, the selection of a leader is
tied to personality and the perceived benefits the person can provide for those who
                                                          
1 Unlike other independent variables, interest in elections is tested by a two-tailed t-test.
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support him (Jacobs 1985).  The fact that the party leaders merged parties or made a
united candidacy is a strong indicator of the personalization of political parties.  Thus,
those who voted for a candidate in an earlier election should vote for him or his protégée
in a next election.  As shown in Table 1, three major candidates in the 1987 and 1992
elections obtained the most votes.  Three candidatesRoh, Kim Young-Sam and Kim
Dae-Jungin the 1987 election are used as dummy variables in the 1992 model.  Three
other major candidatesKim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Chungin the 1992
election are used as dummy variables in the 1997 model.
The histories of all candidates except Roh Tae-Woo have been discussed earlier.
Roh first appeared in politics after the 1979 coup with his Military Academy classmate,
Chun Doo-Hwan following the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in December
of 1979.  At the end of Chuns administration, Roh was the chairman of the governing
Democratic Justice Party and already appointed the presidential successor.  His
popularity suddenly increased when he stunned the nation on June 29, 1987 by
succumbing to the publics fierce and long-standing democratic movements and
accepting the citizens' demands.  He announced on the same day that the ruling DJP
would accept almost all the publics and the oppositions demands to achieve a new
constitution: direct election of the presidency, democratization and other political and
economic reforms (S. Pae 1992).2   He later became a ruling party presidential candidate
and finally was elected president in the 1987 presidential election when the major
                                                          
2 Rohs initiating of the announcement was discovered later to have been strongly backed by President
Chun (S. Pae).  He declared that he would ask for approval of his proposals from the President, and if
declined, he would resign all his posts since the President and Roh just wanted to make Rohs declaration
more dramatic and pave the way to win in the coming election.
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opposition candidates, Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pil, divided their
electoral base.
Neither rules nor parties have dominated Korean politics as much as personal
influences.  Hence, one expects that voters who supported a candidate in one election will
vote for him or his protégée in next election.  Dummy variables are employed for the
three main candidates in each election to determine voters relationship between their
votes for former candidates and the effects of the votes in the next election.
While determining impacts of prior voters for particular leaders on the
consecutive presidential elections particular attention is paid to comparing how much
their older supporters of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung are different on the choice
of them in later elections.  Since both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung ran in the
1992 and 1997 elections, their previous effects are compared in the 1992 and 1997
models respectively.  In Korean politics, it is widely believed that Kim Dae-Jung has
more loyal and cohesive supporters than Kim Young-Sam although both of them have
dominated Korean politics so long (K. Lee 1997).  Yet, Kim Young-Sam was elected in
1992 with a large margin of 8.1 percent over Kim Dae-Jung while Kim Dae-Jung was
barely elected in 1997 with a 1.6 percent margin over Lee, Kim Young-Sam protégée.
This study employs Monte Carlo simulation in an effort to determine who has more loyal
supporters between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung.
Regionalism
Since the early voting studies (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944), region
has been an important factor in explaining voting behavior.  Charles Pattie and Ron
Johnson (1995), in a study of Britains voting also argue that Britain has a strong regional
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factor in its voters choices.  Different parts of the country have different levels of
economic development, and, accordingly, the state of the voters regional economy
affects party choice differently.  The authors argument is based on the observation that
voters are more affected by the state of their regional economy than by their personal or
national economies.  Regionalism is also found to be an important indicator in Canada
(Clarke and Kornberg 1993, 1994; Le Duch 1984; Gidengil 1989, Kornberg and Clarke
1994) and in France (Lewis-Beck 1984).
Korea is a nation whose regional divisions are predominately drawn along
economic boundaries.  The Southeast region of the nation is more developed and contains
the bulk of the industrial facilities of the country.  The Southwest region of Korea is its
agricultural heartland.  In addition to the economic division of the nation, there are also
important historical differences.  Most of Koreas ruling elite, including presidents, has
come from the Southeast region.  The Southwest region has produced neither national
kings nor presidents.  The influence of regionalism has been documented in many studies
(B. Ahn, I. Kim and J. Seo 1995; K. Cho 1996, 1998; Kim and Yoo 1996; C. Park 1992).
For instance, K. Cho confirms the significance of regionalism to voters choice in the
1992 presidential election.  Voters from the Southeast and Southwest regions of the
country voted for candidates from their regions or the candidates protegees.  Thus,
regionalism in terms of the Southeast and the Southwest should significantly affect the
1992 and 1997 Korean elections.  Dummy variables for the Southwest and Southeast
areas are used in the model.
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Age
Initial studies of voting in the United States stressed sociological variables in their
analysis (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948).  Among the variables found to
have an impact on party support and voting was age.  Age has continued to be an
important variable in the study of Western democracies (Andersen 1979; Bone and
Ranney 1976; Butler and Stokes 1974; Converse 1976; Franklin et al. 1992; Glenn and
Hefner 1972; Johnston 1993).  Following these studies, Kim and Yoo (1996) found age to
be a significant variable in their study of 1992 Korean general and local elections.  Park
and Kim (1996) also found that older voters tended to vote for conservative parties such
as the governing DLP, and the conservative opposition party, ULD, in the 1992 general
election.  This tendency may be because they like to perpetuate their own idealized past
and because they have more to conserve (Lazarsfeld 1944, 23).  In contrast, younger
voters were more likely to vote for a progressive party such as the Democratic Party.
Lazarsfeld et al. (24) offer a similar reason for this pattern: younger voters are more
liberal, more receptive to change.   Due to severe regional cleavage and leaders impacts
on Korean politics, influences of other sociological factors are weak on electoral choice
in Korea (S. Bae 1995; N. Lee 1993; S. Shin 1999).  Age appears to affect the Korean
voter in much the same manner as it does in Western countries.  Based on these studies,
one expects age to have a significant affect on the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. 
Methods
Many social science studies recently adopted random utility models of discrete
choice.  That is, an individual selects the alternative with the greatest utility.  According
to Sheffi, Hall and Daganzo (1982), the utility of an alternative is composed of two
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factors: a deterministic component and a random component.  The former deals with the
effect of the average preferences of the population and the observable characteristics of
the alternative and the individual.  The latter, however, explains the effects of deviation
of the individuals preferences from those of the population average and the influences of
unobserved characteristics of the individual and the alternatives.  Finally, the random
utility model forecasts the probability that an individual will choose a particular
alternative that is greater than the utilities of all other alternatives as a function of the
observable characteristics of the individual and the available alternatives.
The multinomial logit (MNL) model assumes that the random components of
utilities are independently and identically distributed (IID) (Horowitz 1980; McFadden
1974).  Due to the computational ease and widespread adoption of commercial software,
MNL has been popular in social sciences, including political science (Powers and Cox
1997).  Nevertheless, it is not always easy to satisfy MNLs major assumption that
respondents with same observable characteristics have exactly the same preferences and
that any effects of unobservable characteristics of respondents or alternatives are not
correlated across respondents and alternatives.  This assumption is widely known as the
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) property (Greene 1997; Hausman and
Kennedy 1998; Horowitz; Long 1997; McFadden 1984; Shiffi, Hall and Daganzo 1982).
Horowitz succinctly expressed MNL as below.
Uij = Xijθ + Xijδ1 + εij   (1)
Where Xij: a J-dimensional vector of observable characteristics of individual i and
                 alternative j
θ : a vector of constant parameters
δ1: a random vector showing the differences between preferences of individual i
     and the average preferences of other respondents with the same observable
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     characteristics
 εij: a random disturbance
In MNL, the components of δ1 are all zero, and the addictive disturbances εij are assumed
to be independently and identically distributed with the cumulative distribution function
F(e) = exp[-exp(-e)].
According to McFadden (1974), the probability that any individual i chooses alternative j
is
                          M
Pij = exp(Xijθ)/  Σ   exp(Xikθ).
                          k=1
After McFadden (1989) has resolved the computational problem, the multinomial probit
(MNP) model began to be popularly employed in social sciences (Alvarez and Nagler
1995; Chintagunta 1992; Ho 1996; Horowitz 1980; Kamakura 1989).  Instead of
satisfying the rigid assumption of MNL, MNP assumes that utilities are multivariate,
normally distributed, and permit preferences of respondents to vary among respondents
with same observable characteristics.  Unlike MNL, MNP permits effects of unobserved
variables to be correlated across choices.  In formula (1), MNP assumes that the
components of δ1 for any individual i are assumed to have been drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and a J*J covariance matrix Σ.
The addictive disturbances (j = 1, , M) for any individual i are assumed to have been
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero means and an M*M covariance
alternative j:
Pij  Pr[Uij > Uik for all k ≠ j].
The ideal method to test a candidate choice hypothesis may be an MNP.  Yet, the bulk of
literature that incorporates different nominal categories in the dependent variable uses
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MNL (Campbell 1997; Cho 1997; Hoffman and Duncan 1988; Kanaroglou and Ferguson
1998; Nownes 1992; Powers and Cox; Sigelman, Wahlbeck and Buell 1997; Whitten and
Palmer 1996).  For instance, Whitten and Palmer (235)--while comparing binomial logit,
nested multinomial logit and multinomial logit models of electoral behavior in Dutch and
British politics--mentioned that given the computational difficulties of estimating MNP
models, we recommend the use of MNL models.  Whitten and Palmer moreover assert
that estimation of MNP models does not always enhance empirical analyses whose
dependent outcome has even three or four alternatives.  Another well-known example of
recommending MNL on electoral studies is a recent paper presented at the American
Political Science Review by Powers and Cox (1997).  By employing MNL they analyzed
cross-sectional election data that were collected right after the Polish parliamentary
election in 1993.  They asserted that if a researcher is modeling influences of drop or
addition of a party to the alternatives, MNL is not a good method.  Yet, if a researcher is
more interested in examining party or candidate choice at one point in time,
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is not a serious problem, and
MNL can be applicable.   Since this study also analyzes different candidate choice in two
separate elections, MNL is used.
MNL is conceptually similar to binary logit because MNL simultaneously
estimates all possible comparisons among the outcome categories (Long 1997).  For
instance, the outcome y of the 1992 model has several nominal categories, Kim Young-
Sam (YS), Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) and Chung Joo-Young (Chung).  Each category has cases
NYS, NDJ and NChung.  To make a formula simpler, there is only one independent variable,
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x.  When one analyzes how x affects the odds of Kim Young-Sam v. Kim Dae-Jung, the
NYS + NDJ cases are needed.
3   The binary logit will be as follows:
Ln[Pr(YS|x) / Pr(DJ|x)] = a1 + β0, YS|DJ + β1, YS|DJx
Here, a1 is a constant, and the dependent variable is comparing the odds of Kim Young-
Sam v. Kim Dae-Jung, and the dependent is natural-logged.  One interprets the
coefficient β1 in such a way that the odds of Kim Young-Sam v. Kim Dae-Jung changes
by a factor of exp(β1, YS|DJ), as x is one-unit changed.  Similarly, the binary logit for
Kim Dae-Jung v. Chung with cases of NDJ + NChung and the logit for Chung v. Kim
Young-Sam with cases of NChung + NYS are as follows:
Ln[Pr(DJ|x) / Pr(Chung|x)] = a2 + β0, DJ|Chung + β1, DJ|Chungx
Ln[Pr(Chung|x) / Pr(YS|x)] = a3 + β0, Chung|YS + β1, Chung|YSx, and
Pr(YS) + Pr(DJ) + Pr(Chung) = 1,
where Pr(YS),  Pr(DJ) and  Pr(Chung) are the probabilities of voting Kim Young-Sam,
Kim Dae-Jung and Chung respectively.  Finally, the hypothesized relationships are
specified by the following model:
Candidate Choice = β0  + β1Orientation + β2Interest + β3Merger (1992 only)
                                 β4Single (1997 only) + β5exRoh (1992 only) +
                                             β6exYS + β7exDJ + β8exChung (1997 only) +
                                             β9SW + β10SE + β11Age + ε
where Orientation: orientation toward governing or opposition parties
           Interest: interest in the election
 Merger: evaluation of the 1992 three-party merger
 Single: evaluation of the 1997 single candidacy (alliance) between Kim Dae-Jung
                       and Kim Jong-Pil
 exRoh: those who voted for Roh Tae-Woo in the 1987 presidential election
           exKim Young-Sam: those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1987 and 1992
                                            presidential elections
           exKim Dae-Jung: those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 and 1992
                                                          
3 The odds indicate how often one category happens compared to how often that category does not happen.
The log of odds is referred to as logit.
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                                        presidential elections
           exChung: those who voted for Chung Joo-Young in the 1992 presidential election
 SW: those who live in the southwest (Honam) area
 SE: those who live in the southeast (Youngnam) area
           Age: age.4
Findings and Discussion
The 1992 Presidential Election
Table 2a shows the results of the MNL estimates of the 1992 presidential
election.5  Since the logit model is non-linear, interpretation of parameter estimates is not
straightforward.  Furthermore, interpretation of parameter estimates of the MNL is fairly
complex because the model has a comparison group or base category.  Yet the signs of
the coefficients and their magnitudes compared to one another suggest the direction and
the size of the effect on the joint probabilities (Robins and Dickinson 1985).  Moreover
this chapter uses many figures to visualize logit coefficients and help readers understand
major findings more easily.  Comparison of variables between the 1992 and 1997 models
and a more comprehensive evaluation of each variable will be shown later.
The second column (Kim Dae-Jung v. Kim Young-Sam) of Table 2a on p. 190
shows most coefficients of the independent variables affecting the categories of the
dependent variable (candidate choice) are very strong; in this case, the vote for Kim Dae-
Jung is compared to the vote for Kim Young-Sam.  The results support our expectation of
governing/opposition-party orientation.  As the political orientation of the 1992 voters
                                                          
4 See Appendix 1 for coding and variable descriptions.  Distribution of variables used in the model is
shown in Appendix 2a (1992 election) and Appendix 2b (1997 election).  Translation was carefully done
not to change the original meaning of the Korean questionnaire.
5 No multicollinearity problem has been found among the independent variables of the 1992 and 1997
models.  STATA automatically removes the collinear variables.  In addition, a model has multicollinearity
problem when the largest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is greater than 10, or the mean of all the VIFs is
considerably larger than one (Chatterjee and Price 1991).  Yet, no VIF of the variables is over 3, and their
mean is only 1.65.  Thus, there should not be multicollinearity problems in the model.
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changed from the governing party to the opposition party, opposition candidate Kim Dae-
Jung became more favorable.  Kim Dae-Jungs support from opposition-oriented voters
also means that the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-Sam, received more support from
the governing party-oriented voters.  Furthermore, voters with a stronger political interest
supported Kim Dae-Jung over Kim Young-Sam.  That is, those who were more interested
in the 1992 presidential election tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung, the first opposition
candidate.  Contrarily, voters who were less interested were more likely to choose Kim
Young-Sam.
The 1992 merger had a negative effect for Kim Dae-Jung.  As the voters
considered the merger a good decision, they were less likely to vote for Kim Dae-Jung.
This consideration is because the merger of the three parties was conducted by Kim
Young-Sam, and there were many voters who supported the merger.  Conversely, those
who considered the merger to be a bad decision tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung.
In addition, Kim Dae-Jung achieved more votes from voters who lived in his
home-region, the Southwestern area.  This indicator is highly significant and produced
the most positive impact for Kim Dae-Jung.  The voters living in the Southeast area,
however, penalized Kim Dae-Jung.  Kim Young-Sam drew most votes from the
Southeast area.  This result significantly confirms regional effects on the 1992 Korean
presidential election.  Regional effects on candidate choice are clearly shown in Figure 4
on p. 211.  Figure 4 shows how the five major regions voted for candidates and total
regional votes.  Unlike other regions, the Southwest and Southeast are more noticeable.
Kim Dae-Jung achieved insurmountable support from the Southwest while Kim Young-
Sam achieved almost similar support from the Southeast.  These histograms show how
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much the 1992 election was affected by the Southeast and Southwest regionalism.  Kim
Young-Sam had more support than Kim Dae-Jung in terms of total regions and may be a
good indicator of his win in 1992.
Returning to Table 2a, older voters, as expected, tended to vote for Kim Young-
Sam.  As is commonly found in Western electoral literature, older voters choose a
conservative candidate, thus Kim Young-Sam was the choice for the older voters and
Kim Dae-Jung, the progressive candidate, for the younger.
In terms of prior votes, voters maintained candidate loyalty from one election to
the next.6  Even when the candidate was not running, their support was transferred to his
protegee in the election.  For example, voters who supported Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987
election were highly likely to vote for him again in 1992.  The same is true of voters who
had supported Kim Young-Sam in the prior election, as shown in the second column.
Those who voted for Roh Tae-Woo in the 1987 election did not choose Kim Dae-Jung in
the 1992 election.  This is understandable because President Roh coalesced with Kim
Young-Sam and created one large party, the Democratic Liberal Party, to compete
against Kim Dae-Jung.  Many of those who had voted for Roh cast their votes for his
partner, Kim Young-Sam.  This confirms the loyalty of the Korean electorate to
candidates or their protegees.  Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam have been lifetime
political rivals.  It is important to examine more closely how their supporters in the earlier
election affect later election results.  Their comparison will be shown later through
simulation.
                                                          
6 To care of any possible time impacts of the including prior-votes indicators on the model, a model
excluding all prior-votes variables both in the 1992 and 1997 elections showed that all independent
variables and the model itself were statistically significant.
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Column three (Chung v. Kim Young-Sam) shows the support for Chung in the
1992 election, compared to Kim Young-Sam.  Only about half of the variables are
statistically significant, indicating that the combination of Chung v. Kim Young-Sam is
not as significant as that of Kim Dae-Jung v. Kim Young-Sam.  In fact in the election of
Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung was second and Chung third.  First, voters who favored
the opposition party favored Chung.  Although Chung was the owner of the largest
business group, Hyundae, in Korea, his election strategy was markedly different from
those of the governing party candidates.  He divulged the inner workings of Korean
politics: slush funds.  He mentioned that he had donated 5-10 billion Korean won in cash
between 1988 and 1990 to President Roh (Clifford 1992).  He also suggested he would
solve chronic housing problems as soon as he was elected.  For many lower-class voters,
it was astonishing but believable news because Chungs construction company was the
largest in the nation, and yet the housing problem was one of the most serious problems
in Korea.  As a result, Chung drew more support from opposition-minded voters.
Since Chung was not in the merged camp, the electorate who supported the idea
of a merger was less likely to vote for Chung.  Conversely, Kim Young-Sam received
support from the voters who were positive about the 1990 merger.  Furthermore, because
Chungs political hometown is not the Southeast area, he was significantly penalized by
the Southeast voters.  Kim Young-Sam, the leader of the Southeast, did not lose votes
from this area to Chung at all.  Thus, the third column also confirms the regional effects
on the election.  Moreover, older voters did not support Chung compared to Kim Young-
Sam.  As the older electorate chose conservative Kim Young-Sam over progressive Kim
Dae-Jung, they also voted for Kim Young-Sam over Chung.  Older voters, as Lazarsfeld
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et al. (1944) noted, had many valuable things to conserve.  They did not want to lose their
assets when born-again opposition candidate Chung was in power.
Voters who had voted previously for Roh, Kim Young-Sam, or Kim Dae-Jung in
1987 were supportive of Kim Young-Sam and negative toward Chung in 1992, although
these variables are not statistically significant at all.  Those who voted for Roh and Kim
Dae-Jung in 1987 did vote for Kim Young-Sam over Chung.
The final column (Chung v. Kim Dae-Jung) of Table 2a compares Chung and
Kim Dae-Jung, the two opposition candidates.  Most indicators show a negative
relationship for Chung when compared to Kim Dae-Jung.  Those opposition-oriented
voters tended to choose Kim Dae-Jung over Chung in 1992.  Although both Kim Dae-
Jung and Chung were opposition candidates, the Korean electorate regarded Kim Dae-
Jung more opposition-oriented.  This is easily convincing.  Kim Dae-Jung had been an
opposition activist all his life, while Chung had been in opposition for only about two
years before the presidential election.  Chungs justification for his involvement in
politics was to clean the corrupt political circle that had dominated the countrys
economics.  Despite his assertion, many voters still thought his personal business success
was due to his close relationship with politics.  Hence, Kim Dae-Jung won more support
from opposition-oriented voters.  Furthermore, the electorate who regarded the merger a
bad decision favored Kim Dae-Jung over Chung.  Although both were not in the merged
coalitions, voters knew that the merger initiated by Kim Young-Sam sought to win the
1992 election against Kim Dae-Jung.  In fact, Chung organized the UNP after the merger.
Chung could not be a rival of Kim Dae-Jung despite Chungs enormous wealth,
unyielding effort and political ambition.
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Those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1987 tended to vote for Chung over Kim
Dae-Jung in 1992.  Unlike the combination of Chung v. Kim Young-Sam, the earlier Kim
Young-Sam supporters easily decided to vote for Chung over Kim Dae-Jung.  Many
previous Kim Young-Sam supporters might have been attracted toward Chung rather
than Kim Dae-Jung because Kim Dae-Jung was too far away from both Kim Young-Sam
and Chung in terms of their conservative ideology.  Finally, those who voted for Kim
Dae-Jung in 1987 strongly supported Kim Dae-Jung again in 1992.  This also confirms
the hypothesis of voters close attachment to candidates in Korean elections.
In terms of regionalism, those who lived in the Southwest area strongly supported
their regional leader, Kim Dae-Jung.  The finding that Southeast residents voted for
neither Chung nor Kim Dae-Jung may also support the regional hypothesis.  Although
regional support may simplify Korean electoral processes, it may conceal other campaign
issues, characteristics of candidates, or party policies.
Finally, the variable of age in this column is not significant.  Insignificance of age
is unexpected considering the extreme ideological distance between the two candidates.
Although Chung had been moderately progressive after he became involved in politics,
Kim Dae-Jung was much more progressive and liberal in comparison.  Older voters
should have supported Chung over Kim Dae-Jung, but they did not.  Thus, the
conventional assumption that older voters generally vote for conservative candidates
while younger voters for progressive ones does not apply to Kim Dae-Jung and Chung.
Since interpreting the MNL model is complex, odds plots were created for the
MNL models.  Odds ratios are calculated by eb.  They are amounts by which the odds
favoring y = each category are multiplied, with each 1-unit increase in the right-hand
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variable, when controlling other independent variables (Long 1997).  Graphs were
created by using unstandardized coefficients.  Figure 5a on p. 212 shows electoral effects
of all dummy variables, and the Southeast, former votes for Roh, and Kim Young-Sam
are not very distinguishable in their distances.7  These figures run from left (low effects)
to right (high effects).  Yet, the Southwest and prior votes for Kim Dae-Jung clearly
distinguish candidates.  Those who were living in the Southwest and voted for Kim Dae-
Jung in the 1987 election represented his most significant support in 1992.  Kim Young-
Sam obtained more votes from the Southeast, those who voted for Roh and for him in
1987.  Figure 5b on p. 213 shows the rest of variables used in the model and clearly
shows influences of each variable on candidate choice.   For instance, since opposition-
party orientation is the opposite of ruling-party orientation, both effects are positioned
almost exactly in the opposite position of its row space.  Kim Dae-Jung achieved more
voters from the votes with opposition-party orientation while Kim Young-Sam from
voters with ruling-party orientation.  Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the earlier
election are noticeable in their support of Kim Dae-Jung.  Candidates are closer in other
variables, suggesting that their less heterogeneous effects on choice of candidates.
1997 Presidential Election
Table 2b on p. 191 indicates impacts of independent variables on the values of the
dependent variable (candidate choice) of 1997 model.  The second column (Lee v. Kim
Dae-Jung) compares Lee to Kim Dae-Jung in the 1997 Korean presidential election.
                                                          
7 This does not mean that the Southeast, former votes for Roh and Kim Young-Sam are not significant.
None of the candidates is overlapping in the figures, indicating significant effects of the explanatory
variables on the choice of candidates.
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Five indicators are statistically significant and negatively impact Lee as well, when
compared to Kim Dae-Jung.  As voters political orientation changed from the governing
party to the opposition party, they voted for Kim Dae-Jung.  As in the 1992 election,
opposition-oriented voters tended to vote for the long-time opposition activist, Kim Dae-
Jung, over the ruling party candidate, Lee, in 1997.  Conversely, the governing party-
oriented voters voted for Lee.
Those who agreed with the united candidacy voted for Kim Dae-Jung over Lee.
Kim Dae-Jung realized that the 1997 election would be his last chance to hold power and
to change the political power from the governing party to an opposition in about four
decades.  Kim Dae-Jung conducted a united candidacy with another presidential hopeful,
Kim Jong-Pil.  Like in the 1992 election for Kim Young-Sam, Kim Jong-Pils help was
necessary for Kim Dae-Jung to be elected.  Kim Dae-Jungs strategy of a united
candidacy was the best possible way to win the election, considering his past mistakes in
his electoral strategy.  He made a serious mistake in the 1987 election.  He thought that
he would have a better chance of being elected in an election where he competed with
three other major candidates: Roh, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Pil.  Kim Dae-Jung
and Kim Young-Sam had been in the same party for a long time, but Kim Dae-Jung
defected from the party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), less than two months
before the 1987 election.  Kim Dae-Jung created a new Peace and Democracy Party
(PDP) and ran in the 1987 election (S. Pae 1992).  Thus, the division of the opposition
candidatesKim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pilroughly divided all
the opposition-oriented votes.  Roh, the governing candidate, could easily win the
election.  Roh achieved 36.7 percent, Kim Young-Sam 28 percent and Kim Dae-Jung 27
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percent.  Despite the public pressure to unify the opposition candidacy, Kim Dae-Jung
refused to do so by arguing that if more candidates were competing with each other, he
would have a greater chance to be elected.  He asserted that his supporters were more
cohesive than others.  However, his successive failures in the 1987 and 1992 presidential
elections finally forced him to seek alliance with Kim Jong-Pil in 1997.  This strategy
turned out to be successful.  Nonetheless, there were many voters who did not like Kim
Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pils united candidacy.  The united candidacy between Kim
Dae-Jungs more progressive party and Kim Jong-Pils conservative party was not based
on any principle.  Kim Dae-Jung had long criticized Kim Jong-Pil because Kim Jong-Pil
was the co-organizer of the 1961 military coup and the founder of the KCIA.  Moreover,
the fact that Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil made a contract between themselves to
change the Korean political system from presidential to parliamentary angered many
voters.  A direct presidential system was the system Kim Dae-Jung himself advocated to
replace the authoritative government in the 1987 democratic revolution.  This was
supported by decades of student movements.  As a united candidate, he negated life-long
ideals of many of his causes.  Although Kim Dae-Jung was eventually elected in 1997,
many voters who disagreed with the united candidacy voted for Lee over Kim Dae-Jung.
In terms of interest in the election, Kim Dae-Jung achieved support from those
who had a higher interest in the election, as in the 1992 election.  Conversely, Lee's
support consisted of voters with less interest in the election.  It is not understood why the
governing party candidates in 1992 and 1997 received more support from voters with
lower interest in the elections while the major opposition candidate received more
support from interested voters.  It is probably because those who wanted a change of
74
government may have had a greater interest in the elections and therefore supported
opposition candidates.  Those who wanted the status quo may have had lower interest in
the elections and supported the ruling candidate.  Relationship between electoral interest
and choice of candidates is analogous to energy in physics.  When an object is to be
moved, it needs much more energy than when it stays in one place.  Similarly, voters who
were more electorally interestedwith more energypreferred opposition candidates.
This analogy is acceptable since the more well-known and popular opposition candidates
garnered more support from those with more interest in the election than less famous
opposition candidates.  Additionally, interest in the elections may help solve the puzzle of
the first transfer of political power.  The 1997 election marked the first change of
government in four decades in Korean politics.  The change of government may be due in
part to the low participation rate among those with a lower interest in the 1997 election.
Figure 6 on p. 214 shows the difference between voting rates and interest in the elections
in 1992 and 1997.  The voting rates of those who were extremely or moderately
interested in the elections were nearly identical in 1992 and 1997.  Yet, the voting rate of
those who were weakly interested in elections was 8.4 percent less in 1997 (81.5 percent
- 73.1 percent).  Moreover the voting rate of those who were not interested at all in the
elections was 27.5 percent less in 1997 (59.1 percent - 31.6 percent).  As Lazarsfeld et al.
argued, many non-voters might have deliberately stayed away from voting because they
were less interested in the election.  In fact, the official turnout rate of 1997 is 80.6
percent, 1.3 percent lower from the 1992 rate of 81.9 percent.  The 1.3 percent reduction
in the turnout rate might have been ascribed to those who were less interested in the
election.  As shown in Table 1, the small difference (1.6 percent) of supports between the
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winner, Kim Dae-Jung (40.3 percent), and Lee (38.7 percent) might have also been
caused by the reduced number of the voters who were less interested in the 1997 election.
Reduced participation in the election by those who were less interested in the 1997
should be a clue to the win of Kim Dae-Jung in the election because, as shown in Table
2b, these voters were more likely to vote for the ruling candidate, Lee.  This finding will
be examined in next chapter.  Then why did the number of lesser-interested voters
increase in the 1997 election compared to the 1992 election?  There seem to be several
explanations.  Voters were less interested in the 1997 election because some were cross-
pressured by the Korean political and economic situations.  First, the governing party that
used to have a single candidate produced two ruling candidates.  Although Rhee was an
opposition candidate, there was a rumor that President Kim also helped Rhee with
electoral funds, party and government organization, and electoral information.  In fact,
both Lee and Rhee attempted to obtain support from Kim Young-Sam political base, the
Southeast.  There were many Southeasterners who had a hard time choosing between
them.  Second, Korea had previously enjoyed an excellent economy was now
experiencing an economic crisis.  Those who were more affected by the severe economic
hardship may have lost interest in the 1997 election.  Finally, the opposition leader, Kim
Dae-Jung, who used to be admired for his unyielding movement against military regimes,
aligned himself with a conservative and authoritative politician, Kim Jong-Pil.  Party
coalitions occurred both before the 1992 and 1997 elections, but the timing of their
occurrence was very different.  The 1992 three-party merger was completed almost three
years before the 1992 election, but the 1997 single-candidacy took place only about 50
days before the 1997 election.  Most voters in the 1992 election were accustomed to the
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coalition, but many of the 1997 voters were still shocked by the new coalitions.  All these
new unconventional political and economic developments produced cross-pressures for
some voters, which may have led them not to vote.  As they stayed away from the polls,
the ruling party, an offspring of four decades of military regime, surrendered its political
power for the first time in modern Korean history.  More on the impacts of electoral
interest on turnout will be examined next chapter.
Among the voters who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 presidential
election, more voted for Lee than Kim Dae-Jung.  This support is most likely explained
by the fact that Lee had been the chairman of the governing party under Kim Young-
Sam.  It also illustrates the connection in Korean politics of voters to their candidates and
their proteges.  However, the reason the variable indicating votes for Kim Young-Sam in
the prior election is statistically less significant and smaller in effect is that voters who
had been supporters of Kim Young-Sam split their votes between Lee, the governing
candidate, and Rhee, a former member of the governing party and a pro-government
governor.  Both Lee and Rhee sometimes praised Kim Young-Sam for his military
reforms, business reforms and other successful policies, but sometimes attacked Kim
Young-Sam for his mistakes or policy failureseconomic breakdown, corruption of
government officials and his close aidesdepending on the reporters questions or the
occasion of Lees and Rhees speeches.  Lee, aiming not to be tarnished by Kim Young-
Sams failure in economy, changed the ruling partys name from the New Korea Party to
the Grand National Party (GNP) just before the 1997 election.  Unlike in 1992, the
governing party leader, Kim Young-Sam, did not clearly align himself with one
candidate.  This was partly because his close intervention in the election might have
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caused criticism from the opposition for possible unfairness in the election and partly
because he could rely on either Lee or Rhee to protect his post-presidency life, whoever
won.  Consequently, Lee gathered support, although weakly, from previous Kim Young-
Sam voters.
Those who supported Kim Dae-Jung in the prior election remained supportive in
1997, and his supporters were so cohesive and loyal.  In fact, Kim Dae-Jung was the only
candidate who ran in four presidential elections (1971, 1987, 1992, and 1997 elections)
and was also found to be a benefit.  Kim Dae-Jungs strong achievement of coherent
support confirms the candidate attachment hypothesis in Korean electoral behavior.
Moreover, almost all the Koreans who live in Kim Dae-Jungs political region, the
Southwest, supported his candidacy over Lee in 1997.
Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung have been the most popular political leaders
in Korean politics.  They still control Korean politics today.  Kim Dae-Jung is the current
President, and Kim Young-Sam is a former President.  What were the influences of their
former supporters on later elections?  Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine their
influences.  As Tables 2a and 2b show that Kim Dae-Jung voters impact was more
cohesive and stronger than those of Kim Young-Sam.  The Monte Carlo simulation
shows somewhat different impacts of both of their older followers.  The figures were
created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992 and 1997 multinomial logit
models.8
                                                          
8 By employing a program, Clarify, that was recently developed by several Harvard scholars (King, Tomz,
Wittenberg 1998; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 1999), these four figures use stochastic simulation
techniques.  According to these authors, many researchers present only the coefficients and t-values of
independent variables in the models.  Accordingly, they recommend that researchers report further
interesting estimates on top of simple parameter estimates and standard errors.  Simulation is one way of
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Ternary diagrams of Figures 7a on p. 215 and 7b on p. 216 show possible impacts
of previous Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung supporters in the 1992 election, while all
other variables are set at their mean.9  The simulated observation dots inside the
triangular diagrams demonstrate the stronger impact of former Kim Young-Sam
followers on Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and the weaker strong impact of former Kim Dae-
Jung supporters on Kim Dae-Jung in 1992.  Compared to Figure 7a, Figure 7b exhibits
that dots are elongated along the line of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, and they
are less condensed than those of former Kim Young-Sam supporters.  Coefficients of
multinomial logit models in Table 2a indicate stronger influences of former Kim Dae-
Jung supporters than those of former Kim Young-Sam supporters in the 1992 election.
Yet, simulation results reveal that Kim Young-Sam would have had more cohesive
supports from his older followers than Kim Dae-Jung in 1992.
In comparison to Figures 7a and 7b, Figures 8a on p. 217 and 8b on p. 218 look
very distinctive.  According to Figure 8a, dots are positioned almost in the middle of the
triangular diagram.  This means those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992
election would have been almost equally divided among Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee.
The older Kim Young-Sam loyalists were led astray in 1997.  Yet those who voted for
                                                                                                                                                                            
satisfying researchers curiosity, for example, about how much the probability of candidate choice changes
with a given independent variables.  King, Tomz and Wittenberg argue that running a 1,000 algorithm
indicates 1,000 times of re-running the election.  After estimating the model and then choosing one value
for previous Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung supporters, Clarify simulates the outcome of the
dependent variable 1,000 times.  The simulation reduces fundamental uncertainty stemming from estimates
obtained by using one dataset.  Simulated estimates can be presented in the regular tables, but ternary
diagrams can present the finding more vividly.
9 Ternary diagrams are called in many different names: triangular diagrams or triplots.  After they were
introduced in geology, they have been used to present voting patterns and are called electoral triangles
(Dorling, Johnston and Pattie 1996; Upton 1991, 1994).  Governing candidates have been placed on the
top, progressive candidate on the left and the other candidate on the right of the triangle.  In the ternary
diagrams, the point related to each candidate indicates the point where the candidate obtains all votes.  As
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Kim Dae-Jung in 1992 are united near the triangular point of Kim Dae-Jung, according to
Figure 8b.  Their response is similar to what Kim Young-Sam received from his
supporters in the 1992 election.  In summation, simulation results negate the traditional
assumption that Kim Dae-Jungs support is always cohesive.  His support was only
cohesive in 1997 when Kim Young-Sam older supporters were split.  Unlike
conventional arguments, Kim Young-Sam had a greater cohesive support from his older
supporters in 1992 than Kim Dae-Jung.  Both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jungs
loyalists were crucial for their wins in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.
Turning back to Table 2b, the Southeast and the Southwest provide significant
constraints on the choice of Lee and Kim Dae-Jung.  Lee received high supports from the
Southeast while Kim Dae-Jung received higher support from the Southwest.
The histograms shown in Figure 9 on p. 219 indicate the electoral support for the
1997 presidential candidates by region.  It shows that the electorate in the Southeast
supported Lee over Kim Dae-Jung.  This is significant for it indicates a weakening of
regionalism in Korean presidential elections.  Lee was supported in a region where he
was not born and had never lived.  Almost all the Southeasterners continued not to
support Kim Dae-Jung although there was a marginal increase of favor for him compared
to the 1992 election.  Figure 9 shows that Kim Dae-Jung obtained the majority of votes
from the Southwest.  Yet Lee had lower support from the Southeast.  Compared to the
1992 election, the Southeast in 1997 split its votes among the three candidates, although
Lee obtained the most.  His share was much smaller than Kim Dae-Jungs share in the
Southwest.  The total votes of the three candidates among all the regions indicate that
                                                                                                                                                                            
the more dots are condensed to a corner, the candidate related to the corner obtains more votes.  If the dots
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Kim Dae-Jung had slightly more votes than Lee and Rhee.  In a close election this small
marginal difference can often determine an election outcome.
While most explanatory factors are very significant on the choice between Lee
and Kim Dae-Jung, some variables in the second column, however, are not statistically
significant.  The prior vote for Chung is one of these.  Chungs support may be attributed
to the fact that Chung's supporters were not strongly committed to either Lee or Kim
Dae-Jung.  The age variable was also not significant, which is an unexpected finding
considering the ideological positions of the two candidates, where Kim Dae-Jung
represented the progressive camp and Lee the conservative camp.  One would expect
that, on this dimension, age would have been more important than the data indicate.  It
was expected that the older voters would tend to be more conservative and the younger
more progressive.  The voters, however, did not clearly choose between Lee and Kim
Dae-Jung along this dimension, despite their clear ideological differences.  This
indecision is probably because Kim Dae-Jung made many efforts to change his radical
image to a soft and moderate position during the campaign.  For example, he offered
many conservative politicians or professionals admittance into his party.  Kim Dae-Jung
ushered in Lee Jong-Chan and Eum Sam-Tag, who had been senior officers of the KCIA
for many years.  Kim Dae-Jung sought the support of former high-ranking police officers,
Lee In-Seop, Yoo Byung-Gug, and Kim Mal-Tae (S. Kim 1997).  He also accepted the
support of former three-star general, Cheon Yong-Tae, former chairman of Korean
Political Science Association, Kihl Seong-Heum, and many other generals and scholars
who in turn helped Kim Dae-Jung to appeal conservative or moderate voters.  The
                                                                                                                                                                            
are positioned in the middle of the triangle graph, the three candidates would divide votes almost equally.
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biggest ideology factor for Kim Dae-Jung was Kim Jong-Pil.  Kim Jong-Pil and his
partisans in the ULD were mostly pro-government politicians during the military regime.
In terms of conservative ideology, no one could match them.  The 1997 election was the
first of Kim Dae-Jungs four presidential bids, in which Kim Dae-Jung was not criticized
for being radical communist or leftist anymore.  Accordingly, Kim Dae-Jung obtained
votes not only from younger voters but from older voters as well.
The third column (Rhee v. Kim Dae-Jung) of Table 2b compares two opposition
candidates, Rhee with Kim Dae-Jung.  It reveals that Rhee received positive responses
from voters in terms of only a few variables: prior vote for Kim Young-Sam and Chung,
and the Southeast region.  As noted earlier, people who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the
1992 election separated their votes between Lee and Rhee in the 1997 election.  Rhee
received moderate support from the old Kim Young-Sam supporters, as did Lee as shown
in the second column (Lee v. Kim Dae-Jung).  This moderate support should be one of
the most important factors of change in decades.  The ruling party, for the first time,
produced two candidates.  Nonetheless, divided support of the Southeast for Lee and
Rhee does not indicate that Rhee was only cutting into Lees share of votes, by looking at
the prior vote for Chung in the 1992 election.  In fact, Chung in 1992 and Rhee in 1997
had several things in common.  First, their original ideologies were conservative, but by
transforming to opposition candidates they were campaigning against the conservative
ruling candidate.  Second, they were forced to modify their policies.  Finally, they had
common political experiences.  In 1997, Rhee benefited from Chungs former supporters.
The data indicate that Rhee was also more successful in Kim Young-Sam region
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of the Southeast than in that of Kim Dae-Jung.  As seen in the second column (Lee v.
Kim Dae-Jung) and simulation diagrams, Lee obtained considerable support from Kim
Young-Sams home-area, the Southeast area, and Rhee also achieved significant support
from this area.  This, in fact, is another indicator of the ruling camp dividing their support
and contributing to Kim Dae-Jungs victory in 1997.
There are also many negative impacts for Rhee.  First, those who were favorable
to the idea of a united candidacy between a conservative ULD and a progressive NCNP
tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung, who initiated the idea, instead of Rhee.  This resulted
in Rhee, who was not involved in the united camp, receiving more support from anti-
united-candidacy voters.  Second, as voters interest in the 1997 election strengthened,
they tended to support Kim Dae-Jung, while those less interested tended to choose Rhee.
Third, as in the 1992 data indicates, those with a higher interest in the election tended to
choose the more famous opposition candidate in the 1992 election, and Kim Dae-Jung
was well known for his opposition.  Fourth, those who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the
prior election remained loyal to him in 1997.  Kim Dae-Jungs voters once again showed
their strength by supporting him unconditionally.  Fifth, residents of the Southwest did
not vote for Rhee.  They were much more supportive of Kim Dae-Jung, again showing
the strong effects of regionalism.  Finally, as voters aged, they supported Kim Dae-Jung
more than Rhee even though Kim Dae-Jung was not as conservative during the election.
This phenomenon is almost same as the finding that some older voters hesitated between
Kim Dae-Jung and Lee, as shown in the second column.  Kim Dae-Jung, during the
military government, had even been regarded a communist, although he was not (Kristof
1997).  Nonetheless, older voters showed greater support for Kim Dae-Jung over Rhee.
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How can this be explained?  As shown before, Kim Dae-Jung realized his past three
failures to become president were due to his overly liberal image.  He made every effort
to address this image.  When the radical Korean students took to the streets and asked for
justice, human rights, and resignation of President Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, who
once had a close relationship with students, called for them to disband voluntarily
(WuDunn 1997).  He also accepted several former generals in his party to reduce hostility
toward himself in the military.  In terms of age, Kim Dae-Jung was most benefited in
1997.
The final column (Rhee v. Lee) of Table 2b is of particular interest because it
compares two candidates who had been members of the same governing party and they
attempted to attract supporters from their political mentors (Kim Young-Sam) electoral
base.  However, not many variables are statistically significant, probably due to Rhee and
Lees similarities.  As voters political orientation moved from a pro-governing party to a
pro-opposition party, they tended to support Rhee over Lee.  Although Rhee had been a
member of the governing party until three months before the election, and attempted to
become an official candidate of the governing party, he benefited significantly from
opposition-orientated voters.  Rhees former experience as an opposition lawmaker
before the 1992 election and attack on the ruling candidate, Lee, might have placed him
as the more opposition-oriented candidate.  He also benefited from those who had voted
for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election.  Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the
previous election generally continued to vote for Kim Dae-Jung in later elections.  Yet, in
combinations of candidates without Kim Dae-Jung, responses of previous Kim Dae-Jung
voters draw special attention.   In 1992, in the combination of Chung v. Kim Young-Sam,
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the electorate who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 election was indecisive.
These two candidates were not considered by the previous Kim Dae-Jung supporters.
Yet in 1997, in the combination of Rhee v. Lee, the former Kim Dae-Jung electorate
became decisive.  Voters who had supported Kim Dae-Jung in 1992 voted in 1997 in
significant numbers for Rhee over Lee.  A major reason may have been the issue of Kim
Dae-Jungs age.  Many thought at 75 years old he was too old to be a presidential
candidate.  Although Kim Dae-Jungs supporters were more cohesive and loyal than
those of other candidates, Kim Dae-Jung seemed to lose some of his old supporters in
1997.  Thus, some ex-Kim Dae-Jung voters defected to the much younger Rhee who was
49 years old.  Finally, as anticipated, the older voters were more likely to support the
more conservative Lee than Rhee.  Other variables did not produce significant differences
in this column.  Figures 10a on p. 220 and 10b on p. 221 visually show the findings of
Table 2b.  These figures describe a spatial representation of the key variables in the 1997
presidential election.  Figure 10a shows all the dummy variables of the model and among
the most significant in Figure 10a are Southwest region and previous Kim Dae-Jung
voters.  There is a greater distance between 2 (Kim Dae-Jung) and 1 (Lee) at row space of
the Southwest.  Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election also showed
larger difference among the three candidates.  Figure 10b shows that party orientation
severely separated Lee and Kim Dae-Jung, suggesting major significance of
ruling/opposition party orientation in the model.  In contrast, Lee and Kim Dae-Jung are
adjacent on the age row, again, suggesting that older voters could not easily decide
between Kim Dae-Jung and Lee.  The voters indecision was beneficial to Kim Dae-Jung
but detrimental to Lee, considering the normal voting behavior of older voters.
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Although the individual estimates of the combination of the candidates of the dependent
variable, candidate choice, have been examined it is not always easy to determine
statistical significance across candidates.  For instance, according to Table 2a, a prior
vote for Roh shows a moderate significance between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-
Sam (DJ v. YS), no significance between Chung and Kim Young-Sam (Chung v. YS) and
weak significance between Chung and Kim Dae-Jung (Chung v. DJ).  Thus prior vote for
Roh is candidate specific.  The similar indecisiveness of statistical significance holds for
the 1997 election.  To clarify the significance of these relationships, Wald and LR tests
are used (Long 1997).  These tests formally determine the effect of these variables on the
dependent variable.
According to the Wald and LR tests, as demonstrated in Table 3 on p. 192 , most
of the independent variables are highly significant at the .01 level.  Prior votes for Roh in
the 1992 election are significant at .05 level.  Furthermore, both Wald and LR tests show
the same results of statistical significance for both the 1992 and 1997 elections, although
the coefficients are slightly different.  In short, Table 3 implies the models
parsimoniousness.
Yet, another way of interpreting a MNL model is employing discrete change in
the predicted probabilities.  Long (1997) has shown that partial change or marginal
effects that indicate the slope of the curve relating to xk to Pr(y=m|x), holding all other
variables constant, are misleading.  This misunderstanding happens especially when the
probability curve is changing rapidly or when an independent variable is a binary one.
Thus, discrete change of the variable is employed.
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Table 4 on p. 193 shows the discrete change of independent variables in the 1997
and 1992 elections.  Discrete change is the change in the predicted probability for a
change in xk from the start value xS to the end value xE (Long 136).  The change of the
binary variables is achieved by letting the variables vary from zero to one.  The change of
the other variables is the effect of the standard deviation change by computing mean of xk
to mean of xk + sK.
For instance, for a standard deviation increase in the united candidacy from
disagreement with the united candidacy to agreement, the probability of voting for Kim
Dae-Jung in the 1997 election increased by 0.16, holding all other variables constant at
their means.  In a similar manner, the probability of selecting Kim Young-Sam in the
1992 election in terms of merger increased by 0.14.  Thus, Kim Dae-Jung received a
positive response from voters who supported united-candidacy in 1997, and Kim Young-
Sam received positive support from voters who supported the merger in 1992.
Moreover, among voters who had voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 election,
their probability of voting for Lee in 1997 was 0.06 greater than voters who had not voted
for Kim Young-Sam, ceteris paribus.  The probability of choosing Rhee, however, was
slightly stronger, 0.10 greater than that of voters who had not.  Rhee, in the 1997 election,
achieved a marginally more favorable response than Lee did from voters who had
selected Kim Young-Sam in 1992.
Another noticeable phenomenon may be the regional effect.  The probability of
Southwest voters choosing Kim Dae-Jung in the 1997 election was 0.49 greater than that
of voters from other regions, other things being equal.  The Southwest support of Kim
Dae-Jung is the greatest probabilities any candidate received in the study.  In contrast,
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candidates Lee and Rhee in 1997 achieved probability of only 0.18 and 0.10,
respectively, from the Southeast more than voters from the other areas.  Thus, division of
the Southeast voters offered an advantage to Kim Dae-Jung, whose region was firmly
united.  In short, employing discrete change of the independent variables in the model
also upholds findings obtained in the Tables 2a and 2b.
Economic Model of Korean Candidate Choice
Political, social, military or foreign issues have been major indicators in
explaining electoral behavior and attitudes in the Western voting literature (Key 1966;
Page and Brody 1972; Clarke and Stewart 1996; Carmines and Stimson 1989).  The
economy is also important.  Past research in political economy indicates that the
popularity of a government depends on the success of its economic policy (Tufte 1978).
Although many authors predict that economic variables constrain voting behavior,
literature is divided on whether to use objective economic variables or subjective
economic variables.  Clarke et al. (1992, 51-74) debated the issue in detail in their book,
Controversies in Political Economy.  They listed three reasons for the shortcomings of
employing subjective economic variables.  First, citizens evaluation of economic
situations can often be distorted.  Governments can publicize only good economic news
even if the economy is in downturn.  In addition, governments often blame a poor
economy on outsiders such as bankers, bureaucrats, corporations, the EEC, foreign
countries, the IMF, OPEC, [and] unions (55).  Second, economic information the public
receives is sometimes limited.  Although reports on unemployment and inflation are
frequently shown in the mass media, other aspects of the economy appear only in more
obscure and less read sources.  Examples here are structural issues or monetary policies
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that are not easily accessible to the public.  Third, the publics understanding of the
economy is usually not sufficient.  Economic phenomena are complex and often are the
results of political and social activities.  People tend to understand economy mostly by
receiving episodic or dramatic economic reportswalkouts, severe GNP drop or change
of export.
Accordingly objective economic variables that governments or economic
institutions issue regularly instead of subjective economic variables may be preferred in
studying voting behavior.  Nonetheless, if the public does have the capacity to properly
understand economic conditions, one should not negate the usefulness of employing
subjective economic variables.  Clarke et al. agree with individual citizens' misperception
of economic reports, yet they admit that the publics economic understanding, as a whole,
is accurate and unbiased.  There are a multiple of economic reports everyday but
collective understanding by the public is continuous and consistent.  Most importantly, it
is the public that votes and chooses the government regardless of the accuracy of their
knowledge of economy.  To test economic effects on the candidate choice in the Korean
presidential elections, this study employs subjective economic variables in the 1992 and
1997 Korean presidential elections.
One of the best-known economic models is the reward-punishment argument
(Carmichael 1990; Clarke, Rapkin and Stewart 1994; Clarke and Stewart 1996; Fiorina
1981; Happy 1989; Key 1966; Lanoue 1994; Lewis-Beck 1986; Page 1978).  The model
focuses on the performance of the incumbent party.  If the party is viewed favorably by
the voter, it will be retained.  On the other hand, if the governments performance is not
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perceived satisfactory, the voter will turn the incumbent out of office (Kramer 1971).10
This argument is simple: what voter would like a government that caused economic
hardship for the nation or the public?  For instance, Lanoue (1994) showed that
retrospective economic judgment was indeed significant in the 1984 and 1988 American
presidential elections.  Happy (1989) also reported that evaluation of past economic
performance of Canadian governments during the period of 1930 through 1979
constrained Canadian voters.  The reward-punishment hypothesis is also found in Third
World Countries.  Pacek (1994), while studying the impacts of poor economic conditions
in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in the presidential and legislative
elections in the early 1990s, found that voters in the economically hardest-hit areas
severely punished incumbent reformist governments and preferred opposition candidates
or parties.  For example, poor unemployment rate negatively affected the incumbent
candidate, Mazowiecki, in the 1990 Polish presidential election.
When evaluating past economic performance, voters are often divided into two
different categories: personal versus collective (Lewis-Beck 1986).  Personal voters
evaluate economic conditions by their own personal experiences: their own employment
status or family economy. Happy (1989), for example, used real personal income in his
study of economic performance of Canadian governments.11  Lanoue (1994) found that a
                                                          
10 The other side of evaluation is prospective evaluation.  That is, the decision to vote for a specific party or
candidate is to choose about its future performance.  For more on prospective evaluation, see MacKuen,
Erikson and Stimson (1992) and Clarke, Rapkin and Stewart (1994).
11 Happy used real personal income as a variable indicating evaluation of past personal economic condition.
Although income usually is used as a measure of socioeconomic status (SES), income has been also used as
an indicator of personal economic condition to show peoples poverty in the literature (Rosenstone 1982;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  In this study, level of living standards is used to show respondents'
evaluation of personal economic condition.
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general evaluation of personal economy was a significant factor on choosing presidents
both in 1984 and 1988 American elections.
Despite the importance of these personal economic variables on estimating
incumbent candidates, Lewis-Beck (1986) maintained these pocketbook evaluations had
a marginal effect on individual vote choice in his comparative study of four European
countries.  He explained that voters consider that they are responsible for their personal
economic conditions.  However, one of the reasons Lewis-Beck found poor performance
of personal economic variables in his study must be that he used legislative elections.  It
is presidents that have more impact on the economic conditions of countries, and this
distinction must be made.  In addition, all the countries Lewis-Beck studied are advanced
industrial economies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.  These countries have
superior social security systems and even if citizens economic conditions are poor, they
need not worry about their lives.  In fact, evidence of personal behavior is not absolutely
absent.  Nannestad and Paldam (1997) argued that Danes are considered pocket-oriented
voters.  Individual analysis of economic voting in Denmark between 1986 and 1992
shows that the perceived Danish personal economic situations over the last three months
before elections was a key variable influencing support for parties.  Korea is a developing
nation and its citizens do not enjoy good social welfare benefit.  Consequently, Koreans
during economically poor times should penalize their leaders for their hardship.
This does not mean, however, that personal evaluation is the only factor in the
choice of presidential candidates.  When collective voters evaluate the economy, they
resort to national economic situations: national unemployment or inflation rates, or
general economic conditions.  Personal economy cannot be favorable if the national
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economic conditions are adverse.  The collective or sociotropic hypothesis assumes that
the engine of economic voting is the role played by government for the destiny of the
macroeconomy (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1990).  The government is supposed
to reduce severe depressions and secure full employment and stable prices (Lewis-Beck
1991). Clarke et al. (1992, 123-40) found that opinions on the national economic
conditions significantly affected voters choices for Bush rather than Dukakis.  The
sociotropic retrospective evaluation was also evidenced in the Canadian federation
election.  The Mulroney-led Conservatives won a landslide victory over the Liberal
government in the 1984 election mainly because the Canadians were very unhappy with
personal and national economic conditions as well (Clarke and Kornberg 1992).  The
national retrospective theory of voting was also confirmed in many countries that conduct
free and competitive elections.  Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth (1997) showed that
evaluations of GDP and inflation played major roles in partisan support in countries
regardless of their political situationsfragmented party system, coalition governments,
divided control or lack of party cohesion.12
While analyzing the impact of economic evaluation on the incumbent candidates
or parties, mediated variables are sometimes used (Clarke et al. 1992, 123-40; Fiorina
1981; Lewis-Beck 1986).  The Korean election data include a simple question on the
1992 election and a "mediated" one in the 1997 election.  A simple question of past
economic evaluation is Compared to one to two years ago, would you say that the
national economy has been better, almost the same, or worse?  However, a mediated
                                                          
12 Although this study employs Korean individual-level survey data, it cites several studies that have used
aggregate data.  It is assumed that major findings of economic influences on electoral behavior can be
applied to analysis that uses individual-level data.
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question combines two national and personal items together: Compared to one to two
years ago, would you say that your familys economy has been strong or weak due to the
national economic policies?  For simple items, respondents consider only one object, but
for mediated items, they need to consider two objects at the same time (Lewis-Beck
1986).
Now it is necessary to review the Korean economy during election time before
formulating economic hypotheses.  Since the 1987 Democratic Movement, Korean
society has engaged in a massive debate on the role of democracy.  Workers demanded
better wages and better working conditions.  A fierce conflict between workers and
management that resulted in concession to the workers was common.  Workers were then
paid much more after the pre-Democratic Movement.  Between 1987 and 1992, unit labor
costs increased 13 percent annually compared to only 2.4 percent in Japan and 11.7
percent in Taiwan (J. Mo 1999).  Korean aggregate wage levels were actually one of the
highest in Asia.  The wage increases were considered justified and overdue by many, but
rapid increases of wages caused negative effects on economy.  Rising wages not only
added to inflationary pressure but also made Korean exports less competitive abroad (J.
Mo 1999, 112).  J. Mo further indicates that the failure of Korean economy was also due
to failed government policies.  Government policy was not consistent with democratic
pressures, moving from nonintervention process to tough crackdown on the protests.  The
election year of 1992 marked the worst economic year since 1981.  The growth rate was
only 4.7 percent, far below the expectation of 7 percent (J. Oh 1999).  Many small- and
medium-sized companies became bankrupt and the number of unemployed skyrocketed.
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Finally, the government's economic policy resulted in its inability to meet
international debt payments, forcing it to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
help on November 21, 1997, about one month before the presidential election.  J. Mo and
C. Moon (1999) maintained that the greatest damage to the Korean economy came from
ten years of policy gridlock under an immature Korean democracy (173-74).  Although
the government attempted to reform labor markets, big-business (chabol), banking and
financial system, policy confusion multiplied without firm resolutions.  Around the fall of
1996, current account deficit grew to $17 billion and the foreign debt amounted to $140
billion (J. Oh 1999).  Many managers and workers were laid off and Hanbo, an
impregnable conglomerate in early January, and later Kia, the seventh-largest
conglomerate, in Korea went bankrupt (Clifford 1998).  Reduced government spending
and private investment also reduced the number of employed, straining levels of standard
of living.  The two presidential elections were held under these adverse economies.  With
this in mind, this study may derive following hypotheses.
H1: Those who have higher level of living standards should vote for the ruling candidates
(1992 and 1997 elections).
H2: Those who evaluate national economy more positively should vote for the ruling
candidates (1992 election).
H3: Those who evaluate that national economy has affected family economy more
positively should vote for the ruling candidates (1997 election).
Findings and Discussion
Multinomial logit model of candidate choice by using two past economic
evaluations reflects somewhat conflicting findings, compared to the hypotheses.  The
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impacts of other independent variables are similar to those of models that do not include
economic variables, and their analysis is not shown here.  Table 5a on p. 194 shows
candidate choice model that includes economic variables both in the 1992 and 1997
elections.  In the second column of the 1992 model that compares choice of Kim Dae-
Jung over Kim Young-Sam, those who evaluated national economy better in the past 1-2
years voted for the strong opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung.  Reward-punishment
theory indicates that if the incumbent government did a satisfactory performance, it is
supposed to be rewarded in the election.  Yet, the Korean voters in the early 1990s
demonstrated an opposite direction.  Those who were satisfied with past national
economic performance of the incumbent government rewarded an opposition candidate,
not the ruling party candidate.  Conversely, those who were not satisfied voted for the
ruling party candidate, Kim Young-Sam.  It is hard to explain this phenomenon.
However, the levels of standard of living support the traditional reward-punishment
theory.  Those who had higher levels of standard of living selected the ruling party
candidate much more than those who had lower levels.  The candidate was rewarded by
the past economic performance of his government.  The third column that compares the
choice of another opposition candidate, Chung Joo-Young over Kim Young-Sam shows
an evaluation of national economy and the levels of standard of living, which probably
were not important.  Voters were indeterminate on whom to choose between the two
candidates.  One probable but untested explanation for this asymmetry would be that
Chung is the owner of the largest conglomerate of Hyundae and has long been involved
in the business.  In evaluating past economic performance, citizens might have judged
him partly responsible for the nation's economy.  In fact, as the nation's economy became
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larger, there were more debates on whether conglomerates were beneficial for the
economy.  The chabols are ruled by a handful of family members, not by modern CEOs,
and these businesses include many diverse and unrelated areas, reducing managerial
effectiveness.
Since coefficients of the variable, national economy, is significant at .05 level
between Kim Dae-Jung v. Kim Young-Sam but it is not significant at any conventional
statistical level between Chung Joo-Young v. Kim Young-Sam, one might apply Wald
test to resolve the ambiguity.
The Wald test in Table 5b on p. 195 indicates that the national economy and
living standards have, in general, significant influences although weak.  Figure 11a of the
odds ratio plot on p. 222 also confirms the findings of Wald test.13  The reference group,
Kim Young-Sam (1) is positioned at 1 in terms of factor change scale.  Compared to Kim
Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung is positioned at right hand at the row of national economy.
This means, as shown in the Tables 5a and 5b, those who were more positively evaluated
national economy preferred the opposition candidate over the ruling candidate.  Kim
Young-Sam and Chung (3) are adjacent, indicating their indifference of choice.  Yet, in
the living standard row, Kim Dae-Jung is positioned to the left of Kim Young-Sam,
indicating those with poor living standards chose Kim Dae-Jung over Kim Young-Sam.
                                                          
13 The units of original coefficients are shown at the bottom of the figure.  Since category 1 (Kim Young-
Sam) is the reference category, it is positioned at 0, suggesting "national economy" does not change the
logit of category 1 compared to category 1.  Factor change that is the exponential of the value of the
original coefficients is shown at the top of the figure.  Category 2 is located at almost 1.29 = exp(.26).
Thus, a unit change in "national economy" increases the odds by a factor of 1.29.  Interpretation of the
figure is same with either use of logit coefficients or factor change.  Logit coefficients and the odds ratio
are greater with the greater distance.  For more on odds ratio, see Long (1997).
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The effects of economic variables on the candidate choice in the 1997 are very
different from those of 1992 model.  In the last column of Table 5a, the choice between
an opposition candidate Rhee and the ruling party candidate Lee supports the reward-
punishment theory.  Although the variable is statistically weak and has a small impact,
those who evaluated their past family economy affected by the national economic policy
as better voted for Lee over Rhee.  Standard of living level is 99% significant, reflecting
more important influence on the choice of Lee over Rhee.  The findings in the last
column support the conventional reward-punishment hypothesis.  Yet, the voters in the
1997 election did not distinguish Lee from Kim Dae-Jung in term of the two economic
variables, as shown in the fourth column.  The Wald test reveals significant effects in
general and Figure 11b on p. 223 shows that Rhee was favored by the voters who were
not happy with the poor family economic condition in their standard living.  One very
interesting finding is that although those who enjoyed a higher family economy and
standard of living voted for Lee also voted for Kim, although their choices for Lee and
Kim are not statistically significant.
The Korean economy was finally resuscitated by the IMF one month before the
election and the very visible opposition leader Kim was regarded by many as the rescuer
of the almost bankrupt Korea.  He published economic books and demonstrated
knowledge concerning the economy.  This may well have had in voters' choices.  To
investigate this, one needs batteries of prospective evaluation.  Voters' choice of
candidates should be related to their evaluation of future national or personal economic
condition.
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Taken together, the reward-and-punishment theory is partly confirmed.  K. Park
(1993) made an important analysis of economic effect on Korean electoral behavior,
although not empirically.  Due to the constitutional restraint of presidential single-term,
no incumbent president can run again in the 1990s.  Accordingly influences of
retrospective evaluation are not as strong and consistent as those found in other countries.
In addition, it is hard to find specific issue difference among candidates.  Conservative
ruling candidates during the campaign announced they were reform-oriented without
damaging stability while progressive opposition candidates announced they would pursue
reforms that did not cause severe damage to the middle class.  Furthermore, the ruling
party candidates argue that they are not responsible for any policy failures the
governments have made.  Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997 asked
the incumbent presidents to leave their parties before the elections.14   The retrospective
economic evaluations then indicate only weak, inconsistent influences on the choice of
candidates.  This does not, however, negate the usefulness of economic variables in
studies of Korean electoral behavior.  As C. Park argues, economic issues have been
important ones in the 1990s since political and social issues such as political reform,
democracy, or political stability has been somewhat accomplished in the late 1980s.  A
precise investigation of economic effects on the Korean voting behavior in the future
needs a full range of economic indicators--retrospective and prospective evaluations of
the national and personal economic condition--and indicators of issue-priority and
objective ones as well.
                                                          
14 President Roh had to leave his party and became non-partisan before the 1992 election and supporters of
Lee burned President Kim in effigy to dramatically show that it is the President who was responsible for
98
Conclusion
Despite the long established importance of political party identification in studies
of Western voting behavior, this measure is not important in understanding Korean
elections.  The primary reason this variable does not transfer to the Korean electoral
process is that voters see new political parties appearing each election cycle.  At this
point in the history of open elections, Korea has not developed and sustained a party
system, a situation similar to the early years of Western party systems.  Koreans have,
however, developed delineation between the governing parties and opposition parties.
These findings strongly confirm this assertion, one made by Korean scholars.  The
electorate is factionalized along the support for the governing party and support for
opposition parties.  Kim Dae-Jung and Chung in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in
1997, as opposition candidates, reaped strong support from those in the electorate who
opposed the governing parties.  Conversely, those in the governing partyKim Young-
Sam in 1992 and Lee in 1997received strong support from those favoring the
governing party.  Moreover, when faced with two candidates from the opposition, the
electorate was more likely to choose the candidate with a longer history of opposition.
Kim Dae-Jung provided evidence of this in his candidacy against Chung in 1992 and
Rhee in 1997.  This study maintains that the reason the governing/opposition party
orientation is stable is because the ruling party in Korea remained conservative in its
orientation although it has undergone many structural and name changes during the past
several decades.
                                                                                                                                                                            
the 1997 economic crisis, not the ruling candidate, Lee.  The two ruling party candidates also changed
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Second, interest in the election is important in accessing Korean presidential
elections.  The more interested individuals are, the greater the likelihood that they will
support opposition party candidates.  Governing party candidates received more support
from those with weaker interest in the election and vice versa.  Although this pattern held
for both the 1992 and 1997 elections, impact of electoral interest was stronger in 1997.
In addition, unconventional political and new economic developments, such as economic
failure, division within ruling camp, unusual coalition and so on, might have caused
cross-pressures for some voters who were less interested in the election.  These voters did
not vote in the 1997 election.  As they stayed away from the polls, the nation saw the first
transfer of government by election in its modern history in 1997.   Thus, the fact that
those less interested voters tend to vote for the governing candidates and the fact that
many of them still voted in the 1992 election but not in 1997 should be crucial clues to
resolve the first win of an opposition candidate in the 1997 election.  Electoral interest
will be scrutinized more in later chapters to resolve the power transfer.
Third, to elect a regional favorite son to power, each major regionthe Southeast
and the Southwestneeded electoral support from other minor regions.  It was the
Central region that cooperated with others in 1992, and provided for a united candidacy
in 1997, that helped the coalition hold power.
Fourth, while regional and merged/united candidacy factors were most
significant, preferences for candidates in prior elections also meaningfully affected votes
of candidates.  For instance, Kim Dae-Jung, who had run for the presidency four times,
firmly maintained his supporters.  The single five-year term limit placed on the Korean
                                                                                                                                                                            
names of their parties.
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presidency has not restricted former presidents from performing an important role in
politics.  Korean politicians have sought to use their past loyalties to their success.  Kim
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung garnered most of their older followers.  In 1997, Lee and
Rhee enjoyed their political mentors former popularity.  One addendum to the fifth
conclusion is that the Monte Carlo simulation indicates that, unlike the traditional
assumption that Kim Dae-Jungs support was cohesive but not Kim Young-Sams, Kim
Dae-Jungs support was cohesive only in 1997 when Kim Young-Sams older supporters
were divided.  Kim Young-Sam had a greater cohesive support from his older supporters
than Kim Dae-Jung in 1992.  Both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jungs followers were
important for their wins in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.
Fifth, age was a significant factor in Koreans' voting behavior.  The older
respondents tended to vote for the conservative candidates while the younger ones for the
progressive candidates, except in 1997 when they voted for the most progressive
candidate, Kim Dae-Jung.  This is probably due to Kim Dae-Jung's efforts to change his
radical image to a soft and moderate position during the campaign.
Sixth, five players have dominated past two presidential elections, the three
KimsKim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil, along with other major
players such as Roh Tae-Woo, Chung Ju-Yong in 1992, Lee-Hoi-Chang, and Rhee In-Je
in 1997.  They have created, merged, and divided parties according to their personal
plans, and most of the supporters and partisans have followed their directives and
commands for the past three decades.  Their influences are reflected in Korean politics as
effects of regionalism, prior voting preferences, and merged or united candidacies.
Accordingly, regionalism is strengthened by voters loyalty to candidates of a region.
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Each major region, especially the Southeast and the Southwest, have their representative
leaders although 1997 marked loss of a firm regional representative in the Southeast.
Finally, the retrospective economic evaluations indicated only weak and
inconsistent influences on the choice of candidates.  Yet, this should not negate the
usefulness of economic variables in studies of Korean electoral behavior.  Since
economic issues have been important ones in the 1990s, a closer monitor of these
variables, when studying Korean voting behavior, will be needed.
In short, this chapter shows how Korean voters chose their presidents in the 1992
and 1997 presidential elections, and particularly how the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-
Jung, won in the 1997 election.  The general candidate choice model is parsimonious.
Almost all the indicators in the model are considerably significant in explaining Koreans
voting behavior.  Koreans were found to be affected, when selecting their leaders, by
several indicators: their governing/opposition-party orientation, evaluation of the merged
party or the united candidacy among/between totally heterogeneous parties, their political
interest in elections, their devotion toward candidates chosen in the former election,
Southwest and Southeast regionalism, and voters age.
One suggestion stemming from this examination is that once the
governing/opposition party orientation is a meaningful factor in Korean electoral
behavior, future studies need to develop indicators that access its categories with greater
clarity.  Currently all studies and surveys have a few categoriesgoverning-party
orientation and opposition-party orientation, sometimes including independents.  Likert
style five- or seven-point scales of political party identification used in most Western
literature should be developed to apply Korean governing/opposition-party orientation.
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CHAPTER 3
WHO VOTES IN KOREA?
Introduction
The most common act of political participation is voting in elections.
Conventional democratic studies (Pateman 1970; Powell 1982; Conway 1991) have
argued that citizens in democratic countries are interested and participate in politics.
Koreans have enjoyed free and open elections for more than a decade.  Since the 1987
Democratic Movement, voting has become a regular political event through which
Korean citizens have exercised their voice in democracy.  Unlike low turnout rates of
America (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Conway 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996),
those in Korea have been high.  During the three presidential elections of 1987, 1992, and
1997 the average turnout was 84.9 percent.1
Turnout rates are important in determining who gets what (Lasswell 1936).  Key
(1949) and Burham (1987) asserted that politicians do not pay attention to non-voters and
that they are isolated from politics.  As the number of non-voters increases non-voting
potentially presents greater damage to democracy.  Countries with large non-voting
population are more susceptible to autocratic or authoritarian control.  This assertion,
however, does not necessarily mean that countries with lower voting rates are on the
brink of democratic breakdown, because two of the most democratic and stable countries
are Switzerland and the United States whose turnout rates are lowest among democratic
                                                          
1 The official turnout in the three elections was 89.2 percent (1987), 81.9 percent (1992) and 80.6 percent
(1997).  See Figure 1.
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countries (Franklin 1996).  A simple comparison of one-time voting rates may not
meaningful.  For instance, a Cambridge resident in England voted about four times
between 1985 and 1990, while an Irvine resident in California voted about 44 times in a
single year of 1992 (Dalton 1996).  In terms of the amount of electing that goes on,
America may be the highest among democratic countries.  Therefore while turnout rates
are theoretically important to democracy the frequency of voter participation may provide
a practical explanation to the viability of democracy in countries that have low voter
turnout.
Studies on turnout in America have received less attention than electoral choice
from scholars (Miller and Shanks 1996).  Voting participation in developing countries
remains sparse (Barnes 1998).  Recent studies of voting participation in developing
countries include: Brazilian compulsory voting (Power and Roberts 1995), comparative
analysis of turnout in Central America (Seligson et al. 1995), comparison of turnout
among 29 developed and developing countries (Radcliff 1992), Korean political
participation (Kim 1980), and others.  Fewer numbers of turnout studies than those of
candidate choice studies may come from the possibility that there exist no substantive
differences between voters and non-voters on many issues (Erikson 1995; Gant and
Lyons 1993; Shaffer 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Teixeira (1992)
specifically addressed this issue in American voters and found that although nonvoters
are a little more liberal, their differences were not substantial enough to affect outputs of
government had they voted.  For instance, in some American presidential elections, even
if all qualified non-voters participated in elections it would not have altered the results.
Bennett and Resnick (1990), while studying non-voters after the 1984 and 1988
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American presidential elections, assert that Reagan and Bush would have still won the
elections with only 2 percent fewer votes even if all the non-voters had voted.
Not all the political scientists, however, agree with the notion that there are no-
substantive differences between voters and nonvoters.  For example, Piven and Clowand
(1982, 12) assert that in the United States presidential election of 1980 in which Reagan
received 52 percent of the votes over incumbent Carter, had the non-voters voted the
outcome would have been different.  They base this assertion on the wide margin
non-voters gave Carter over Reagan (51 to 37 percent).  In addition, in most elections, the
winner has benefited by non-voters.  Bush, for instance, was assisted by low voting
turnout (50.1 percent) in 1996 (Herron 1998).  Herrons study indicates that most non-
voters would have voted for Dukakis.  Finally, Radcliff (1994) supports general political
wisdom that the Democratic Party is more likely to benefit in elections as turnout
increases.  He notes that when Democrats have more supporters in the electorate, their
numerical advantage is offset by defection of supporters to the Republican Party.  When
Democrats do not enjoy large margin, in contrast, they are rescued by defectors from
Republicans.
Substantive differences between voters and nonvoters on elections are also
reported in other countries.  In Australia where there is compulsory voting a turnout of 95
percent is common.  However, when turnout drops even slightly right-wing parties have
benefited at the polls, and when it slightly increases left-wing parties have benefited
(McAllister 1986).
Given the inconsistencies in the results of studies on turnout it is important to
examine some of the possible causes of these findings.  The studies that have shown a
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substantial difference between voters and nonvoters on the "possible" election outcome
also raise many unanswered questions.  One of the causes of the differences between
voters and non-voter has been attributed to non-voters providing answers to surveys that
are spontaneous.  Therefore the results of these studies do not accurately represent non-
voters opinions.  Lijphart (1997, 4) argues that "Nonvoters who are asked their opinions
on policy and partisan preferences in surveys are typically citizens who have not given
these questions much thought ."  However he does agree with Herron (1998) that if
they were mobilized to vote, their votes would be more likely to be different from those
in the survey.  Pacek and Radcliff (1995) offer a more positive explanation of the effects
of non-voters.  Examining nineteen national elections from 1950 through 1990, they
report that for every percentage point growth in turnout there was a one-third of a
percentage increase in the number of votes for left-wing parties.  The authors further
insist that turnout in most industrialized countries that has been declining partly parallels
the decline of the left-wing parties, beginning in the 1960s.  The literature raised several
questions concerning the effects of turnout and the role of voters versus non-voters and
needs greater attention in future research.
This chapter examines who voted in the 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential
Elections and seeks to determine whether the winner of the 1997 election won the
election because of turnout level.  While there was a slightly lower participation rate in
1997 than in 1992 (1.3 percent), this difference may contribute to explaining the first
peaceful change of government in 1997 since Koreas independence.  The difference of
the winner (40.3 percent) and the second (38.7 percent) candidate in the 1997 election is
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only 1.6 percent or mere 390,000 votes.  Could this small difference in turnout help
explain the outcome?
 In order to solve the puzzle related to turnout in Korean elections, this chapter
employs a logit model to analyze 1992 and 1997 post-presidential election data.  Korean
voting turnout will be explained by sociological characteristics such as education, age,
and region, and by psychological characteristics such as sense of personal political
effectiveness, evaluation of both democracy and fairness of the Central Election
Commission (CEC), orientation toward political parties, interest in the election, and the
effects of political mobilization.
Additionally, since the economy affects all citizens it is reasonable to assume that
it would have a significant impact on Korean voter turnout.  By employing several
subjective past evaluation of economic conditions as control variables, this chapter
examines their impacts on Korean voter turnout.
Over-reporting of Turnout Rates
Before moving forward to examine turnout there is one area that needs to be
addressedover-reporting.  Unlike such other aspects of electoral studies as voter choice
or political interest, the study of turnout presents a unique problem.  There are two kinds
of turnouts: official voter turnout and survey voter turnout, and they differ from 10 to 15
percent difference (Abramson and Claggett 1992; Belli et al. 1999; Burden 1999; Katosh
and Traugott 1981).  Voter turnout literally means the percentage of the voting-age
population that actually voted (Conway 1991, 4).  Official turnout rate is calculated by
dividing the total number of votes cast for, say, the presidency by the total number of
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voting age.  However, these official turnout rates generally are smaller than studies that
use random samples.
Why are actual turnout rates and survey results different?  Abramson, Aldrich,
and Rohde (1996) present three basic reasons why turnout of the American National
Election Studies is over-reported.  Since ANES surveys and other national surveys are
similar in design and implementation, their reasons should apply to other survey
research.2  First, although interviewers ask respondents reasons for not voting, some
respondents who have not voted deliberately answer that they had.  Second, since many
lower SES voters are excluded from the sample, NES surveys do not exactly reflect
American voting age population.  Third, those who were interviewed before an election
date are instigated to vote more than those who were not.  Thus respondents of NES
surveys have higher turnout rates by over-representing likely voters.
Swaddle and Heath (1989) also report similar reasons of discrepancy between
official (75 percent) and survey estimates (86 percent) of turnout in Britain.  They found
that some respondents who did not vote claimed they did because they actually could not
remember or did not want to embarrass themselves at misperforming their civic duties.
Another reason of over-reporting is that those who do not give permission for being
surveyed when pollsters call may have different attitude toward politics or elections from
those who give permission.  They may be less interested in politics and are bothered in
spending their time on surveying.  Thus, turnout rates of surveys based on those who
                                                          
2 Surveys conducted at the University of Michigan since 1940s are called National Election Studies (NES).
NES, before 1978, was called the Center for Political Studies (CPS), Survey Research Center (SRC), or
commonly Michigan study (Burden).
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permit to be interviewed are naturally higher than those of official estimates based on
people including those who declined interviewing.
Except severely rare over-reported estimates such as 28 points higher than official
turnout in the 1996 NES turnout (Burden ibid.), many moderately over-reported survey
data have been used by many scholars without considering their possible negative
impacts.  Abramson and Aldrich (1982b) maintained that the SRC data do precisely
represent the real world tendencies despite their systemic discrepancy of turnout.
Teixeira (1987) also insists that although turnout has been over-reported by the NES data,
they do provide real picture of American population.  Despite these arguments, other
scholars have attempted to avoid using over-reported data.  Wolfinger and Rosenstone
(1980) employed survey samples that are nearly 50 times larger than normal data.
Sometimes voter validation is used to reduce the difference between official and survey
estimates of turnout, according to Rosenstone and Leege (1994).  NES checks whether
respondents really voted by making calls to or sending staff to official agencies.  NES
committed voter validation method in several presidential election surveys.  Yet, NES
gave up voter validation because of expenses.
In an effort to adjust this discrepancy, this chapter employs weighted variables to
deal with the over-reporting problem.3  This will permit one to compare two sets of
findings, one from the original survey data and another from survey data weighted by the
                                                          
3 For more on the use of weighted variables, see DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) and Winship and Radbill
(1994).
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official turnout rates, whether how much they differ in explaining the variance of the
dependent variable, turnout.4
Literature Review
While their arguments have yet to be confirmed the debate has provided three
models of turnout behavior: the sociological, social-psychological, and mobilization.
These models provide the basis for analyzing the Korean presidential elections.
Sociological Model
The sociological model is associated with the seminal works of Berelson and
Lazarsfeld and their associates.5  Their studies of voting behavior have provided the
foundation for scholars since the 1940s (Lazarsfeld 1948; Berelson 1954).  It is from
these studies that sociological variables have become important to the understanding of
why people vote as they do.  They were the first to develop an extensive model to
understanding American voting behavior.  This model is straightforward and is used
today in many studies of elections and participation.  There is a long list of important
studies that have used these variables in an attempt to understand political behavior.
Among some of the more important are: Almond and Verba (1963); Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman (1995); Brody (1978); Conway (1991); Milbrath and Goel (1977); Leighley
and Nagler (1992); Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Schlozman and Brady (1995);
Seligson et al. (1995); Teixeira (1987, 1992); Verba and Nie (1972); Wolfinger and
                                                          
4 The current 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Election data do not contain weight variables and  weight
variables adjusted by official turnout rate are created.
5 Several scholars call this sociological model SES model (Caldeira, Patterson, Markko 1985; Leighley and
Nagler 1992), although they add race, age and other variables.  This is probably because SES is a more
widely known vocabulary in the scholarship.  The American Voter that began massive studies on SES
argued that when race, age, region, or religion was added to the use of income and education, a term
sociological should be used instead of SES.
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Rosenstone (1980).  Conway indicates that there are differences among voters caused by
three factors.  First, one's life experiences change and as they do so does the individuals
involvement.  Second, higher-status respondents also engage in more political activities
since they have more time, money, or interest.  Finally, these respondents have the civic
responsibility such as sense of obligation to participate and perceptions of government
responsibilities that activate them to engage in politics.  Presidential elections are better
explained by sociological model than other elections.  This is because presidential
elections draw more lower status voters (Cox and Munger 1989; Patterson and Caldeira
1983).  The following specific variables are employed in the analysis of 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections.
Education
Among many sociological variables, education has been found the most
significant impact in electoral participation: the more educated, the more citizens
participate in voting (Jackson 1995).  In his study of seven European countries and
Canada, Powell (1986, 27-8) found a ten-percent difference in voting turnout between
respondents in the lowest educational level and those in the highest.  Simply speaking,
college graduates are more likely to vote than high school graduates.  According to
Conway, there are four major reasons education stimulate turnouts (1991, 23-25).  First,
those with higher education tend to have firm knowledge on the political system and thus
recognize effects of their turnout on politics.  Second, more educated citizens are
pressured to vote by their social environments.  Third, those who achieved higher
education have the skills to cope with bureaucratic complexities related to voting.  Finally
and most significantly, education enables citizens to understand political and social
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events and issues that are generally complex.  Education provides them with cognitive
skills that stimulate their voting participation.
Korea must be one of countries where Conways reasons of educational
importance in turnout should apply, and better educated Koreans should better understand
Korean politics.  However, other studies indicate that while education provides a strong
indication of voting participation in countries with lower turnout rates, its impact is weak
or negative in some countries with higher turnout rates.  According to Seligson et al.,
three countriesHonduras (79 percent), Costa Rica (79 percent), and Nicaragua (75
percent)--have higher voting rates in early 1990s, and three countriesPanama (55
percent), El Salvador (44 percent) and Guatemala (41 percent) have lower voting rates
among these Central American countries.  What their significant finding is that education
is associated with turnout in Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, but not in Honduras,
Costa Rica and Nicaragua.  For instance in Costa Rica, about 90 percent of those with
elementary education voted, and about 85 percent with college education or above voted.
Education is not a major constraint on turnout in Costa Rica.  Torf (1995) who analyzed
sixteen European countries also found that voters with lowest educational level voted a
little more than those with highest educational level.  He concludes that there is no
generalization between education and turnout.  Turnout rate is also higher in Korea and to
clear different arguments on educational effect on voting turnout, education should be
controlled in the model.
Age
Another major sociological variable is age.  Studies have found that older people
tend to participate in the election more often.  Conway (1991, 17-21) also offers good
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reasons that age affects turnout.  First, younger citizens tend to vote less because their
mobility is higher.  Although legal consequences of mobility are not major constraints on
voting these days, high mobility suggests fewer social and organizational ties in a
community.  Younger citizens, thus, are less interested in and less engaged in the local
community.  Conway argues that voting rates increase among citizens who have lived in
a community for three to five years.  Although Conways explanation of low rates of
voting among younger citizens due to higher mobility seems reasonable in America, it
may not apply to Korean elections.6  Korean children generally live with their parents
until they get married, which is about thirty years old for men and twenty-seven years old
for women.  By this time, they have lived with their parents in the community for long
time.  By the time they marry they will have been exposed to extensive political
socialization from the family.  This could be an important factor in determining political
participation in Korean elections.  When the younger people move to new places, their
local interest may be reduced, but not the national interest.  Above all, the country is
small geographically.  Moving to different parts of the country should not be very
different from ones former place.  Since Korean electoral system does not need
registration, any lower voting among younger citizens should not be explained by their
mobility.
It is Conway's second reason, marriage, which is more relevant for Korean
electoral participation.  Turnout among younger citizens increases as they get older and
they are married.7  Married parents become concerned with community amenities and
                                                          
6 Nearly no research has been done on mobility and turnout on Korean elections and mobility items are not
available with current data.
7 Unfortunately, current data do not have an item on marriage status of respondents.
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government policies as they or their children are involved with schools, military, tax,
recreational facilities, hospitals and so on.  Younger citizens, instead, may be more
concerned with dating or getting jobs.  Thus, a significant difference between younger
and older voters is their stake in the community, and these different concerns offer
different contribution on turnout.  According to K. Kim (1986), 25.6 percent of Koreans
in the twenties did not vote while only about nine percent of those over 50 did not vote in
1984 Congress elections.  His finding has been also supported by later Korean scholars
(W. Kim 1998; N. Lee 1993).  Thus, among many sociological factors, this chapter
selected education because the American literature on turnout unanimously maintains its
significance on turnout.8  In addition, this chapter employs age since all the Korean
studies confirm its impacts on turnout.
Region
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) defines a region as a homogeneous
area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighboring area.  In
terms of race, language, or culture, there are no different regions in Korea, since the
country is essentially composed of one race, one language and the culture established for
the last 5,000 years.  The Encyclopedia further defines regionalism as what properly
represents the regional idea in action as an ideology, as a social movement, or as a
theoretical basis for regional planning .  Regionalism is not uncommon in Western
countries.  America has severe South-North difference in political participation (Miller
and Shanks 1996; Niemi and Weisberg 1993; Teixeira 1987, 1992; Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980).  Wolfinger and Rosenstone maintain that traditionally Southern
                                                          
8 Considering insignificance of education in countries of higher turnout rates, education is tested by two-tail
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turnout rates were much lower than those of other regions partly because of poll tax, lack
of party competition, and years of disenfranchisement of African-Americans.  Although
the turnout gap between southern and northern regions influentially reduced in the 1960s,
regional differences are still noticeable.
In Korea, regional difference is a recent phenomenon, and political and economic
characteristics distinguish especially two regions in the country: the Southeast and the
Southwest areas.  According to K. Lee (1997), Korean parties remain ruled by major
leaders who retain their regional political bases.  Therefore, it is expected that due to
severe regionalism between the Southeast and the Southwest, more people from these
regions should vote.  To test this, dummy variables are created by using a residency
question.
Despite the apparent explanatory power of sociological model, it does not
completely explain recent low rates of American turnout.  As Winders (1999) asserts,
although socio-economic conditions improved after 1960, American turnout has been on
the decline.  Turnout is more complicated when we consider high voting rates of other
Western countries that ranked similar in the increase of socio-economic improvement
(Piven and Cloward 1989).  Hughes and Conway (1997), using data from the American
National Election Studies (ANES) from 1964 through 1992, examined the impact of
efficacy on turnout in American presidential elections.  They conclude that among many
factors that contribute to political participation in American presidential elections
"demographic characteristics are among the most important (209)." Yet these
characteristics have not changed significantly over time therefore while "... they help
                                                                                                                                                                            
t-test.
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explain turnout in any one election, they are less helpful in explaining changes in turnout"
(209).  What had changed over the three decades of their study was political attitudes and
these were strongly related to turnout.  They conclude that, in American presidential
elections, what is important to understand turnout is not demographic variables, for they
are relatively stable over time, but certain attitudinal variables.  This study needs to
control more powerful variables from other theories that will more clearly explain Korean
voter turnout, due to incompleteness of sociological model.
Psychological Model
The existing evidence suggests that turnout in the United States has declined as a
result of changes in attitudes and beliefs toward the political system.  The psychological
model focuses on psychological forces of citizens in explaining for turnout (Brody 1978;
Caldeira, Patterson and Markko 1985, 497; Conway 1991).  Based on Campbell et al.s
(1960) study, these authors argue that people decide whether they participate or abstain in
terms of divergent attitudes or orientation toward political life.  They use several
conceptual devices found in the psychological model: political efficacy, strength of party
identification, political interest, and others.
Efficacy
Efficacy is a political actors subjective feeling that one could bring about
change by ones own efforts (Hayes and Bean 1993a, 262).  Scholars have divided
efficacy into two categories, internal and external.  Internal efficacy measures the sense
of power and control the individual perceives to have in influencing the political system.
This indicates the individuals own ability to understand and to participate effectively in
political process.  External efficacy refers to the faith and the trust people have in
116
government and those elected to govern (Young 1987; Huges and Conway 1997).
Efficacy stands for long-term evaluation of the value or effectiveness of voting (Caldeira,
Patterson, and Markko 1985; Jackson 1995).
Since efficacy was first used in The American Voter (1960), it has been employed
by many studies on turnout (Abramson and Aldrich 1982a; Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975;
Cassel and Hill 1981; Hayes and Bean 1993; Hughes and Conway 1997; Miller 1980;
Powell 1986; Reiter 1979; Shaffer 1981; Southwell and Everest 1998; Teixeira 1987,
1992; Timpone 1998).  These authors consistently assert that the higher efficacy level of
citizens, the higher their voting turnout.  Why do efficacious people vote more than
inefficacious people?  In addressing this question, Abramson and Aldrich (511) conclude
that "Those who feel politically capable may feel psychologically motivated to
participate, whereas those who feel overwhelmed by the political process may withdraw
from political activity.  Teixeira (1987) finds that one major characteristic of efficacy is
that it is normally not measured as an individual behavior, attitude or opinion regarding
his/her influence on government, but measured with respect to a certain reference group.
Questions regarding efficacy generally include expressions like "people like me ."  In
other words, although it is true that turnout of an individual may not change the result of
elections, people nonetheless go to the polls.  This contradiction is overcome by the
feeling that "their individually defined reference group (people like me)" can influence
the government or elections.
Now, which efficacy indicator is more significant on turnout?  Studies have
shown that "politics seems complicated" was not a constraint on turnout (Ashenfelter and
Kelley 1975).  Powell (1986) compared turnouts in eight developed countries with
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American turnout.  He found that efficacy was significant, but compared to other
variables--political interest, education, legal or institutional factors, people like me have
no say had only five percent explanatory power.  Therefore, this study employs an
efficacy indicator that is directly related to turnout.  "Whether I vote or not is not
important since too many people are voting" is used to test impacts of efficacy on
turnout.9
Democracy (1992) and Fairness of the CEC
If efficacy is a major constraint on voting participation, the electoral environments
where citizens vote should affect people's choice of participation.  Based on rational
choice theory (Downs 1957) that expands the conception of the category D to the value
of democracy, Baloyra-Herp (1995) examined El Salvador elections.  It was found that
when possible fraud was rumored during the campaign election turnout was low, and
when elections were perceived to be fair and open turnout was high.  Following this logic
as more Koreans perceive an improvement in democracy, like the proper counting of
votes, their attitudes and opinions should be reflected in greater participation. Conversely,
if they perceive improper counting of votes some will stay home.  Due to data
availability, this perception of democracy factor is used only in 1992.
Conceptually similar to the perceived democracy variable is the role of Korean
Central Election Commission (CEC) that supervises the campaigning process.  Booth
(1995) maintained that the supervision of elections had a positive role in the movement
toward democracy in Central America.  The perceptions of the citizen regarding the
"fairness" of an election are vital to participation in a democracy.  In the case of Korea, if
                                                          
9 Efficacy items are available only in the 1997 data.  Instead, general evaluation of democracy is used in the
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people think of the CEC only as a government institution and view it as unfair they will
be less likely to vote.  If however, they perceive the CEC as an impartial and fair overseer
of the elections they will be more likely to vote.  Therefore the perception of the CEC
should be a significant indicator of turnout in Korean presidential elections.
Orientation toward Governing and Opposition Parties
Although some researchers (Cassel and Hill 1981; Hill and Cassel 1983) argue
that unpopularity or inability of American political parties is not related to lower turnout,
other studies (Abramson and Aldrich 1982a; Brody 1978; Conway 1991; Shaffer 1981;
Teixeira 1987, 1992) have found weaker partisanship, caused by social disorder in the
1960s, and Vietnam and Watergate in 1970s, substantially lowered voting turnout in the
United States.  Abramson and Aldrich, for instance, found that between two-thirds and
seven-tenths of turnout reduction between 1960 and 1980 was caused by the weakening
of party identification, together with reduced political efficacy.  There is a rich body of
literature that asserts that psychological involvement with parties greatly affects voting
turnout (Campbell et al., 1960; Jackson 1993, 1995; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Miller and
Shanks 1996; Powell 1986; Southwell and Everest 1998; Teixeira 1987; Timpone 1998;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Teixeira (16-18) explains why partisanship affects
turnout precisely.  Partisanship provides identifiers with an interpretive framework for
the issues of a campaign as well as feeling of making the actual outcome of the election
a matter of personal importance.  The framework and feeling people have towards
parties are expressed in voting participation, and their level of participation among
partisans is much higher than among non-partisans.  Verba and Nie (1972) documented
                                                                                                                                                                            
1992 model.
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that partisan effects on electoral participation are independent, regardless of
socioeconomic factors.  All citizens, despite different sociological variables, showed one
results: strong partisans were more active in electoral participation than weak partisans or
the Independents.
In addition, according to Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1996), during the last 40
years of presidential elections (1952-1996) strong party identifiers have voted much more
than any other identifiers.  Abramson et al. showed that the percentage of strong party
identifiers among Whites was never below 35 percent between 1952 and 1964, while
White Independents made up about 8 percent.  Although the number of strong identifiers
in the United States has been reduced recently, the different voting trends of strong and
weak identifiers have remained the same.
In Korea parties do not have the history or allegiance that they have in the United
States.  Since Korean parties are not institutionalized, parties are formed, merged and
disbanded too often.  Therefore, we cannot directly use party identification to analyze
voting turnout in Korea.  In their place, the general orientation toward the governing
parties and the opposition parties are used.10  While Korean voters do not have strong and
enduring identification with a particular party, there are voters who identify with the
governing party while other voters prefer opposition parties regardless of their names.
There has never been a peaceful change of governments until the 1997 presidential
election.  Most governing parties have been conservative while most major opposition
parties have been progressive.  Korean voters accordingly have obtained distinct feelings
toward governing and opposition parties.  Thus, those who are not interested in parties or
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in which parties are elected, should not participate in the election.  It is expected that the
probabilities of turnout among Korean voters who have governing or opposition party
orientation should be higher than that of turnout among who do not have.11
Political Interest
The significance of studying individual interest in politics is that it is closely
related to other common political activities such as talking politics with others, political
participation, and political knowledge.  Compared to efficacy, political interest deals with
short-term impact in the election (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985).12  This
psychological concept has also been examined for decades in America (Brady, Verba and
Schlozman 1995; Herron 1998; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-43; Milbrath and Goel 1977,
46-8; Shaffer 1981; Verba, Nie and Kim 1971).
Milbrath and Goel (1977), and Verba, Nie and Kim (1971) once reported that
psychological involvement in public affairs is different depending on modes of political
activities.  Political interest is more closely related to participation in election campaign,
participation in community activities, and political protest, but is less essential to voting
turnout, and contacts with public officials.  Kleppner (1982) supports these arguments,
noting that American political interest did not decline between 1960 and 1978, and
arguing that political interest did not cause the drop in turnout during this period.
However, there are studies that link political interest to the decline in turnout.  In his
comparative studies by using pooled data from Britain, West Germany, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Finland, and Canada, Powell (1986) showed that levels of political interest
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 For more on Korean parties and a concept of orientation toward parties, see Chapters 1 and 2.
11 Those who are oriented toward governing or opposition parties are coded 1 and those who are not
(Independents) are coded 0.
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offers substantially different impacts on turnout.  For instance, predicted turnout rate of
those who were not interested in politics at all was only 72 percent while that of those
who were very interested was 90 percent.13  Other studies that employ more refined
methods find that general political interest very significantly affects electoral turnout.
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) conducted simple regression and two-stage least
squares (2SLS) and also found that political interest was more significant on overall
political participation in the 2SLS than in OLS.  As the authors articulated, this is
probably because any error with which political interest was measured was corrected by
2SLS.
In addition, studies that employed specific interest in elections rather than general
political interest show significantly positive effects of the electoral interest on voting
turnout.  Bennett (1986) used an apathy index created by including direct interest in
elections and documented that between the 1960s and 1980s, voting turnout was almost
same among those who were very involved in public affairs, while a significant drop of
turnout occurred among voters whose index was "very apathetic," "slightly apathetic,"
and "neutral."  Brody and Sniderman (1977) incorporated "electoral interest" instead of
general political interest in their model and found that interest in the elections more
strongly predicted voting turnout than duty, efficacy, and concern about the outcome.
This study uses "direct interest in elections" in the turnout model.  In short, as
more ardent basketball fans are more likely to attend basketball games (Casswell and
                                                                                                                                                                            
12 For more on political interest, see chapter 4.
13 These estimates are probit estimates (39).  Those estimates conducted by logit and OLS show similar
results.
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Luskin 1988, 1325), it is expected that the more people are interested in the election,
more likely they are to vote.
Political Mobilization Model
Mobilization model stresses that contextual and political opportunities are major
constraints on political participation (Leighley 1995).  Examples of contextual and
political opportunities are: campaign spending and simultaneous races for higher offices
(Boyd 1989; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985;
Copeland 1983; Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 1993; Patterson and Caldeira 1983), or
informal discussion of politics (Gilbert 1993; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990; Weatherford
1982), effectiveness of party, or candidate organization contacting (Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1992; Wieldhouwer and Lockerbie 1994).
Since these kinds of variables are not available with current Korean data, another
type of mobilization concept is used.  Many earlier scholars such as Deutsch (1961),
Lerner (1958), Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978)
argued a mobilization model: more exposure with community or more interaction with
others in the cities increases political activity.  Deutsch (1961) and Seymour Martin
Lipset (1959) maintained that high literacy, education, modern communication,
consensus on the rules of the game are closely related to democracy, and that these are
higher in urban than in rural areas.
However, as Verba, Nie and Kim has found in their six countries except in
Yugoslavia, turnout is higher in rural areas where in cities since the traditional close
communal life is most often dissolved.  Milbrath and Goel (1977) illustrated this
relationship in their study of Japanese electoral participation and rural areas.  They assert
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that voting rates of Japanese rural areas invariably have been eight to ten percent higher
than those of cities.  They contend that many urban areas have grown so fast that city
dwellers do not easily integrate themselves to their community.  Urbanization,
overcrowding, and crime destroy human spirits and people became anomic.  In contrast,
people in rural areas have greater community integration and hence they cooperate with
each other.  With the increasing spread of mass communication and education in rural
areas, more people incorporate themselves into community.   Milbrath and Goel also
mentioned a phenomenon in Japan that is similar in Korea.  Rural areas in Japan contain
an authoritative tradition by which people obey leaders of the community.  These rural
political machines are more powerful than urban machines.
According to C. Yoon (1990), Khil, Kim, and Ahn (1987), Korean rural areas
were also pre-modernized and therefore it was easier to mobilize people, while it was
harder to mobilize people living in urban areas.  This is because rural people are more
vulnerable to pressure for mobilization by individual politicians or government officials.
C. Kim (1980a, 1980b) accordingly defined mobilized voters in the rural areas as
apolitical voters since their electoral participation does not connote a personal political
meaning.  Rather they went to polls because they had to follow the heads of family,
villages, opinion leaders, or government officials.  C. Kim (1980a, 1980b) and K. Cho
(1996) studied this phenomenon and concluded that political organizations mobilize rural
people.
In fact Korean rural segment has been found to be easily mobilized.  Turnout rates
of Seoul and cities have been lower than those of rural areas in nearly all the elections (C.
Yoon 1990).  For instance, the turnout rate was 66.7 percent in Seoul, 73.5 percent in
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cities, 86.3 percent in mixed areas of cities and counties, and 88.1 percent in rural areas in
1967 presidential election.  This pattern of lower turnout rates in cities or urban areas and
higher turnout rates in rural areas have been present in every election and this
phenomenon is referred to as dojeochongoh in Korea.
Higher turnout in the rural areas is also found in Western countries (Eagles 1991;
Milbrath and Goel 1977; Mishler 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  For instance,
Mishler reports that despite long distance to the polls, voters in the rural areas are most
consistent voters in Canada.  Involvement in community affairs of farmers and rural
villagers is twice that of other citizens in Canada.  Unlike many Korean rural voters,
however, Canadian voters were not heavily persuaded to the polls.  Mishler ascribes
higher voting rates in the Canadian rural areas to the country life that people tend to know
each other better and interact more socially.
However, the substantive difference of turnout between rural and urban areas
cannot be sustained forever.  As rural areas became more developed and mass
communication is more pervasive, the distinction between rural and urban areas declines.
Moreover, due to recent severe regionalism in Korea, voters in large cities in the
Southwest and Southeast vote more than those living in rural areas of other regions (M.
Kim 1995; J. Lee 1995).  N. Lee (1993), after examining the 1992 National Assembly
Election, finally reported that urbanization was not significant in his model of turnout.
By analyzing 1980, 1984, and 1988 Canadian elections, Eagle (ibid.) argues that
whatever forces were responsible for the higher turnouts associated with rural Canada
earlier in this century much have eroded by the 1980s.  None of the three elections show
a significant effect of rural-urban differentials in his model.
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According to Mulgan (1997), Japanese farmers are also losing their electoral
power since absolute size of the agricultural electorate has been reduced.  The number of
Japanese farmers has been halved between 1960 and 1994.  The reduced number of
farmers has been precipitated by rapid urbanization and modernization across the
agricultural industry.  Thus, recent rural villages are not the same as old villages.  As
Mulgan mentioned, this reduced size of rural villages has happened in other Asian
countries such as Taiwan and Korea.  Although there are many studies suggesting that
people from rural areas vote more than other Koreans, it is also true that the differences
between rural areas and others has declined recently.  To explore these different
arguments, a measure indicating rural area is incorporated in the model.14
Methods
In social science binary dependent variables are commonly used (Kilwein 1997;
Krain 1997; Poirier 1994; Swenson 1996; Swers 1998).  Common examples of these in
logit models include workers choosing whether to join workers unions, married-women
deciding whether to work, or voters deciding whether to vote.  Since there are only two
choices in the dependent variable, one is unable to use regular regression analysis
because it may cause a problem for estimating coefficients.  For instance, the regression
line may yield a negative probability for extremely low values of independent variables.
For extremely high values of independent values, the regression line may indicate a
probability much higher than one.  Outcomes of lower than zero or higher than one are
not feasible in the example because there are only two choices of zero or one in the
                                                          
14 The question used for the mobilization variable is not very specific.  The question is where do you
live?  Its choices are 1) large cities, 2) small or medium cities, and 3) rural areas.  It does not indicate
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dependent variable.  To avoid this problem, one may employ the linear probability model
(LPM) that converts probabilities to zero or to one.  As Kennedy (1998, 234) mentions,
LPM is popular due to its computational ease, but sometimes LPM provides outcomes
with certainty even when they may not happen.  One can express LPM as
E(Yi) = 1 * fi(1) + 0 * fi(0) = fi(1)  (1)
Here fi(1) is the probability that a voter decides to vote.  Accordingly, the expected value
of y given x is the probability that y = 1 given x.  One can rewrite (1) as
E(Yi) = "  + $Xi  (2)
Formula (2) indicates that as xk increases by one unit, predicted change in the probability
of voting is $k.  $k is constant since the LPM is linear.  However, in many cases the
increases may not be same.  As illustrated by Long (1997, 39), a woman with more
children will have a lower probability of being employed.  The first child may reduce
probability of being employed by 0.3, the second by 0.2, and the third by 0.05.  This
means the model is not linear.
According to Kennedy, a better solution to the problem of LPM is squeezing the
estimated probabilities inside the 0-1 interval without actually creating probability
estimates of zero or one.  One alternative, commonly employed model is the logit model
that has an S-shaped curve bounded between zero and one.  It is usually defined as
E(Yi) = 1/(1 + e
-" - $Xi)
                     = e" + $Xi/(1 + e" + $Xi)  (3)
where E(Yi) = P(Yi = 1).
One uses natural logarithms and changes the formula (3) to
                                                                                                                                                                            
different areas in terms of size of the areas or number of people living.  By using this question, rural area is
coded 1, and other regions 0.
127
logπi / (1 πi) =  "  + $Xi
where πi = E(Yi) .
Here πi / (1 πi) is the ratio of the odds of Yi = 1 against Yi = 0.  Logit is the ratio of the
two expected responses.  In other words, logit is the natural log of the odds.  While using
logistic errors produce the logit model, using normal errors produces the probit model.15
The choice between logit and probit is a personal preference.  These two functions [logit
and probit] are very similar and in todays software environment; the choice between
them is a matter of taste because both are so easy to estimate (Kennedy 234).   Since the
dependent variable of this chapter, voting turnout, has two categories, voted and not
voted, the logit model is used to analyze the outcome variable in terms of several
covariates.16
Findings and Discussion
Tables 6a and 6b on p. 196-7 show models based on survey data and weighted
data respectively, and they appear very similar in terms of the significance as well as
direction for each variable.  Basic models of 1992 and 1997 contain the same
independent variables, and the 1992 full model includes democracy, and the 1997 full
model also includes efficacy.  The models based on survey data and those using
weighted data look similar, as does their goodness of fit of models.  In order to assess the
fit of models, McKelvey and Zavoinas R2 is used.17   Tables 6a and 6b show that in terms
of the 1992 model, R2 is slightly higher in the weighted model than in the original survey
                                                          
15 Variance of the logit model is assumed π/3 ≈ 3.29, and that of the probit model is assumed 1.
16 Descriptions and coding of variables used in the model are shown in Appendixes 3, 4a and 4b.
17 According to simulation studies of Hagle and Mitchell (1992) and Windmeiher (1995), MeKelvey and
Zavoinas R2 is most appropriate when the underlying binary or ordinal latent variables are used.
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data.  Yet, in terms of 1997 model, R2 is slightly higher in the survey model than in the
weighted model.  Nonetheless, their differences are minor that they can be disregarded.
As Abramson and Aldrich (1982b) and Teixeira (1987) argued that turnout reports at the
NES data, although over-reported, depict the real picture of American society, Korean
over-reported data also seem to provide their electoral participation.  However, before
making a firm conclusion that even over-reported data can describe electoral participation
of the whole Korean population, more studies using voter validation, bigger samples or
other methods should be conducted in the future.   It is too early to generalize that over-
reported data can be used to clearly infer general population based on only two datasets
and the use of weighted variables.
One final diagnostic may be applied to evaluate the quality of the survey models.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves graphically show that the 1992 and 1997
models using survey data have moderate predictive power, as shown in Figures 12a on p.
224 and 12b on p. 225.18  The area beneath the curve in 1992 is almost 79 percent, and
that in 1997 is about 83 percent indicating the models moderate performance.
Since findings are similar between the actual survey data and the weighted data,
findings of survey data are used to explain Korean voter turnout.  Unlike conventional
findings on education and turnout, education is not significant in either 1992 or 1997.
Whether respondents have an elementary education or a college education, their chance
of voting is the same.  To find out how different levels of education affect turnout more
                                                          
18 ROC curve is a graph of sensitivity compared to 1- specificity (Green and Swets 1974).  Sensitivity
reflects observed positive outcome cases that a model correctly classifies, while specificity reflects negative
outcome cases that the model correctly classifies.  The 45-degree line in the graph shows no predictive
power of a model that is 0.5.  As the predictive power increases, the area under the curve is also increasing.
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precisely, predicted values of education can be plotted while all other variables are
controlled.  Figures 13a on p. 226 and 13b on p. 227 show predicted values and 95
percent confidence intervals of education in the 1992 and 1997 elections.  Education
appears to be positively related with the probability of voting, but it is not statistically
significant.19  For instance, in 1992 respondents with elementary education have a
probability of about 0.95 of voting, while all other variables were controlled at their
mean.  Similarly respondents with college level of education or above have an
approximate probability of 0.96 of voting.  The probability difference between the lowest
and highest education levels is nearly same.  The confidence interval around the
probabilities is widest around elementary education.  This means the observations are
sparser at the elementary level of education compared to other levels of education.
Figure 13b looks very similar to Figure 13a.
Education is one of the most important factors in American voter turnout.
Conway (1991), for instance, mentioned that those who have a higher education have the
ability to understand complex political and social events and issues, and to deal with
bureaucratic complexities normally related to voting.  Those who have lower educational
levels may not vote, although they might want to, due to complexity of the process.  In
contrast, voting in Korea is less complex.  Voters go the poll with residence identification
or driver license and mark the one person they prefer among several candidates.  Even
considering all kinds of elections heldpresidential, parliamentary, mayoral, and local
                                                                                                                                                                            
STATA does not provide ROC curves for weighted data and goodness of fit of survey data, and weighted
data cannot be compared with ROC curves.
19 Figure 13a and 13b actually look slightly increasing as educational level changes, but it is only because
the probability in the Figures is between about .91 and about .98.  If their probabilities are shown between 0
and 1, the lines look almost horizontal.
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parliamentary elections, Korean voters cast their votes less than once a year.  In addition,
regional cleavage makes it easier for voters to choose a candidate if they are having a
trouble selecting one.  The insignificance of education in relation to voter turnout in
Korean elections may parallel the findings of Seligson et al. (1995) in Central America.
They found that education was significant in Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, where
the voting rate is low; education was not significant in Honduras, Costa Rica and
Nicaragua where the voting rate is high.  The turnout rates of Korean elections are a little
higher than those of these three latter countries.  Thus, this finding disagrees with
relationship between education and turnout found in the American literature, but it is
close to the findings of some Central American countries.
In contrast to education, age is to be found moderately distinctive in 1992 and
strongly distinctive in 1997.  Younger respondents did not tend to vote while older voters
tended to in both elections.  As Conway argued, voter turnout increases as people age.
Getting older means people may get married, and parents get more often involved with
their communities, government policies, or regulations.  In Korea, the findings on age
support not only the well-established American theories on age, but also confirms that
probabilities of voting among older voters are much higher than those among younger
voters, as suggested by all studies done by Korean scholars.
Regional influences were different in 1992 and 1997.  More voters in the
Southwest areas went to the poll in 1992 than other Koreans.  Yet, the voting probability
of those living in the Southeast is lower, although statistically not significant, than other
Koreans.  Considering the serious regionalism of both the Southeast and the Southwest
areas, the findings about the Southeast are somewhat surprising.  A possible explanation
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involves coalition building of the major leaders.  A few years before the 1992 election,
Kim Young-Sam was politically based in the southern Southeast, Roh Tae-Woo was
from the northern Southeast, and Kim Jong-Pil was from the Central area.  Then they
merged, creating a huge conservative coalition under the name of the Democratic Liberty
Party.  Kim Young-Sam, as a presidential candidate of the coalition, increased his chance
of winning under this new coalition.  However, Kim Dae-Jung, candidate of the largest
opposition party, was campaigning alone against this coalition.  Accordingly, voters
living in the Southwest felt that their candidate might be in a particularly disadvantaged
situation, and significantly more Southwesterners voted, as reflected in Table 6a.  Those
in the Southeast, however, felt that their candidate was in an advantageous situation, and
their turnout rate was not significantly different from that of other Koreans.  In sum,
despite regionalism between people living in the Southeast and the Southwest, evaluation
of their candidates chance of winning affected their decision of electoral participation.
Compared to the regional effects of 1992, both the Southeast and the Southwest
are, however, significant in 1997 and the Southeast is much stronger than the Southwest
in both basic and full models.  The different effects of the Southeast and the Southwest
may be explained by the same reason.  When the candidate based in the Southeast was in
a better position than the Southwestern candidate in 1992, Southwestern regional effects
were greater than those of the Southeast.  Exactly the opposite coalition happened in
1997.  When the candidate based in the Southwest was in a better position than the
Southeastern candidate in 1997, Southeastern regional effects were greater than the
Southwest.  Kim Dae-Jung allied with Kim Jong-Pil one month before the election, and
he could garner broader support not only from his region but also from Kim Jong-Pil's
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Central area.  Yet the ruling candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, was campaigning alone against
the two Kims alliance.20  Actually, Lees support was reduced in the Southeast.  Rhee In-
Je defected from the ruling party and announced that he would create his own party and
run for the presidency.  Accordingly, voters in the Southeast felt that their candidate
Lee or/and Rheewas in a difficult position due to coalition of Kim Dae-Jung and Kim
Jong-Pil.  This does not mean, however, that the 1997 Southwest regionalism is as weak
as the 1992 Southeast regional effect on turnout.  Compared to the non-effect of the 1992
Southeast regionalism, that of 1997 Southwest is much stronger even though their
candidate is in a more advantageous situation.  Their full support is probably because
their candidate, Kim Dae-Jung was running for the candidacy for the 4th time, and they
knew that it would be his last bid.  Southwesterners knew that if he had failed in the 1997
election, the Southwest area would not have a presidential candidate as popular as Kim
Dae-Jung for a long time.  For that reason, the Southwestern effect on turnout was strong
in 1997 although Kim Dae-Jung was in an advantageous position.
The psychological model of voting asserts that voter participation depends on
peoples attitudes towards politics.  In the model of Korean presidential voting, most
psychological factors look very significant.  Electoral interest is the most consequential
element in the 1992 and 1997 models.  Those who were more interested in the election
turned out more than those who were not.  This finding is similar to that of Brody and
Snidermans (1977) studies and other analyses of American voting.  They reported that
electoral interest provides the most significant impact on American electoral participation
                                                          
20 In fact, Cho Soon, former Mayor of Seoul, joined Lee but his contribution was minimal.
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compared with other variables: duty, efficacy, or concern about the outcome.  Importance
of electoral interest on turnout now is more supported.
While electoral interest was found to be very significant, Korean voters
orientation toward the governing party and the opposition parties did not matter in 1992.
Whether voters preferred the ruling party, opposition parties or the Independents did not
substantially affect voter turnout.  This may indicate a partys unpopularity or
insignificance, or the stage of development of political parties in Korean politics.
            Unlike in 1992, party orientation was very significant in the 1997 election.  More
voters among those who preferred either the governing party or opposition parties voted
than Independents.  This indicates that those voters who were attracted to either the
governing party or its opposition parties cared more about the election outcome than did
independents.  Why was this orientation significant in the 1997 election and not in 1992?
In January 1990, when the three conservative parties merged together, Roh Tae-Woos
Democratic Justice Party was the ruling party, and Kim Young-Sams Reunification
Democratic Party and Kim Jong-Pils New Democratic Republican Party were opposition
parties.  The merging of the ruling and opposition parties resulted in greater confusion
toward the parties in the 1992 election as opposed to the 1997 election.  In 1997 Kim
Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil entered into a contract where Kim Dae-Jung would be
presidential candidate, thus providing a single candidate for the electorate.  And since
both Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil had represented the opposition parties the line
between governing and opposition parties was much clearer in 1997.  As a result party
orientation was more significant to turnout in 1997.
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Baloyra-Herp (1995) has shown in the El Salvador elections and other countries,
if political or electoral systems are not working properly, voters may consider that their
votes will not be counted properly or only candidates from the ruling party will be
benefited.  In these situations, the voting rate will go down.  Table 6a supports this
argument.  Those Korean respondents who regarded the Central Election Commission
(CEC) as working fairly voted more than those who did not in both 1992 and 1997.
According to Table 6a, perceived fairness of the CEC is more significant in 1992 than the
perceived general level of democracy.  This suggests that the fairness of the electoral
apparatus is more important to Koreans decision to vote than is their overall evaluation
of the larger political systems democracy.  The role of the CEC, the electoral overseers,
should be very important on voting turnout in Korea.  If higher turnout is an indicator of a
healthy democracy, then in the future the CEC should continue to be independent and
neutral in supervising whole electoral process.
The final psychological factor, efficacy, matters greatly to voter turnout.  The
efficacy distinctiveness is very convincing.  When voters believe that they can effect
government they participate in the political process at a greater rate, and with greater
intensity.  As Powell (1986) indicated in his studies of eight developed countries and
Timpone (1998) argued in his analysis of NES data, as the level of voter's efficacy
increases turnout also increases.  The variable used for efficacy is whether I vote or not
is not important since too many people are voting.  Hence if the voters considered their
votes were important they would have a high degree of efficacy and would vote, and vice
versa.
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The mobilization hypothesis argues that in the rural areas of Korea people were
dependant on family, friends and village leaders for their political information.  As a
consequence they were easily mobilized to vote. This was particularly true during the
1970s through the mid1980s.  In studies of Canada and Japan this same pattern was found
to occur up to the 1970s (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Mishler 1979).  In Korea since the mid
1980s this rural mobilization has declined just as in Canada (Eagle 1991) and Japan
(Malgan 1997) did in the 1980s.  There are several factors that help explain reduced
mobilization in Korea.  One reason is the movement of people out of the rural area into
the urban area.  Second, political campaigns have increasingly relied upon the mass
media that contribute to more independent decision-making, as J. Lee (1995) indicated.
Contingency tables also confirm rural residences lack of effect on turnouts.
Tables 7a on p. 198 and 7b on p. 199 show that more respondents living in rural areas
seem to vote more than respondents living in cities.  For instance, about 95 percent of
people living in rural areas voted in 1992 while about 93 percent of respondents living in
cities voted.   This pattern was repeated in 1997 when approximately 94 percent of voters
from rural areas voted compared to 92 percent from city areas.  However, X2 indicates
that the relationship is not statistically significant.  The impact of rural voting on turnout
in Korean presidential election seems to have diminished.
Since interest in elections was shown to be the most important factor shaping
turnout, as shown in Tables 6a and 6b, Figures 14a on p. 228 and 14b on p. 229 are
created to indicate the effect of interest in elections on turnout among three different
kinds of groups: High-probability Respondents, Average-probability Respondents and
Low-probability Respondents.  These three groups are created based on statistically
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significant variables in Tables 6a and 6b.  High-probability Respondents are defined as
those who show positively significant relationship to turnout in terms of significant
independent variables.  The Average-probability Respondents consist of respondents
by controlling all variables at their mean, and the Low-probability Respondents are
those who show a negative relationship to turnout.  These figures clearly describe
influence of important variables on turnout as the voters' electoral interest changes.
In the 1992 election, the three groups are defined by three items: age,
Southwest regional effect, and evaluation of the CECs fairness.  First, the top line
indicates High-probability Respondents who are over 30, voters living in the Southwest
and those who evaluate the CEC to be fair are most likely to vote.  Their probability of
voting is greater than 0.9 and slowly increases as their level of electoral interest increases.
Second, the bottom line shows Low-probability Respondents, and they were in their
20s, living outside of the Southwest, and those who evaluated the CEC to be unfair.
When their interest is only weak (1), the probability of their voting is about 0.6, but it
increases up to about 0.9 as their interest increases to high (3).  This change in the
likelihood of voting is most conspicuous among three kinds of groups in 1992.   Thus,
interest in the election increases the likelihood of Low-probability Respondents
becoming Voters.  Even those who are low in their interest still show that they would go
to the poll.  Third, the middle line indicates Average-probability Respondents.   They
are almost identical to that of Low-probability Respondents, but their starting
probability (about 0.8) is higher than that of Low-probability Respondents when their
interest is low.  Generally, Figure 14a indicates that voting probability of the three
different kinds of groups in 1992 increases as their electoral interest increases from low
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to high.  Their lowest probability is 0.6, meaning that even if their electoral interest were
low, they would probably vote in the 1992 election.
Compared to Figure 14a, Figure 14b looks very different.  Three groups of voters
were created by a combination of statistically significant variables in the 1997 model:
efficacy, evaluation of the CEC fairness, age, party orientation and voters living in the
Southeast and the Southwest, while their interest in the elections varies.  First, High-
probability Respondents are those who would had high efficacy, perceived the CEC to
be fair, had governing/opposition party orientation, lived in the Southeast and the
Southwest, and were over 30 years old.  This provided nearly linear monotonous pattern,
even as their electoral interest increased.  They are most likely to vote regardless of their
electoral interest.  Second, those Average-probability Respondents whose line was
created by holding all independent variables at their mean were affected moderately by
different levels of electoral interest.  As their interest in the election increases, their
probability of voting also slowly increases.  Their probability of voting is very high with
lowest probability at about 0.8.
One of the most interesting findings of Figure 14b is regarding those Low-
probability Respondents.  These were voters who had low efficacy, evaluated the CEC
as unfair, were Independent, in their 20s, and lived in areas other than the Southeast and
the Southwest.  Unlike other groups in 1992 and 1997, their probability of voting rapidly
increased from about 0.2 up to about 0.8 as their campaign interest increases.  Unlike
their counterparts of 1992, turnout probability of the Low-probability Respondents in
1997 is very low when their interest in election is low or even moderate.  Their turnout
would not be feasible since their probability of voting much lower than 0.5.  This is a
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very significant finding of the 1997 election.  Those who had lower efficacy, perceived
the CEC to be unfair, were Independent, in their twenties and lived in other than the
Southeast and the Southwest probably would not vote when their electoral interest was
below the moderate level.  As shown in Chapter 2, those who were more interested in the
election voted for opposition candidates while those who were less interested would vote
for the governing candidate.  In 1992, less-interested voters participated in the election,
and this is one explanation of why the ruling candidate, Kim Young-Sam, won the
election.  In contrast, in 1997 this group of voters did not vote, and it was a major reason
the ruling candidate, Lee, did not garner enough votes to win.  If those less-interested
voters had followed the pattern of 1992 and voted, Lee might have won the 1997
election.  Figures 14a and 14b clearly suggest that there are substantive differences
between High-probability Respondents and Low-probability Respondents.  While
studying impacts of who voted and who did not on the result of elections, Piven and
Cloward (1989) found that non-voters preferred Cater by 51 % to Reagan by 37%.  If all
the non-voters in the 1980 U.S. presidential election had voted, Reagan might not have
been elected.  Herron (1998) also documented that Bush was significantly helped by
lower voter turnout (50.1%) in 1988.  This is because most non-voters would have
strongly supported Dukakis.  The 1997 Korean presidential election was similar in that
Kim Dae-Jung severely benefited by a lower-turnout rate.  It was the second lowest
turnout among Koreas nine direct presidential elections.
Economic Model of Turnout
Minimal or scarce effort has been made to explain the effects of economics on
Korean voter turnout.  Since the economy affects all citizens it is reasonable to assume
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that it would have an impact on voter turnout.  There are three major economic theories
that have been associated with voter turnout.  The first argues economic conditions have
no or weak impact on turnout.  Fiorina (1978) and Conway(1991) maintain that there is
not a fundamental relationship between financial conditions and turnout.  Schlozman and
Verba (1979) argued that it is the social characteristics of the unemployed that drives
decisions of electoral participation rather than the differences between the employed and
the unemployed.  Dugan and Taggart (1995) used aggregate time-series data for the U.S.
House and presidential elections between 1880 and 1960 and found that the impact of
changing economic conditions on turnout is negligible.  Their main argument of no
relationship between economy and turnout was that voters have two separate mental
dimensionspolitical and economicand that they are not related.  Poor economic
conditions may not be simply improved by increase or decrease of turnout.  It may be
more related to who is in charge of the government.
The second is the so-called mobilization model (Schlozman and Verba 1979)
that explains that economic adversity boosts voter turnout.  Southwell (1996) noted that a
4.4 percent increase of turnout in the 1992 U.S. presidential election was likely caused by
a participation of "have-nots."  This argument is related to the reward-punishment theory
in that incumbent candidates or parties are evaluated in terms of their economic
performance in the elections.  Those voters who are hurt more economically are more
mobilized to cast ballots.  However, do those who are economically less off have enough
resources to go to the polls?
Finally, there is the argument that difficult economic condition reduces electoral
participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Sniderman and Brody 1977).  Caldeira,
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Patterson and Markko (1985) found that unemployed voters were 12 percent less likely to
vote than the employed ones.  Rosenstone (1982) specifically studied the different kinds
of the financial difficulty that voters experience.  Voters who are financially worse-off,
unemployed and poor are less mobilized to vote.  Rosenstone indicates that for his group
of voters, severe opportunity costs may interrupt their turnout (41).  These voters have
to survive in a less secure environment.  They cannot easily spend their valuable time on
outward political activities.  Under the poor economic conditions, as shown in Chapter 2,
those Korean voters who were poor or evaluated past economy negatively should have
different behavior of voting turnout from the others.  Thus, following hypotheses are
deduced.
H1: Those who have higher level of living standards should vote more than those who
have lower level of living standards (1992 and 1997 elections).
H2: Those who evaluate national economy more positively should vote more than those
who evaluate national economy more negatively (1992 election).
H3: Those who evaluate that national economy has affected family economy more
positively should vote more than those who evaluate that national economy has affected
family economy more negatively (1997 election).
Findings and Discussion
Logit model of Korean turnout in Table 8 on p. 200 shows that the findings of the
other factors are nearly the same with those of turnout models (Tables 6a and 6b) that do
not include economic variables and their explanation is not repeated here.  Although the
national economy and standard of living in 1992 are statistically weak, they support
an argument that difficult economic situations reduce turnout.  Those who viewed the
economy better in the past 1-2 years voted more than the others who did not in the 1992.
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Moreover, those who had higher levels of standards of living vote out more than those in
the lower level.  Their turnout was affected by severe opportunity costs, as argued by
Rosenstone.
Figures 15a and 15b on p. 230 and p. 231 respectively show predicted values and
their 95 percent confidence intervals of national economy and living standards in the
1992 election.  Both figures were created with all other independent variables controlled
at their mean, while national economy and living standards respectively varying.  Both of
them are positively related to turnout.  In Figure 15a, those who evaluated the national
economy more weakly have a probability of about a 0.95 of turnout.  However,
respondents who evaluated the national economy better have an approximate probability
of 0.97 turnout.  Figure 15b looks similar to Figure 15a.  The difference between the
lowest category and the highest category is about 0.03.  The confidence interval of the
probabilities is most narrow around respondents who were in the middle in their levels of
standard of living, suggesting more observations in that category than others.  In short,
these two figures generally show marginal influences of the national economy and living
standards on voting in the 1992 election.
The effects of economic variables on the turnout, however, are nearly non-
existent in the 1997 election.  Probability of voter turnout of those who regarded that their
family economy influenced by the better national economic policies were almost the
same as that of those who regarded that their family economy worsened by policies.
Moreover, different levels of standard living caused a similar impact on the turnout.  As
Fiorina and Conway ask, is there no fundamental relationship between financial
situations and turnout?  Do voters have two separate mental dimensions of politics and
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economics?  Family economy and living standards were marginally significant in the
1992 election, but they were not in 1997 when the country was almost bankrupt.  It is
premature to declare the null effects of economy on voter turnout due to the sparse
measures currently available regarding the economy.  As in the candidate choice model,
one needs to examine more economic indicators to examine their precise influences on
voting turnout.
Conclusion
In order to examine the extent of over-reporting in the surveys, weighted variables
were created and examined against the actual survey data.  Comparing the two data sets,
the findings and fitness of models look so similar to each other that one may reasonably
conclude that even over-reported data clearly depicted the Korean population.
Among several psychological factors, electoral interest was the most important
both in 1992 and 1997.  Those who were more interested in elections participated in the
elections more than those less interested.  Korean voters indicated that they would not
vote if the CEC were perceived to be unfair.  For them, the role of the CEC supervising
elections is crucial for fair elections.  In other words, only those who regarded the CEC to
be fair in both elections would vote.
Moreover, the debate of the role of regionalism in Korean elections has generated
severe controversy, particularly the role of the rural voters.  This controversy needs to be
reevaluated in light of the rapid mobility that is occurring in Korea.  As people move
from rural areas to urban areas their traditional means of electoral knowledgethe
family, friends, and village leadershas been broken.  In addition, the number of people
living in the rural areas is steadily declining making them less attractive to the
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presidential candidates.  The style of campaigning is also undergoing a profound change
as well.  Where once campaigns were personalized and large rallies were held, since the
1990s they have been primarily conducted through the media.
Finally, unlike expectation, the economic model of voter turnout shows marginal
influences of the national economy and living standards on turnout in the 1992 election.
The effects of economic variables on the turnout, however, are nearly non-existent in the
1997 election.  As found in the economic model of candidate choice in Chapter 2, past
evaluation of economic conditions are not consistently important on turnout in both
presidential elections.
One of the most profound findings of this chapter was the role of Low-
probability participants.  These Low-probability participants whose interest in the
election was lower showed a greater likelihood of not voting in the 1997 election than in
the 1992 election.  Those who had lower efficacy, who evaluated the CEC to be unfair,
who were Independent, who were in their 20s, and lived in areas other than the Southwest
or the Southeast had a higher probability of non-voting when their interest was lower in
the 1997 election.  Considering that highly interested voters tend to choose opposition
candidates while low interested voters tend to choose the ruling candidate in Korea,
abstention of low interested voters in 1997 benefited Kim Dae-Jung and was a major
reason of the first peaceful transfer of power in Korea.
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CHAPTER 4
INTEREST IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Introduction
One of the better-known aspects of mass belief systems in political science is
"interest in politics." The psychological concept has been examined for decades in
America (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-3; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46-8; Van Deth 1990;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  The significance of studying individual interest in
politics is that "citizens who are interested in politics--who follow politics, who care
about what happens, and who are concerned with who wins and losesare more
politically active" (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46).  In other words, political interest is
closely related to common political activities such as talking politics with others, political
participation, and political knowledge.
Unlike other areas of electoral studies such as candidate choice or voting turnout,
research on political interest has received less attention.  While political interest has
received less attention than other measures in the study of American voting behavior,
there have been few systematic attempts to ascertain its importance in Korean voting.
Drawing from the literature on political interest developed in the United States, this
chapter develops electoral interest models for the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential
elections.  Since the 1987 Democratization Movement, Koreans interest in presidential
elections has increased.  As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, interest in elections was a major
predictor of candidate choice and voter turnout.  Those who were highly interested in the
election chose opposition candidates, but those who were less interested preferred ruling
candidates.  In addition, less interested voters did not vote in the elections, contributing to
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the win of Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 who had been dubbed as permanent opposition leader,
in the 1997 election.  The intent of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of
what motivates the Korean electorate to become interested in elections.  Through the use
of an ordinal logit model the sociological factors, their interaction terms, stump
campaigns, media effectspresidential debates, campaigning commercials, and speeches
on televisionand candidate popularity to explore their impacts on political interest in
Korean presidential campaigns are examined.
In addition to employing a more appropriate method fit for ordinal characteristics
of the dependent variable, political interest, binomial analysis of sociological variables as
well as joint tests of these variables and their interaction terms are used.  Interaction
terms usually cause high multicollinearity, becoming a major reason interaction terms of
sociological variables have not been often used, despite theoretical importance.  By
making sociological variables centered, these variables are free of multicollinearity and
their coefficients are accurately interpreted.  Finally, it is assumed that Korean political
interest was significantly affected by massive outdoor stump campaigning in 1992 and
presidential debates in 1997.  Influences of stump campaigning and presidential debates
on political interest are more closely investigated while controlling voters age.  In
Korean electoral behavior, age seems most important among sociological predictors. This
study has incorporated age in the candidate choice model and found out that older voters
significantly tended to vote for governing candidates and while younger voters tended to
vote for opposition candidates.  Age was also found to effect Korean voter turnout
substantially.  Although the younger voters in general lack political interest,  as people
age, they began to regard politics relevant for their lives.  Thus, impact of stump
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campaigning and presidential debates on electoral interest in the 1992 and 1997
presidential elections should also depend on different age groups.
Operationalization of Political Interest
There are many ways of operationalizing political interest.  Van Deth (1990, 281-
87) has employed the most comprehensive measure of political interest.  To reduce
ambiguity and unreliability of the self-rating question of political interest, Van Deth
included in his scale for political interest: subjective interest, general interest in the
survey, reading about politics in the newspaper, discussing politics with friends, attending
a political meeting, and closeness to political parties.  His six indicators represented "one
for subjective interest, another for external observation, three for positive salience of
politics, and one for party identification (286)."  He used this scale to compare political
interest among three countries, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United States.
He found that during the late 1970s the level of political interest was highest in the
United States, moderately lower in West Germany and lowest in the Netherlands.
Another method measuring political interest was developed by Verba and Nie
(1972, 367-69).  Their "Index of Psychological Involvement in Politics" was composed of
several indicators such as general interest in politics, engagement in political discussions
and media utilization for political purposes.  Both of these methods of operationalizing
political interest use people's general political interest.  This general interest, however,
may not be the same as particular interest in elections.  Lipset (1981, 196-6) viewed
political interest to be closely related to political crisis.  For instance, Americans' political
interest was very high during national emergencies such as the taking of U.S. hostages in
Teheran, Watergate, and the Vietnam War (Bennett 1986, 51-52).  With these exceptions,
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people's interest in politics was usually higher during election campaigns than during
non-election years.  Thus, general political interest cannot fully capture the interest of
particular campaign.  Almond and Verba (1963) in their seminal work, The Civic Culture,
used an indicator they named "Civic Cognition" to test for political interest.  Bennett
(1986) and Bennett and Bennett (1989) called theirs "Political Apathy Index" after
combining political interest and electoral interest.  By indexing the general and particular
campaign interest variables, these authors were able to measure more precisely voters'
political interest.
In this study, direct "interest in election" is used due to the lack of indicators in
the dataset.1  This study, then, examines only partial political interest of Korean voters.
However, this restriction still allows us to use a measure similar to those used in
American electoral studies.  For instance, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), and
Verba, Schlozman and Bradley (1995), and others have relied on a single variable,
interest in elections that has been commonly used since the 1950s (Dalton 1996).  This
study examines specifically Korean voters interest in the 1992 and 1997 Korean
presidential elections.  The survey question used was "How much were you interested in
the [Presidential] election?""very interested, somewhat interested, not much interested
or not at all."
                                                          
1 It should be noted that the data used in this analysis represent the most comprehensive study of the
Korean electorate to data.  However, due to the nature of the data only a partial examination of political




Many studies have shown that there is a higher relationship between sociological
variables and interest in elections (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 143-80; Hayes and Bean
1993b; Inglehart 1981; Jennings 1998; Milbrath and Goel 1976, 107-27 and 116-8;
Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994; Van Deth 1990, 301-12; Verba, Burns, and
Schlozman 1997; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  Among the sociological variables,
education is the most significant (Bennett 1986, 68).  For example, those who have
higher level of education typically have greater skills and knowledge to assist them in
understanding of politics better.  Campbell (1962, 20) speculated that education is more
likely to increase people's acquaintance with political facts, allows personal implications
of political events, or maximize people's confidence in their own ability to act
competently politically.  Baxter and Lansing (1983, 43) argued that if voters were not
equipped with "a broadened world view and a set of reasoning skills," they could not be
interested in elections.  Even if some voters are interested in elections, their interest may
be extinct when faced with complexities.
Another main indicator is age.  The older tend to become more interested in
elections.  The younger voters traditionally lack interest in politics and elections.  In
addition, they tend to move more often than their older counterparts.  It is not until one
reaches ones thirties that their lives become more stable: employment or family, they are
about to conceive politics as relevant for their lives (Van Deth 302-3).
Gender is also significantly related to political interest.  While studies show
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that the stereotyping role of the female is longer true (Van Deth 1990), there are many
studies that suggest that women are less interested in the politics.  According to
Lazarsfeld et al. (1940, 45), for instance, "33 percent of the men but only 23 percent of
the women professed great interest in the election."  Lipset (1981, 206) found that women
in most countries were expected to have less concern with politics due mainly to the
demands of a homemaker and mother.
           Although existing literature argues that sociological factors are strongly
significant, their effects on political interest have not been thoroughly studied.  For
instance, while studies indicated these sociological variables are interrelated on their
effects on political interest (Van Deth 1990), there are few empirical studies to test these
arguments.  According to Sapiro (1983, 91), women have had a more difficult time
obtaining formal education.  Recently there is more opportunity for women to go to
colleges than there was prior to the Second World War.  Although women, in general, are
less interested in politics, the more educated women tend to be interested in national and
international affairs.  In examining the relationship between education and interest in
presidential elections for men and women, Baxter and Lansing (1983) claim that the
interest gap between men and women decreases with increases of educational levels.
They found that education effects campaign interest for women more than men.  Despite
their theoretical arguments on interaction effects, thorough empirical analysis has been
rare due to the problem of multicollinearity between sociological variables and/or their
interaction terms.  Multicollinearity is caused by large variances and the estimates of the
regression coefficients are highly imprecise (Kmenta 1997).  The best way to take care of
multicollinearity is to exclude the problem variable from the model.  However, this raises
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the question of which is more important, methodological or theoretical considerations?
Although it is true that any finding contaminated by collinearity cannot be interpreted
properly, theoretical arguments about sociological interaction terms and political interest
cannot be totally disregarded, unless the collinearity is far too serious (Studlar and
Moncrief 1997).  Moreover, if there is a remedy such as using centered variables, one
does not have to exclude variables that cause multicollinearity.  Examination of these
variables should satisfy both theoretical and methodological considerations.  This chapter
includes interaction terms between age, gender, and education in the model of interest in
elections.
Another sociological indictor that should significantly affect Korean electoral
interest is region.  Since the early electoral studies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee
1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944), region has been a major factor in
explanation of voting behavior.  Korea has endured severe regionalism that is mainly
economic.  Despite their similar size of population and land, the Southeast region of the
country is more developed and contains the largest area of the industrial facilities, while
the Southwest region is the nations agricultural heartland.  This regionalism has had a
direct impact on presidential elections, with all past four presidents coming from the
Southeast (C. Park 1993; K. Cho 1998; K. Lee 1997).
Media Effect
Most studies of political interest or campaign interest have focused on the factors
such as age, education, and gender.  Until recently the impact of mass media has been
neglected (Weaver, Drew and Wu 1998).  One reason is the difficulty in measuring this
media impact.  Another is rapid growth of the media, and finally the literature on the
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media is inconclusive.  Before the Second World War, direct effects were assumed, and
after the war, studies found that effects of media had minimal effects (Kinder and Sears
1985, Patterson 1980; Klapper 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954).  However,
more recent and refined models deny both these two extreme arguments.  Media perform
a significant role in agenda-setting, framinghow the media select to portray the issues
they deal withand primingwhen an activated part of thought spreads to other parts of
the network(Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Beck 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987;
Roberts and Maccoby 1985).  Media impact is also contingent on audience characteristics
(Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980).  Those who perceive media as favoring certain
candidates tend to regard media as hostile rather than neutral or supportive (Beck 1991).
The study of medias affects on the electoral process have focused primarily on its
portrayal of who is winning or the impact of campaigning events, but rarely have there
been studies on the medias impact on arousing interest in politics.  Only recently have
scholars begun to address this aspect of the media and elections.  One study indicated
"those with high levels of interest in politics were more likely to seek reinforcement,
more likely to seek media help in making voting decision, more likely to seek
information, and also more likely to follow the media coverage, to enjoy the excitement
of the campaign" (Miller 1991, 20).  His argument is that peoples interest in politics
continuously affects their media use.  Those who have low interest in politics may not
want or seek political information.  However, we need to be more careful about direction
of the relationship between media and political interest.  The precise role of the media in
the electoral process is yet to be determined, but what is accepted is that the media's role
in the political process is increasing (Zaller 1992).  Most American voters claim that the
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media is their primary source for political information and television is the most
believable form of news (Glynn et al. 1999).
There has been a long history regarding the media and politics.  A central issue
involves the causal relationship.  Do the media cause people to discuss politics, or does
the people's interest in politics cause the media to report on the election?  While a number
of studies have attempted to address this issue, the result is that none have been
successful and most agree that relationship is two-way.  However, nearly all agree that
media perform an increasingly important role in the electoral process.  The media may
not tell the voter what to think, but they do tell them what to think about.  Mondak
(1995), for example, suggests that media exposure fuels political discussion, not vice
versa.  He collected data from a post-election survey by a quasi-experimental design.  He
surveyed Allegheny County in Pennsylvania and Cuyahoga County in Ohio
simultaneously.  Voters in the Cleveland, Ohio could read local newspapers while those
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania could not during the 1992 campaign owing to a newspaper
strike in Pittsburgh.  Before the author started his experiment, he had found that there was
a strong similarity across many individual-level sociological characteristics between
these two areas so that any difference between the two cities was not caused by the
sociological characteristics of the two cities.  The Pittsburgh newspaper strike
significantly affected local House campaigns.  Pittsburgh voters did not discuss the local
elections as much as their counterparts in Cleveland, since Pittsburgh residents obtained
less information on the local congressional elections.  Mondaks study indicates that
news reports offer some topics of the political discussions, not vice versa.  One can
therefore deduce from his study that mass media surely propel voters' interest in
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elections.  Glynn et al. finally argued that even the most politically disenfranchised and
disinterested people find major campaigns hard to avoid, especially given their play on
television (1999, 440).
                Do the media perform a similar function in Korean elections as in America?
Holt-Bucha and Kaid (1995) and Gurevitch and Blumler (1990, 311) assert that practices
of the American political communications industry are popular in other countries.
According to these authors, American video-politics is characterized by the dominant role
of television, the prevalence of images rather than issues, and the professionalization of
political actors.
To examine the role of the political communications in Korea this chapter
examines the effects of street speeches, televised campaign advertisements and speeches
in the 1992 election, and televised presidential debates, campaign commercials and
campaign speeches in the 1997 election.2  Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon (1992, 101-2)
argued that American presidential debates on television were among the most watched
political programs and were one of the most important events to occur during the
campaigning.  They found that eighty percent of Americans viewed at least one debate in
the 1960 election, and nearly 90 percent watched at least one in 1976.  Presidential
debates have reached more than 100 million people.  Joslyn (1990) indicated that unlike
other kinds of political campaign, presidential debates do not allow the candidates to
manipulate the audience.  In addition, voters learn from debates about issues and
differences between candidates (Hellweg, Pfau and Brydon 1992; Zhu, Milavsky and
Biswas 1994).  Finally, Weaver and Drew (1995) claimed that viewing presidential
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debates was the strongest predictor on being interested in the 1992 U.S. presidential
election.  Televised presidential debates were introduced for the first time in the 1997
Korean presidential election and were seen by millions of viewers (Shim 1997).
Television emerged as a powerful campaign method in Korean politics.   Presidential
debates have become an important means of communication and should draw attention to
the election in Korea.
Electoral interest model of this chapter also controls campaign commercials and
speech on television.  They were also introduced in Korea to reduce tension, disorders,
and huge expenses associated with stump campaign (H. Kwon 1997; Tak, Kaid and Lee
1997).  Korean electoral interest must have been provoked by televised campaigning
speeches made by the candidates and nationally well-known persons who support a
candidate.  The television coverage of questions and answers at the Kwanhoon Club
where major candidates answered almost any kinds of questions from the reporters were
very popular (H. Kwon 1997).  Additionally, there has been an explosion of televised
political advertisements.  No other medium [than electoral commercials on television]
can bring a given message to millions of viewers nationally (Glynn et al. 1999, 432).
Each presidential candidate was allowed to place ten commercials on the electronic
media (five on radio and five on television) in 1992 (Tak, Kaid and Lee 1997) and to
place twenty commercials in the 1997 election (Shim 1997).  Thus, one expects that
campaign speeches and political advertisements on television should have a substantial
impact voters' interest in the presidential elections.
Prior to the 1997 presidential election, major candidates gave speeches directly to
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 These variables are measured by asking respondents whether they experienced the events or not.  For
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the people with tens of thousands of people gathering in a single area.  Since giant
political rallies were norm of the past Korean elections" (J. Shim 1997, 17), one expects
that street speeches would increase electoral interest of a large number of voters.
Politicians who had rhetorical skills and eloquence before mass audiences became
popular leaders, such as Kim Young-Sam or Kim Dae-Jung.  Yet, these open speeches
also produced disruptions based primarily on regionalism.  When candidates from a
different region were speaking in these large open areas people often hurled stones at the
candidates and fight occurred between supporters of the candidates and those from the
local region.  Some candidates, consciously or unconsciously, made more regionally
antagonistic remarks in order to increase support in their own home region (H. Choi
1996).  Stump speeches also had the problem that candidates attempted to show their
popularity and mobilize supporters by paying people to attend these speeches.  Preparing
for street speeches was very expensive for candidates and was one of the main reasons
for corruption in Korean elections.  Two presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo,
were sentenced to prison on charges of corruption tied to their excessive campaign
expenditureexpenditures where a large proportion was of the money was allocated for
stump speeches (J. Shim).  Shim further asserts that Kim Young-Sam spent more than
one billion dollars in the 1992 election mostly to gathering crowds for his rallies.  To
resolve this kind of vicious cycle, Korea banned massive street speech from the 1997
presidential election.  Despite its negative side effects, stump campaigning should be an
important contributor to electoral interest in the 1992 election.
                                                                                                                                                                            
more, see Appendixes 5-6b.
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Candidate-Centered Politics
In order to examine voters' interest in Korean presidential elections, this chapter
develops a model that also includes the popularity of major candidates.  Unlike many
Western countries, Korea does not have strong independent parties.  The Liberal Party
that had dominated Korean politics right after its independence was created and
developed by President Rhee to keep power and to erect supra-partisan politics (K. Yoon
1995).  Governing parties developed later were also created to publicize policies and
issues initiated by administration or the KCIA under the military rule.  Thus, ruling
parties were pseudo-military group that followed the orders from the leader and failed to
adjust different interests of the society (K. Yoon).  To fight against the military
governments and their parties, opposition parties were also authoritatively managed and
only loyalty to the leadership in the party was allowed.  When General Chun took power
after assassination of President Park in late 1979, he banned most existing parties and
politicians including Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung because they were corrupt,
and allowed only docile parties.  These parties cooperated with the ruling Liberal Justice
Party and became friend parties to the ruling party (S. Koh 1995).  Both Kims formed
the New Korean Democratic Party just prior to the 1985 Assembly election, and it won
103 seats in the election to lead democratic reforms.  Thus, Korean politics has been
dominated by a few well-known figures.  It is boss politics.  Major presidential
candidates such as Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-Sam or Lee Hoi-Chang who was
nominated in 1997, all have wielded powers in Korean politics.  This results in personal
loyalties, not party loyalties.  Therefore, it is expected that voters personal orientation
toward a candidate should arouse their interest in politics.  Respondents identification
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with two major candidates in each election Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung in
1992 and Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997is incorporated to the model to
determine their impacts on interest in elections.
Methods
The first step in analyzing political interest in Korean elections is an examination
of the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model, as shown at Appendixes 5,
6a and 6b.  All the independent variables employed in the model are free of
multicollinearity.3  This chapter controlled several interaction variables between age,
education and gender based on the literature of political interest to determine their
interactive significance on voters' campaign interest.  By using centered sociological
terms, models of this chapter are free of multicollinearity that is commonly found in
incorporating interaction terms.
Since the dependent variable, electoral interest, is ordinal, as shown in Table 9a
on p. 201, ordinal logit regression is employed instead of regular OLS.  Problems of
using OLS for models whose dependent variable is ordinal are similar to those of using
OLS for models whose dependent variable is dichotomous, as shown in Chapter 3.
                                                          
3When there is a severe multicollinearity problem in the model, STATA automatically deletes variables
that cause the problem.  None of the variables including interaction terms both in the 1992 and 1997
models were deleted.  By applying the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) rules to the models (Chatterjee and
Price 1991), the basic models that do not include interaction terms are free of collinearity problems.  Yet,
full models that include interaction terms cannot avoid high multicollinearity.  For instance, the largest VIF
is 30.09 that is much greater than the cutoff-point, 10, and the mean of all the VIF is 7.01, that is also much
larger than 1, the cutoff-point, in the 1992 model.  In the 1997 model, VIF is 32.03 and its mean is 7.96.
Thus, the interaction terms surely cause multicollinearity problem to the full models.  Since these high
multicollinearities are caused by adding interaction terms to the regression model, one remedy to improve
computational accuracy is to use centered independent variables in such a way that xik = Xik - Xbark , where
Xbark is mean of Xik.  After using these centered sociological variables, none of these causes any
multicollinearity problem.  In the 1992 model, for instance, VIF of men is only 1.07 whereas that of
men is 30.09 before employing centered variables.  The highest VIF is 1.90 and mean is 1.43 and the
mean is not considerably greater than 1.  The 1992 model is free of multicollinearity.  In addition, in the
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McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) three decades ago introduced models using ordinal level
dependent variables through the extension of binary logit.  According to Long (1997), as
an ordered dependent variable y is considered to offer incomplete information about the
underlying latent variable y*, the measurement equation can be expressed:
              yi = m, if τm-1 ≤ yi* < τm for m = 1 to J  (1)
where, τs are threshold.
         The final categories 1 and J runs from τ0 = -4 and τJ = 4.  For example, by using three
ordinal categories of our dependent variable, electoral interest, measure equation can be:
               yi = 1 => not much interested if τ0 = -4 ≤  yi* < τ1
               yi = 2 => somewhat interested if τ1 ≤  yi* < τ2
               yi = 3 => very interested if τ2 ≤  yi* < τ3 = 4¥
The structural model using ordered dependent variables is
 yi* = α + $xi + gie
where, xi is a row vector.  The first column is 1 for the intercept and column k + 1 is
shown as xk for the i
th observation.  $ is column vector of structural coefficients.
As with other logit model, ordinal logit model has a logistic distribution of g with
mean of 0 and a variance π2/3.  Its probability density function is
            8(g) = exp(g) / [1 + exp(g)]2
and its cumulative distribution function is Λ(g) = exp(g) / [I + exp(g)].  Finally the
ordered logit model is:
            Interest in Elections = $0 + $1Edu + $2Age + $3Men + $4Age*Edu + $5Men*Edu
                                                + $6Men*Age + $7SW + $8SE + $9Stump (1992 only)  +
                                                $10TVspeech + $11TVads + $12TVdebate (1997 only) +
                                                                                                                                                                            
1997 model, the highest VIF is 1.88 and mean is 1.44.   Thus one can accurately interpret the coefficients
of the model.  For more on interaction terms, see Allen (1997) and Neter et al. (1996).
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                                                $13YS (1992 only) + $14DJ + $15Lee (1997 only) + g e
where Edu: Education
           Age: Age
           Men: Gender
 Age*Edu: interaction term for age and education
 Men*Edu: interaction term for men and education
 Men*Age: interaction term for men and age
 SW: those who live in the Southwest (Honam) area
 SE: those who live in the Southeast (Yongnam) area
 Stump: Stump campaigns, available only in 1992
           TVdebate: presidential debates on television, available only in 1997
           TVads: campaign ads on television
           TVspeech: speeches of candidates or their close supporters on television
 YS: popularity of Kim Young-Sam, available only in 1992
 DJ: popularity of Kim Dae-Jung
 Lee: popularity of Lee Hoi-Chang, available only in 1997
Findings and Discussion
Table 9a shows that the dependent variable for the 1992 and 1997 data, interest in
elections, has four ordinal categories: not at all, not much interested, somewhat
interested, and very interested.  Distribution of all categories looks fine, except the first
one, "not at all," where there were only 19 observations in 1992 and 22 in 1997.4  Instead
of excluding it, the not at all category is merged with "not much interested" category.
The newly merged categories are shown in Table 9b on p. 202.  Justification for the use
of the three merged categories is shown in the last column of Table 10 on p. 203.  Table
10 shows the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable of the 1992 and 1997
models.  The 1992 model shows moderate ranges of predicted probabilities with the "not
                                                          
4 The dependent variable, electoral interest with four categories, had variance problems in both 1992 and
1997.  In the 1992 model, minimum predicted probability of "not at all" is .00 and maximum predicted
probability is only .07, producing their difference at approximately .07.  In addition, in the 1997 model,
minimum predicted probability of "not at all" is .00, and maximum predicted probability is about .21.
Their difference is also about .21.  Since variations of the first category, "not at all" in both 1992 and 1997
models are too small, one cannot proceed further with the analysis of this dependent variable including four
different categories.
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much interested" (.450) and "somewhat interested" (.406) categories and greater ranges
with "very interested" (.777).  In the 1997 model, ranges or variations of predicted
probabilities of all three categories look better than those of the 1992 model.  The
"somewhat interested" category has a moderate range (.436) since its minimum expected
probability is .033 and maximum expected probability is .469.  Yet, the other two
categories have greater ranges: not very much interested (.687) and very interested (.906).
In summary, the dependent variable, electoral interest in both years that includes three
categories, has sufficient variations.  Therefore, one can proceed with further analysis.
Findings of the ordinal logit regression are shown in Table 11a on p. 204 and
goodness of fit of the models is in Table 11b on p. 205.  The overall X2 tests of all basic
and full models that include interaction variables both in 1992 and 1997, is nearly zero.
Therefore, one can easily reject null hypotheses that all coefficients in the models, except
constants, are zero.  Goodness of fit of models is only moderate.  For instance, McKelvy
and Zavoinas R2 of the 1992 basic model is 14 percent and that of the 1997 basic model
is higher, 25 percent.5  These somewhat lower explanatory powers of the models may
indicate the models' poor specifications probably caused by important omitted variables,
outliers, measurement errors, or abstract theories (Kennedy 1998).  Most studies on
political interest, however, have very low explanatory powers.6  Students of political
                                                          
5 Simulation studies of Hagle and Mitchell (1992) and Windmeiher (1995) indicate that McKelvey and
Zavoinas R2 is most accurately represent explanatory power of models that include ordinal outcomes.
6 R2 is a coefficient of determination and is the square of the correlation coefficients between y and yhat.
Most practitioners search for higher R2 because a high R2 is usually a good fit of models. Yet, a greater R2
does not always indicate a good model.  Since R2 is significantly affected by the range of variation of the
dependent variable, a high variance of the disturbance terms causes low R2.  For more on R2, see Green
(1997) and Kennedy.  Average R2 of local political interest among five different countries is .075 (Hayes
and Bean 1993).  R2 of interest model based on SES variables, personal resources and family is .18 (Verba,
Burns, and Schlozman 1997).  Political interest model composed of marital and employment status has R2
of .16 (Sapiro 1983).  Finally, political Apathy Index examined by Bennett (1986) has the highest
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interest should seek more meaningful indicators and comprehensive theories on political
interest that clearly and fully explain voters' political interest.  Full models that include
three interaction terms in both years also do not have high explanatory powers.7
Comparing the difference between initial log likelihood and final log likelihood of these
full models show nearly the same amount of goodness of fits as those of the basic
models.  That is, their addition to the models is only marginally useful for the models in
general.
The basic models are described first.  As expected, education was found to
moderately affect electoral interest in 1992 but not in 1997.  Respondents with higher
education in 1992 were more likely to become highly interested in the presidential
election, but different levels of education had no distinguishable effect on interest in
1997.  In contrast, older voters were strongly interested in the 1997 election but not in the
1992 election.  In terms of gender, men and women were almost equal in electoral
interest in both years.  Although statistically not significant one may argue that men were
more interested in 1992 but women were more interested in 1997, judging by the
directions of the coefficients.  In fact, in a recent survey on 500 Korean high school
students by the Bureau of Korea Womens Development, 34.4 percent of the girls
answered they are interested in politics, while only 32.8 percent of the boys were
(Joongangilbo Oct 21, 1999).  Electoral interest of adult respondents polled after the
presidential election and these high school students cannot be directly compared, but the
political interest of Korean women has recently increased.  Regional effects on electoral
                                                                                                                                                                            
explanatory power: from 23percent in 1972 to 28percent in 1960.
7 STATA does not provide R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina or others except pseudo R2 for models including
interaction variables.
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interest are very unexpected.  Those living in the Southwest areas should have greater
interest in the election since they supported their regional representative, Kim Dae-Jung.
His election was a way to increase their political and economic status.  Compared to the
Southwest area, those in the Southeast showed less electoral interest in both years.  This
low interest may be a result of having already produced four out of the six presidents
since Korea's independence in 1948.  Their loss of interest may be a result of
complacency.
Because of different electoral regulations in 1992 and 1997, the stump speech
factor is only available in 1992 and television debate is only available in 1997, while
campaign ads and speeches on television are available in both elections.  Unlike
sociological factors, participation at stump campaigning and viewing campaign activities
through media were moderately or strongly significant to electoral interest in both years.
Among many predictors of electoral interest in 1992, campaign speeches on the street
were found to be most important.  Television speeches by candidates or major party
members tended to show significant effects on interest in elections in 1992.  These two
factors represent the nationwide popularity of outdoor rallies and candidate speeches on
television that are similar to street speeches.  Contrary to the expected outcome,
campaign commercials on television did not matter in 1992.  This lack of impact is
probably because the commercials were not professionally created in 1992 and it was the
first time campaign advertisements on television were used in Korea.
While television commercials in 1992 were not significant, however, they
produced an important electoral impact in 1997.  The technology for making
advertisements had improved and their role in the 1997 campaign was an important
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factor.  Prior to the 1997 election commercials were composed of dull speeches, but by
1997 the candidates developed pithy sound-bites (Shim 1997, 17).  Television speeches
by candidates or their supporting figures also prompted voters towards higher electoral
interest.  Among several campaign activities, television debates in 1997 had a dominant
impact, just like stump speeches had in 1992.
Those who preferred major candidates were more likely to have a greater interest
in elections.  Voters who liked Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung more showed higher
electoral interest in the 1992, while voters who liked Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang
more than other candidates showed greater campaign interest.  The impacts of the two
major candidates on interest in the 1992 election were very similar, but those of the 1997
major candidates were quite different.  Kim Dae-Jung not only had a greater impact than
his opponent, Lee, but also than any other predictors in the 1997 model.  His personal
popularity may not have directly transferred to his win of the 1997 election, but it appears
to have helped him.
In general, personal campaign experience and media events, and the preferences
of major candidates seem to have a more consistent impact on electoral interest than
sociological indicators.  In other words, political recognition is more significant to
electoral interest than factors that voters have formed through their lives.
The full models include the interaction terms on top of all the variables used in
the basic models.  It is apparent that the impact of regionalism, participation at the
campaigning places, media impact, and the preferences for major candidates of the full
models is similar to these variables in the basic models.  A primary function of the full
model is to determine how much impact these interaction terms had on campaign interest.
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An interaction effect occurs when the effect of one variable changes, depending on other
variable.  Only the interaction term of age and education provided a strong impact in
1992 while gender and age was moderately significant in 1997.  This selective
significance suggests that the overall interaction terms of sociological factors do not have
a significant and consistent impact on electoral interest.
Interpretation of interaction terms is easy when one of the two variables is a
dummy, but it is complex when both variables are either ordinal or interval.  For instance,
the interaction effect of men and age variables in the 1997 full model, as shown in Table
11a is interpreted as follows.  As Korean voters aged, their electoral interest also
moderately increased among men compared to women.  Older men were more interested
in the 1997 presidential election than older women.  However, interpretation of the
interaction term of age and education in the 1992 full model is complex.  According to
Neter et al. (1996), interpretation of the interaction terms containing ordinal or interval
variables depends on the coefficient signs of the two variables and their interaction term.
For instance, when both signs of β1 and β2 are negative, and the sign of their interaction
term, β3, is positive, the effect of β3 is of an interference or antagonistic type on the
dependent variable.8 The interpretation of the interaction term of age and education is as
follows.  The electoral interest gap between older and younger voters was reduced as
educational levels of these voters increased in 1992.
The basic and full models show that not only sociological variables but also their
interaction terms are found not to have a consistent and important influence on electoral
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interest in the two presidential elections.  To determine the precise effects of these
variables on the interest in elections, a bivariate relationship between sociological factors
education, age, and genderand electoral interest is presented first, as shown in Figure
16 on p. 232.  Although there was no relationship between gender and electoral interest in
1997, the relationship between other sociological factors and electoral interest is
statistically very significant in both years.   The strength of their relationship is weak or
moderate.  Age was negatively related to electoral interest in 1992 since a larger number
of older voters were not much interested in the election compared to younger voters.
Yet, age was positively related to electoral interest in 1997.  Many older voters were
more interested than younger voters.  Unlike the relationship between age and electoral
interest, education was positively related to interest in the 1992 election, but negatively
related in the 1997 election.  As educational levels increased, the number of not much
interested voters in 1992 decreased and the number of very interested voters decreased
in 1997.  Finally, men were slightly more interested in the 1992 election, but gender
difference was not found in the 1997 election.  Men and women had almost same amount
of interest.
Bivariate analysis of sociological factors shows their relationship with interest in
elections is consistent compared to the result of the ordinal logit regression.  This finding
is different from that of the logit regression.  The ordinal logit regression shows that none
of the sociological variables had a significant effect in both 1992 and 1997 at the same
time.  Their effects are weak or moderate and specific to each election.  Compared to the
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 According to Neter et al. (1996, 308-15), when both signs of β1 and β2 are negative, and the sign of β3
(interaction effect) is negative, the effect of β3 is of a reinforcement or synergistic type on the
dependent variable.
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findings of the basic and full models of ordinal logit regression, bivariate analysis of
education, age, and gender, with that of interest shows a more consistent relationship with
electoral interest.  Before making a firm conclusion on the effects of sociological factors
on electoral interest, however, it is important to examine their joint effects on electoral
interest.
Table 12 on p. 206 shows joint Wald tests of complex hypotheses.  Two or more
variables are tested at the same time to determine whether they had a jointly significant
impact on electoral interest (Long 1997).  Since the Wald test has a X2 distribution, each
set of sociological variables has X2 and its statistical significance.  Table 12 shows that
among combinations of age and education, gender and education, and gender and age,
only the joint effects of age and education are consistently significant across all models.
Joint effects of gender and age are statistically significant only in the 1992 basic and full
model.  Yet, the combination of gender and education is only significant in the 1992
basic model.  These three combinations of two sociological variables also indicate their
irregular impact on interest in Korean elections.  In addition, the joint effects of the three
interaction terms were significant in 1992, but not in 1997.  However, joint effects of all
three sociological variables were consistently significant across all basic and full models.
Their joint significance was also confirmed by the combined significance of all the three
sociological variables and their three interaction variables.
To recapitulate, the ordinal logit analysis of sociological variables and their
interaction terms indicate poor performance of these factors on electoral interest, but one
cannot completely deny their impacts on electoral interest.  The bivariate relationship of
sociological variables and electoral interest was still statistically significant, although
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weak, and gender was not distinguishable in the 1997 election.  The importance of a
single sociological variable, combinations of two, or their interaction terms as
explanatory factors on the electoral interest is overall irregular or weak.  Yet, their impact
on electoral interest is noticeable when combined as all the three sociological variables,
or all the three sociological variables and their interaction terms.
Since stump campaigning in 1992 and presidential debates in 1997 influenced
voters interest in elections more significantly than other predictors, it is useful to
determine how much they precisely affected each category of the dependent variable,
interest in elections.  Korean voters are divided into two groups for each of the elections:
those who participated in stump speeches and those who did not in 1992, and those who
watched presidential debates on television and those who did not in 1997.  Table 13 on p.
207 shows that among those who did not view street campaigning, the probability of
voters being somewhat interested or very much interested in the 1992 election was
almost the same: 44 percentage to 43 percentage.  Among those who watched street
campaigning, the probability of being somewhat interested in the election dropped to
23 percent while those who were very interested increased to 73 percent.  About two-
thirds of those who watched stump campaigning became very interested in the 1992
election.
The effect of a major campaign event in 1997, presidential debates on television,
was nearly identical to that of stump campaigning in 1992.  Among those who did not
watch presidential debates, only a quarter of the voters were very interested in the
election.    Yet, the number of those who became very interested when they viewed
debates on television, almost doubled to 46 percent.  In short, in both 1992 and 1997,
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interesting campaigning events such as stump campaigning and televised presidential
debates drew the attention of many voters.  Very interested voters were most positively
affected by stumps and presidential debates.  While Table 13 shows the impact of the two
campaigning events on each category of interest in the elections, figures below visually
describe their impact on electoral interest depending on different age groups.
Figures 17a, 17b, 18a and 18b on p. 233-6 respectively provide conditional
expected probabilities for age across different outcomes of the dependent variable.9
Figures 17a and 17b compare two groups in 1992 to determine how much each category
of electoral interest is different in terms of age.  Figure 17a indicates that among those
who did not experience stump campaigning, as age levels increase, different expected
probabilities of interest are visualized.  In terms of voters who were not much
interested in elections, different age levels slightly increased their electoral interest.
Almost the same pattern is found among somewhat interested voters, although their
probabilities are much higher than those who were not much interested.  Unlike these
two groups of voters, however, 1992 voters who were very interested in elections
should show slightly decreasing probabilities of interest as age levels increase.  Age
positively affects respondents who are not much or somewhat interested in the 1992
election, but negatively affects very interested voters.
Figure 17b shows a group who experienced stump campaigning.  Line patterns of
Figure 17b look adequately different from those of Figure 17a.  Not much and
somewhat interested voters of Figure 17b have similar shapes of electoral interest, as
age levels expand.  Yet, the probabilities of these two groups of voters in 1997 are lower
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than those of the same groups in 1992.  This means those who are not much interested
or somewhat interested in the election are negatively affected by experiencing stump
campaigns.  Although stump campaigning once drew as many as one million people at
one time, they were occasions of violence.  These negative aspects of stump campaigning
reduced interest in elections of those who experienced it.  However, although age weakly
and negatively influences electoral interest, the probabilities of those who were very
interested were much higher than those voters who did not experience them.  This group
was positively affected by street speeches, unlike the other two groups.  In short, among
those who experienced stump campaigns, the levels of impact of "not much interested" or
"somewhat interested" voters were reduced, compared to the levels of those who did not
attend stump campaigns.  For those with very interested voters, interest among stump-
experienced voters was still higher than interest among those who did not attend stump
meetings.  In terms of age, its effect on electoral interest was weak in 1992.  Slopes of
lines are gentle.  One may argue, although statistically only minimally significant, that
there were more very interested people among younger voters while there were more
not much or somewhat interested people among older voters in 1992.
Figures 18a and 18b were created by comparing those who watched television
presidential debates in 1997 and those who did not.  A conditional variable of these two
figures is also age.  According to Figure 18a, among those who did not watch presidential
debates, the line indicating "not much interested" voters gently goes down as voters
become older.  That is, there were more not-much interested voters among younger
voters than among older voters, unlike the same group in 1992.  The shape of the line is
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Since most ranges between maximum and minimum predicted probabilities, as shown in Table 10, are
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similar to voters who are "somewhat interested."  Unlike these two groups of voters,
respondents who are very interested show steeply increasing probabilities as they
become older.  Age only positively affects this group.  In summation, among those who
did not watch presidential debates, age positively affects "very interested" voters, while
age negatively affects "not much interested" and somewhat interested voters.
Compared to Figure 18a, Figure 18b shows almost the same patterns, but their
predicted probabilities are totally different.  An important difference between Figures 18a
and 18b is that presidential debates more negatively affect those whose electoral interest
was "not much interested" or "somewhat interested." Compared to the probabilities of
those groups who did not watch presidential debates, the probabilities of "not much
interested" or "somewhat interested" respondents who watched debates are lower.
Presidential debates lessened their levels of electoral interest.  Presidential debates
sometimes contained verbal attacks, assertion or policies without sound foundations, and
some of the same questions in different rounds of debates that might have lowered their
interest in elections.  Age effect on the not much interested electorate is nearly
negligible and that on somewhat interested voters is minimal and negative.  In contrast,
those who were "very interested in elections were very positively affected by viewing
presidential debates.  Their levels of becoming electorally interested were about 25-30
percent higher than that of those who were very interested but did not watch
presidential debates.  The first-ever presidential debates aroused lots of excitement in
these highly interested voters.  Further, age positively affected this group and there were
more very interested voters among older voters than younger voters.  In short,
                                                                                                                                                                            
between .2 and .8, the lines of these figures are linear.
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presidential debates provided a significant impact on election interest depending on age.
For those who viewed debates and were very interested, predicted probabilities are
highest and positively increasing, as age goes up.  Those voters who were not much or
somewhat interested voters were natively affected by viewing presidential debates and
age impact was weak.
In sum, depending on the voters' experiences in the four groupsthose who
experienced stump speeches and those who did not in 1992, and those who watched
television debates and those who did not in 1997age significantly affected voters with
three different kinds of interest in 1997 but not in 1992.  Both street speeches in 1992 and
presidential debates in 1997 produced two extremities: voters who were not much
interested" or "somewhat interested" were negatively affected, and those who were very
interested were positively affected.  Age also produced other kinds of extremities: there
were more not much interested or somewhat interested voters among older voters
than younger voters in 1992.  However, there were more voters who were very
interested among younger voters in 1992.  Yet, age impact was significant in 1997 and
overall older voters were very-interested and younger voters were not much or
somewhat interested.
Conclusion
This chapter attempts to understand what motivates the Korean electorate to
become interested in the presidential elections.  Through the use of an ordinal logit model
this chapter has examined the sociological factors and their interaction terms.  In
addition, included in the model were stump campaigns, media effectspresidential
debates, campaigning advertisements, and speeches on televisionand candidate
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popularity.  Examination of these predictors on interest in Korean elections is based on
the earlier finding that electoral interest highly matters on the choice of presidential
candidates and voter turnout.  Chapters 2 and 3 found that the Korean electorate who was
highly interested in the election was more likely to go to the poll and vote for the ruling
candidates while the less-interested citizen was less likely to turn out.  When they went to
the polls, the less interested voter was more likely to vote for opposition candidates.
By employing centered age, education and gender variables, this chapter
accurately interprets impact of these sociological factors and their interaction terms on
electoral interest, which commonly suffer from multicollinearity.  The ordered logit
model of electoral interest shows that age, education, or gender and their interaction
terms are overall not significant or consistent in creating interest in Korean elections.
Only age was consistently significant: it was marginally significant in the 1992 model
and substantially significant in the 1997 model.   When it comes to interaction terms,
interaction effect of age and education in the 1992 model was very important, indicating
that the interest gap between younger and older voters declined with increases of
educational level.  In the 1997 model, the interaction term for sex and age was
moderately important.  Older men were more interested in the election than older women.
Except these several cases, sociological factors and their interaction terms did not matter
on Korean electoral interest.
These findings do not mean, however, that social indicators are irrelevant to
Korean electoral interest.  Bivariate relationships between sociological factors and
electoral interest are consistently significant, although their strength is weak.
Additionally, joint tests of education, age and gender, and their interaction terms clearly
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showed their significance for electoral interest.  That is, although joint tests of
combinations of two sociological variables, and the three interaction terms are not so
consistently important, they are still significant constraints on Korean electoral interest
when  three social variables combined, or if the three sociological factors and their
interaction variables considered as a group.  Another interesting finding is that voters in
the Southwest region were not as interested in elections as their fellow Koreans, while
those from the Southeast had a significantly lower interest in elections in the 1990s.
Considering the severe political and economic regionalism of these two areas, this
finding should be given more attention in future studies.  In conclusion, although two
datasets can hardly become generalized, scholars should be more careful in employing
sociological variables in their models since the effects of sociological factors are, in
general, mixed on electoral interest.
Electoral interest of Korean voters was also greatly affected by the preferred
candidates campaign.  Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung
and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997 provided a great deal of campaigning interest for the voters.
This chapter shows that Kim Dae-Jung had a similar influence to that of Kim Young-Sam
in 1992 but offered a greater impact than Lee in 1997, contributing to Kim Dae-Jungs
win that year.
In addition, speeches by candidates or their close supporters on television had a
significant impact on interest in elections in both 1992 and 1997.  Yet, campaign
advertisements on television were not important in 1992, probably because when they
were first introduced on television in 1992, their quality was poor and did not appeal to
voters.  Five years later, however, their impacts mattered significantly.
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It was street speeches and presidential debates that considerably affected interest
in the election.  Up to the 1992 election, massive stump campaigns were the norm in
Korean elections.  They mattered substantially in arousing voters interest in elections.
Despite their popularity, stump campaigns were too expensive, caused severe violence,
and were banned in the 1997 election.  Instead, the 1997 election introduced presidential
debates on television.  First time broadcasting of debates among major candidates drew
millions of viewers across the country.  While presidential debates replaced the
significant role of stump campaigns, stump campaigns and presidential debates on
television were two of the most important campaign events in the 1992 and 1997
elections, respectively.
Comparing two groups in terms of stump experience in 1992 and viewing of
presidential debates in 1997, while controlling age, showed more the precise effects of
these two election events on campaigning interest.  In both elections, it was very
interested voters whose interest predominantly and positively affected by the experience
of stump speeches and presidential debates, as their age increased.  Not-much
interested and somewhat interested voters were not significantly affected by the




As Angus Campbell et al. examined American electoral behavior in two
presidential elections, 1952 and 1956, in their book, The American Voter, this study
investigated Korean voting behavior in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections.  The
purpose of this study has been to examine how Koreans voted in the two elections.    It
was in the late 1990s that Korean voters elected an opposition candidate for the first time
since its independence in 1945.  To examine the Korean voting behavior, Korean
presidential election data from the Korean Social Science Data Center were used to
develop three models.  The first was a candidate choice model that focused on what
factors were most important in electing a president.  The second was a turnout model that
examined the factors most closely associated with voting turnout.  The final model was a
political interest model that examined what factors were associated with the voters
interest in the election.
Characteristics of Korean Electoral Studies
The context in which an election is held is critical for a complete understanding of
electoral behavior of a country.  Most electoral theories were developed half a century
ago by American scholars.  Their arguments on electoral behavior have been tested by
later scholars both in America or other countries.  Korean scholars have also applied their
theories to investigate voter choice.  While theories were being applied to Korean voters,
however, certain conceptualizations had to be adjusted and some theories were not
applicable due to specific Korean political context.  There are several unique features that
help in the comprehension of the Korean elections under study.  Three factors are
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particularly important to the Korean political systempolitical parties, the influence of
the three Kims, and regionalism.  Unlike other democratic countries, political parties of
Korea are not mature.  More than 90 parties have attempted to take power in the modern
history of Korea and about five parties have seriously worked at one time during the last
half century.  Despite the many parties born and then disbanded, there was no change of
government from the governing to opposition parties until the 1997 election.
Furthermore, all the ruling parties were conservative and most of the major opposition
parties were progressive.  These circumstances make it extremely difficult for the Korean
electorate to develop deep attachments to a political party.  Instead they have two
distinctive orientations towards parties: one towards ruling parties and the other toward
major opposition parties.  This has forced Korean scholars to employ party orientations
towards governing or opposition parties instead of party identification commonly used in
Western countries.  This study complies with these scholars.
Related to weakened status of parties is an enormous influence of a few political
leaders in Korean politics.  The three KimsKim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim
Jong-Pilhave ruled Korean politics for the last four decades.  They played the key role
in the outcomes of the three recent elections.  When the three were divided, a ruling
candidate, Roh Tae-Woo won the 1987 presidential election.  When Kim Young-Sam in
1990 initiated three-party merger that included Kim Jong-Pil, he won in the 1992
election.  Finally, in 1997 Kim Dae-Jung allied with Kim Jong-Pil and won over the
protégée of Kim Young-Sam, Lee Hoi-Chang.
The influence of the Kims is also connected to regionalism.  Although modern
regional animosity began during the Park regime in the 1970s, recent regionalism
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recurred in the 1987 election where four major presidential candidates consciously or
unconsciously exploited the regional theme.  Especially candidates representing the
Southeast (Youngnam) and the Southwest (Honam) competed to take or hold power,
based on the size of the voters and their regional differences.
Many studies have argued that regional cleavage has been so serious in Korean
politics that sociological cleavages are no longer important.  Therefore, unlike many
studies on Western and other Third World Countries, this study employed a few
sociological predictors.  Only when there is a strong evidence of their significance based
primarily on American and Korean literature were sociological variables used.  For
instance, electoral choice model incorporated age only and voter turnout model employed
age and education.  The political interest model used several sociological variablesage,
education, gender, and their interaction terms, as argued by American studies although
nearly no studies committed by Korean scholarship on political interest.
Candidate Choice Model
To achieve the first goal of understanding what factors contributed to victories in
the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections a multinomial logit regression model was
developed.  Since interpretation of coefficients of multinomial logit regressions is usually
complex, many figures were used to aid their interpretation.  Kim Dae-Jung achieved
most of his votes from the Southwest in 1992 while Kim Young-Sam received most of
his votes from the Southeast in the 1992 election.  Since the Southeast did not produce a
candidate who directly represented the region for the first time in nearly forty years, the
region divided its votes between Lee Hoi-Chang, the ruling candidate, and Rhee In-Je.
This division contributed to Kim Dae-Jungs victory.  The analysis also confirmed that
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voters are intimately attached to leaders in Korean politics.  In 1992 Kim Young-Sam and
Kim Dae-Jung retained most of their earlier supports and in 1992 Kim Young-Sam also
enjoyed the support of former President Roh.  In 1997 Lee received the support of the
older Kim Young-Sam supporters.  While Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam had been
permanent political rivals, it has been widely known in Korea that the former Kim had
more loyal supporters.  As suggested by conventional arguments, the multinomial logit
model showed that Kim Dae-Jung had more loyal supports than Kim Young-Sam.  Yet,
Monte Carlo simulation that re-ran the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections 1,000 times
each showed that supporters for Kim Dae-Jung were more cohesive in 1997 but not in
1992.  Those who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election voted for him in great
numbers in 1997.  Those who had voted for Kim Young-Same in 1992 were almost
equally scattered among the three major candidates, Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in
1997.   The simulation confirmed the traditional view of more loyal supporters of Kim
Dae-Jung.  Yet, unlike the conventional argument, most of who had voted for Kim
Young-Sam in the 1987 election voted for him again in 1992 while Kim Dae-Jung lost
many of his past supporters in 1992.  The simulation showed significance of loyal voters
in Korean elections to be elected.
In addition, multinomial logit regression and odds ratio plots discovered that all
the predictors in the candidate choice model were very significant.  The party orientation
towards ruling or opposition parties constrained voters choice of their candidates.  Those
who had governing party orientation substantially voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and
for Lee in 1997, while those who had opposition party orientation voted for Kim Dae-
Jung both in 1992 and 1997.  While party orientation mattered, evaluation of the three-
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party merger in 1992 and single candidacy in 1997 were also important factors in
candidate choice.  After being defeated in the 1987 presidential election, Kim Young-
Sam thought that the only way to win the next presidential election was to ally himself
with other regional representatives, given the regional influence on Korean politics.  The
merger of his Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) with ruling Democratic Justice
Party (DJP) and Kim Jong-Pils New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) broadened
his electoral support.  At the same time, many voters disliked the merger.  Kim Young-
Sam had been a life-long opposition leader fighting for democracy and against military
government.  Almost the same story was repeated in 1997.  After being defeated in 1992,
Kim Dae-Jung realized that he could not become a president by himself.  He made a
single-candidacy contract with Kim-Jong-Pil who had been kicked-out from the merged
New Korea Party.  Kim Dae-Jung became a presidential candidate representing his and
Kim Jong-Pils parties, thereby appealing to both the Southwest and Central regions.
Yet, many voters still did not like their contract because of the same reason they had
criticized the three-party merger in 1990.  Accordingly those who agreed with the merger
and the single-candidacy contract voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung
1997 but those who disagreed with the merger and the single candidacy did not.  In terms
of the sociological terms, age was important.  Older voters tended to vote for
conservative candidates, that is, ruling candidates in Korean politics, and younger voters
voted for progressive candidates or opposition candidates.  In the 1997 election, however,
Kim Dae-Jung also obtained supports from older voters.  Kim realized that one of the
major reasons for his past failures in the presidential elections was his overly liberal
image.  He accepted many conservative figuresformer generals, police officers or the
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KCIA members in his party.  By his efforts to tame his strong image, he was benefited
considerably from the older electorate.
Finally interest in the election was found to be very important.  Those who were
more interested in the election were more likely to vote for opposition candidates and
those who were less interested were more likely to vote for ruling candidates.
Relationship between electoral interest and choice of candidates can be compared to
energy in physics.  When an object is to be moved, it needs far more energy than when it
stays in one place.  Similarly, when voters wanted status quo, their interest was lower.
When voters wanted the Korean government changed, their interest in the election was
higher.  This finding is very important to the explanation of the first peaceful change of
government in Korea.  Kim Dae-Jung, as an opposition candidate, was strongly aided by
those who were highly interested in the election.  The governing candidate, Lees
supporters were less interested in the election.  The prediction of Lazarsfeld et al. half a
century ago was strongly confirmed in the Korean elections.  Those who were less
interested in the election did not go to the polls.  More voters who claimed to be less
interested participated in the 1992 election and the ruling candidate, Kim Young-Sam,
was benefited.  Yet, in 1997 the less interested did not vote and the opposition candidate,
Kim, was the beneficiary.  This is because Lees loss of support was a gain for the major
opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, and contributed to his win.  While candidate choice
is the ultimate act in the electoral process the results depends on voters turning out to
vote.  What were the main factors that contributed to the voters going to the polls in the
Korean elections was examined in the voter turnout model.
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Voter Turnout Model
In analyzing voter turnout, one need not avoid a problem of over-reporting of
turnout.  In the Korean data, there is about a 12 percent discrepancy between official
figures and survey estimates of turnouts in the 1992 and 1997 elections.  Since the
original datasets do not contain weighted variables to adjust this difference, weighted
variables were created to address the over-reporting problem.  As Abramson, Aldrich or
Teixeira claimed, findings and fitness of the models were so similar that one may
conclude that even moderately over-reported Korean data could depict the real world.
Binomial logit regression of turnout found that most predictors mattered on the
Korean voter turnout.  Two sociological variables were controlled in the voter turnout
model.  As prior studies of Korean voter turnout indicated, age was found to be very
important.  Older voters were more likely to vote than younger voters both in 1992 and
1997.  Yet, the level of education was not significant.  The finding is consistent with that
of several Central American countries.  Studies of Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua
where voting rates are high have also found that the level of education is not important to
turnout.
            Compared to education and age, region had a mixed impact on turnout.  In the
1992 election, the Southwest region was significant while the Southeast was not.  In
1997, both regions were significant, although the Southeast was statistically more
significant.  The reason for the two regions different influences was caused by the voters'
different evaluation of the candidates representing their area.  When voters of either
region felt that a candidate from the other region had a greater chance to be elected, their
probability of voting was higher than that of the other Koreans.  For instance, when Kim
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Young-Sam, the Southeast candidate, was in a better position to be elected than Kim
Dae-Jung in 1992, the Southwest regional effect on voting turnout was significant.  In
1997, when Kim Dae-Jung of the Southwest was in a more advantageous position, the
Southeast regional effect was more significant.  One interesting phenomenon in the 1997
election is that the Southwest regional impact was also significant.  A possible
explanation may be that voters living in the area knew that the 1997 election would be the
last election bid for the aging Kim Dae-Jung, thus arousing a higher turnout.
The debate over the role of rural areas in Korean elections has generated a great
deal of controversy.  Up to 1980s, the rate of turnout in the rural areas was higher than
that of urban areas.  Yet, this argument needs to be reevaluated as Korean society is
rapidly changing.  As rural areas became more developed and mass communication is
more pervasive, the distinction between rural and urban areas declines.  Moreover, due to
recent severe regionalism in Korea, voters in large cities in the Southwest and Southeast
vote more than those living in rural areas of other regions
While most psychological factors were important to Korean voter turnout, party
orientation had no effect on voting turnout in the 1992 election, while it had a major
effect in the 1997 election.  One explanation for the lack of party orientation influences is
the three-party merger conducted before the 1992 election among the ruling DJP and two
opposition parties, RDP and NDRP, confused Korean voters' orientation toward
ruling/opposition parties in the 1992 election.   Voters who had supported opposition
parties could not easily change their attitude and favor a new ruling party that included
opposition parties.  Many of those who had been positively oriented toward the governing
party also found it difficult to continue to support them in the 1992 election.  In 1997,
183
however, the single-candidacy contract alliance between opposition candidates, Kim
Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil, did not cause the same confusion.  Thus, those who had
ruling/opposition party orientation had higher probability of voting than Independents in
the 1997 election.
Turnout decision of Korean voters was also substantially dependent on the
perceived fairness of the Central Election Commission (CEC).  For the electorate, the
role of the CEC as election supervisor was crucial.  Those who regarded the CEC as fair
turned out at a higher rate than those who did not.  Furthermore, both elections showed
that those who were politically efficacious also went to the poll more.
           Among several psychological factors, electoral interest was the most important
both in 1992 and 1997.  Those who were more interested in elections participated in the
elections more than those less interested.  This finding greatly aids in the explanation of
the 1997 candidate choice.  Had those less-interested voters voted in the 1997 election, as
they did in 1992, the ruling candidate, Lee, might have been elected.  In order to clearly
determine how these less-interested voters affected turnout, voters were divided into three
groups: High-probability respondents, Average-probability respondents and Low-
probability respondents.  Considering that Low-probability respondents were in the
twenties, were living in other than the Southwest and regarded the CEC unfair, it was
expected that they would not vote in 1992.  Yet, many of them actually voted even when
their interest in the election was low, contributing to the election of the ruling candidate,
Kim Young-Sam.  However, most Low-probability respondents did not participate in the
1997 election.  These were those who were in the twenties, were living in other than the
Southwest and the Southeast, evaluated the CEC to be unfair, had lower efficacy, and
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were Independent.  They did not go to the polls, aiding the win of the major opposition
candidate, Kim Dae-Jung.
The turnout model discovered interest in elections was very important to turnout.
The candidate choice model found that those who were highly interested in the election
were more likely to vote for the opposition candidate and those who were less interested
were more likely to vote for the ruling candidate.  Findings of these models indicate that
interest in the election is a necessary component of the Korean candidate choice.  The
interest in election model directly addresses this issue.
Interest in Elections Model
Using ordered logit regression, the interest in election model attempts to
understand what motivated the Korean electorate in the 1992 and 1997 presidential
elections.  Since empirical studies on political interest are nearly non-existent in Korean
scholarship several of the traditional sociological variable found consistently in American
literature are used in the modelage, education, and gender.  Their interaction terms
were also chosen as predictors in the model of interest in elections, based on this
literature.  Despite theoretical importance of these interaction terms, analysis of them has
been neglected probably due to higher intercorrelation between the sociological variable
and their interaction terms.  To avoid this problem, the model used centered sociological
variables and cured the multicollinearity problem completely and interpretation of
regression coefficients was accurate.
The model found that age, education, or gender, and their interaction terms were
overall not consistently important to interest in the Korean presidential elections.  Only
age is consistently significant: older voters were more interested in the election than
185
younger voters although it was marginally important in 1992.  Yet direction of age
impact was different in the two elections.  Older voters were more interested in the 1997
election while younger voters were more interested in 1992.  Only two interaction effects
were significant: age and education in 1992 and men and age in 1997.  Thus, the electoral
interest gap between younger and older voters was reduced with the increase of
educational levels of these voters in the 1992 election.  Older males were more interested
in the election than older females in 1997.  The long-term characteristics of sociological
variables may not be of sufficient significance to explain specific election interest.  As S.
Bae and D. Shin argued, since regional cleavages are clearly noticeable, evidence of
sociological cleavages are minimal in their electoral effects in Korea.
Despite the irregular impact of sociological predictors and their interaction terms
in the ordered logit regression, analysis of bivariate relationship and joint test of these
variables indicated they were statistically significant to electoral interest in Korea.
Generally, bivariate relationships between sociological factors and electoral interest were
consistently significant between the two elections, although their strength is weak.  Joint
tests of the combination of not only all three sociological variables, education, age and
gender, but also of these three variables and their interaction terms were found to be
statistically significant.  Thus, overall individual impact of sociological factors and their
interaction terms is weak in the two elections, their bivariate relationship and joint effects
as a group mattered on the Korean interest in the elections.  The interest in election model
additionally incorporated regional impact, as did models of candidate choice and voter
turnout.  The model produced an unexpected finding: the Southwest regionalism was
statistically not significant and those in the Southeast were substantially less interested in
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the two presidential elections.  Their lack or reduction of interest should be carefully
monitored in the future considering their higher activities of turnout and loyal support for
the candidates representing their regions.
Compared to smaller impact of sociological variables and the regional variation
on Korean electoral interest, presidential candidates were very important to electoral
interest.   Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung greatly increased voters interest in the
1992 election as did Lee Hoi-Chang and Kim Dae-Jung in 1997.  The two life-long
democratic leaders, the two Kims, produced an increase in interest in the 1992 election
while Kim Dae-Jung aroused interest in 1997.
Finally, several campaign events were examined.  Media effects were enormous.
Televised speeches by candidates and their close supporters had an important influence
on electoral interest in both elections.  Televised campaign ads also mattered significantly
in 1997, but not in 1992.  The poor quality of production and the early stages of
development of television in campaigns help explain weak relationship found in 1992,
but by 1997 these problems were resolved and television ads were associated with
arousing interest in the campaign.
Among several campaign events, stump campaigns and presidential debates were
most important to interest in the election.  During the 1992 election stump speeches and
public rallies were the primary means of political communication and were associated
with an increased interest in the election.  However, the expense and violence connected
with them led to their banning and the televised presidential debates in the 1997
presidential election greatly boosted interest in the election.
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While controlling age, the interest model also found that the three categories of
the dependent variable, electoral interest, were affected differently by voters experience
or non-experience of these two major campaign events.  Voters were found at the two
extremes: 1) those who claimed to be not much interested" or "somewhat interested"
were negatively affected, and 2) those who claimed to be very interested were
positively affected by watching either stump campaigning in 1992 or presidential debates
in 1997.  The impact was largest in 1997.  In addition, age performed a different role in
election interest depending on the election.  In the 1992 election, older voters were more
likely to maintain that they were not much interested in the election, while younger
voters were more interested.  In the 1997 election the older voters were more likely to be
very interested in the election, while younger voters were not interested or
somewhat interested.
Future Research
Among the past fifteen presidential elections, this study has examined the two
most recent elections, 1992 and 1997.  The availability of data constrained the study to
these elections.  As a result the findings here must be viewed with caution because two
elections do not provide the temporal sequence needed to confirm patterns of Koreas
voting.  Future studies should continue to investigate Korean electoral behavior by
incorporating more data including panel data or time-series data.
In addition, it should be noted that many commonly used predictors of voting
behavior were not incorporated in the models.  For instance, economic indicators
including future and past economic evaluations, and personal and national economic
evaluations were only partly tested in this study.  Korean electoral data should also
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include more variables consistently: marriage status, mobility, a full range of economic








Governing Roh Tae-Woo  (Roh) Kim Young-Sam(YS) Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee)
Candidate (Elected) (Elected)
(36.7%) (42.0%) (38.7%)
1st Opposition Kim Young-Sam(YS) Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) Kim Dae-Jung  (DJ)
Candidate (Elected)
(28.1%) (33.9%) (40.3%)
2nd Opposition Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) Chung Joo-Young Rhee In-Je   (Rhee)
Candidate            (Chung)
(27.1%) (16.2%) (19.1%)
3rd Opposition Kim Jong-Pil (JP)
Candidate ( 8.1%)
Turnout Rate 89.2% 81.9% 80.6%
==============================================================
Note: 1st, 2nd and 3rd candidates are ordered according to their votes achieved at the election.  Names in the parenthesis




Multinomial Logit Estimates of the 1992 Korean Presidential Election
==============================================================
                  Log[DJ v. YS]      Log[Chung v. YS]     Log[Chung v. DJ]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pol orientation      1.38***              .99***               -.39**
(opposition ↑ )
Interest              .48**               .08                  -.40*
(very much ↑ )
Merger               -.88***             -.37***                .51***
(good ↑ )
Prior Vote
87Roh                -.80**              -.26                   .55*
87YS                -1.35***             -.42                   .93***
87DJ                 2.12***             -.21                 -2.33***
Region
Southwest            3.43***             -.11                 -3.54***
Southeast            -.78***            -1.12***               -.34
Age                  -.24**              -.35***               -.11
(older ↑ )
Constant            -2.28***            -1.21**                1.07
==============================================================
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-test except interest).  Comparison group is put behind slash(/).
DJ stands for Kim Dae-Jung, YS for Kim Young-Sam and Chung for Chung Joo-Young.
X2 (18): 861.29*** McFaddens R2: 0.48 McFaddens Adj R2: 0.46
191
Table 2b
Multinomial Logit Estimates of the 1997 Korean Presidential Election
==============================================================
    Log[Lee v. DJ]   Log[Rhee v. DJ]   Log[Rhee v. Lee]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pol Orientation     -1.76***             -.11                1.65***
(opposition ↑ )
Interest             -.39**              -.68***             -.29**
(very much ↑ )
United Candidacy     -.90***             -.67***              .23
(agree ↑ )
Prior Vote
92YS                  .60**               .76***              .16
92DJ                -1.59***             -.67**               .92**
92Chung               .29                1.10***              .82**
Region
Southwest           -2.45***            -2.29***              .16
Southeast            1.29***             1.10***             -.19
Age                   .01                -.27***             -.29***
(older ↑ )
Constant             6.19***             3.19***            -2.99***
==============================================================
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-test except interest).  Comparison group is put behind slash(/).
Lee stands for Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ for Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee for Rhee In-Je.
X2 (18): 834.95*** McFaddens R2: 0.41 McFaddens Adj R2: 0.39
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Table 3
Wald and LR Tests That Each Variable Has No Effect in the 1997 and
1992 Korean Presidential Elections
=============================================================
           W (Wald Test)     G2(LR Test)
Indicators             1997      1992     |   1997 1992
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pol Orientation        148.98***  74.53*** 194.12***   81.39*** 
Interest                14.57***   5.94**   14.84***    6.14**
United Candidacy        44.67***  46.85***
Merger                            29.56***                 31.09***
Prior Vote
92YS                     6.41**   6.49**
92DJ                    14.65***  15.75***
92Chung                  8.05***   7.89***
87Roh                              5.26**                   5.21**
87YS                              12.65***                 13.14***
87DJ                              37.80***                 42.37***
Region
Southwest               20.44***  35.35***  31.11***   54.58***
Southeast               24.86***  18.59***  27.18***   20.18***
Age                     11.89***  14.06***  12.38***   14.81***
==============================================================
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-test except interest).
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Table 4
Discrete Change in Predicted Probabilities of the 1997 and 1992
Korea Presidential Elections
============================================================
             1997                     1992
Indicators         Lee    DJ    Rhee    |    YS    DJ    Chung
----------------------------------------+---------------------------
Pol Orientation   -0.28  0.19   0.09       -0.25   0.20   0.06
Interest          -0.02  0.09  -0.07       -0.06   0.06  -0.01
United Candidacy  -0.12  0.16  -0.05
Merger                                      0.14  -0.14  -0.01
Prior Vote
92YS*              0.06 -0.16   0.10
92DJ*             -0.24  0.27  -0.03
92Chung*          -0.05 -0.17   0.22
87Roh                                       0.14  -0.14  -0.00
87YS*                                       0.22  -0.21  -0.01
87DJ*                                      -0.37   0.48  -0.12
Region
Southwest*        -0.26  0.49  -0.23       -0.54   0.68  -0.15
Southeast*        0.18 -0.28   0.10        0.21  -0.11  -0.10
Age                0.03  0.04  -0.06        0.07  -0.04  -0.05
==================================================================================
Note: The discrete change is the centered change of one standard deviation around the mean.  The discrete change of
the dummy variables is 0 → 1 change.  *Dummy variables.
194
Table 5a
Economic Model of Candidate Choice in the 1992 and 1997 Korean
Presidential Elections
===========================================================================
                      1992                            1997
                  Ln[DJ v. YS] Ln[Chung v. YS]   Ln[DJ v. Lee] Ln[Rhee v. Lee]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pol orientation      1.43***         .99***          1.75***        1.64***
(opposition ↑ )
Interest              .54***         .08              .42***        -.31**
(very much ↑ )
Merger               -.94***        -.37***
(good ↑ )
United Candidacy                                      .91***         .25**
(agree ↑ )
Prior Vote
Vote for Roh         -.80***        -.26
Vote for YS         -1.23***        -.43             -.63***         .12
Vote for DJ          2.20***        -.22             1.64***         .92**
Vote for Chung                                         -.32          .78**
Region
Southwest            3.62***        -.04             2.43***         .11
Southeast            -.70***       -1.13***          1.32***        -.18
Age                  -.27***        -.34***           .00           -.29***
(older ↑ )
National Economy      .26**         -.01
(better ↑ )
Family Economy                                        .07           -.21*
(better ↑ )
Standard of Living   -.40**          .05              .03           -.59***
(higher ↑ )
Constant            -2.24***       -1.30*            6.46***       -1.39**
==============================================================
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-test except interest).  Comparison group is put behind v.
Fit of the Model: in 1992 X2 (22): 865.23***, McFaddens R2: 0.49, and McFaddens Adj R2: 0.47, and in 1997 X2 (22):
845.09***, McFaddens R2: 0.42, McFaddens Adj R2: 0.41.   DJ: Kim Dae-Jung, YS: Kim Young-Sam, Chung: Chung
Joo-Young, Lee: Lee Hoi-Chang, and Rhee: Rhee In-Je.
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Table 5b
Wald Tests That Each Economic Variable Has No Effect in the 1997 and 1992
Korean Presidential Elections
           ======================================================
     Indicators       1992        1997
     ---------------------------------------------------
      National Economy         4.18*       
        Family Economy                     4.76**
      Living Standards         3.16*       7.16***  
             =================================================================
                Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-test).
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Table 6a
Logit Model of Turnout by Using Survey Data in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections
===============================================================
                                                          1992                                                   1997
                                    Basic Model          Full Model             Basic Model         Full Model
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
       Education|   .07           .10            .03           .05
             Age|   .24**         .23**          .34***        .43***
       Southwest|  1.16**        1.25**         1.30**        1.15*
       Southeast|  -.12          -.11            .82***       1.09***
       Democracy|                 .32*
        Efficacy|                                              .65***
Fairness of CEMC|   .52***        .49**          .51**         .49**
           Party|  -.23          -.24            .59***        .59***
        Interest|  1.40***       1.40***        1.41***       1.28***
      Rural Area|   .37           .38            .40           .38
        Constant| -1.94**       -2.16***       -3.12***      -4.62***
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X2                               |     80.03***                82.04***               140.31***             149.66***
McKelvey and
Zavoinas R2               |          .29                         .29                            .36                         .39
============================================================================
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.  All t-tests are one-tail tests except that of education and rural area.
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Table 6b
Logit Model of Turnout by Using Weighted Data in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections
=============================================================
                                                         1992                                                     1997
                                    Basic Model          Full Model             Basic Model         Full Model
----------------+------------------------------------------------------------
       Education|   .06           .09             .03          .04
             Age|   .27**         .26**           .36***       .43***
       Southwest|  1.23**        1.34***         1.20*        1.10*
       Southeast|  -.16          -.15             .83***      1.04***
       Democracy|                 .34*
        Efficacy|                                              .57***
Fairness of CEMC|   .56***        .53***          .39**        .37**
           Party|  -.29          -.31             .53**        .53**
        Interest|  1.42***       1.43***         1.40***      1.25***
      Rural Area|   .34           .35             .36          .33
        Constant| -3.19***      -3.40***        -3.93***     -5.08***
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
X2                               |     77.55***                81.18***                 103.25***             81.18***
McKelvey and
Zavoinas R2               |           .30                          .31                             .35                       .37
===========================================================================
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.  All t-tests are one-tail tests except that of education and rural area.
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Table 7a
Relationship between Turnout and City/Rural Areas, 1992
   ==================================================================
                       Cities       Rural Areas      Total
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
    Did not Vote     65 ( 7.10%)     14 (4.98%)        79 (6.58%)
           Voted    851 (92.90%)    270 (95.07%)     1121 (93.42%)
           Total    916 (100%)      284 (100%)       1200 (100%)
      =======================================================================
      Note: X2(1) = 1.65, p = 0.20
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Table 7b
Relationship between Turnout and City/Rural Areas, 1997
   ==================================================================
                       Cities       Rural Areas      Total
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
    Did not Vote     85 ( 7.75%)     11 (4.98%)        91 (7.54%)
           Voted    952 (92.25%)    164 (93.71%)     1116 (92.46%)
           Total   1032 (100%)      175 (100%)       1207 (100%)
      =======================================================================
    Note: X2(1) = 0.46, p = 0.49
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Table 8
Economic Model of Turnout in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections
===============================================================
                                                                 1992                                             1997
------------------+----------------------------------------------
         Education|        .04                   .04
               Age|        .24**                 .34***
         Southwest|       1.11**                1.31**
         Southeast|       -.10                   .83***
   Fairness of CEC|        .51**                 .49**
   Pty Orientation|       -.26                   .59***
          Interest|       1.40***               1.40***
        Rural Area|        .27                   .35
  National Economy|        .19*
    Family Economy|                             -.06
Standard of Living|        .33*                 -.27
          Constant|      -2.85***              -2.45**
-----------------------------------------------------------------
                                    X2(10)|               83.68***                                    141.05***
 McKelvey and Zavoinas R2|               30                                                 38
============================================================================
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.  All t-tests are one-tail tests except that of education and rural area.
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Table 9a
Distribution of Electoral Interest (Original Four Categories)
=======================================================================
Interest in               1992                       1997
   Election         |   N     %     Cum. % |     N       %     Cum. %
--------------------+----------------------+---------------------------
Not at all          |  19    1.58     1.58 |    22      1.84     1.84
Not much interested | 104    8.62    10.20 |   124     10.35    12.19
Somewhat interested | 336   27.86    38.06 |   468     39.07    51.25
Very interested     | 747   61.94   100.00 |   584     48.75   100.00
--------------------+----------------------+---------------------------




Distribution of Electoral Interest (Recoded Three Categories)
==============================================================
   Interest in               1992                     1997
   Election         |   N      %     Cum. %|    N      %      Cum. %
--------------------+----------------------+--------------------------
Not much interested |  123   10.20   10.20 |   146   12.19     12.19
Somewhat interested |  336   27.86   38.06 |   468   39.07     51.25
Very interested     |  747   61.94  100.00 |   584   48.75    100.00
--------------------+----------------------+---------------------------




Predicted Probabilities of the Dependent Variable, Interest in the Elections
=====================================================================
Categories          |  N    Mean      Sd       Min      Max     Range
--------------------+------------------------------------------------
1992
Not much interested | 123   .112     .065     .013     .463      .450
Somewhat interested | 336   .374     .098     .094     .496      .406
Very interested     | 747   .514     .157     .116     .893      .777
1997
Not much interested | 146   .096     .096     .005     .692      .687
Somewhat interested | 468   .276     .131     .033     .469      .436




Ordinal Logit Model of Interest in the Korean Presidential Elections
==============================================================
                      1992                            1997
Electoral|   Basic Model     Full Model               Basic Model      Full Model
 Interest|   Coef.        Coef.               Coef.        Coef.
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     edu |   .20**        -.13*               -.03         -.05
     age |  -.10*         -.09*                .28***       .28***
     men |   .14           .15                -.08         -.05
 age*edu |                 .13***                           .03
 men*edu |                -.11                              .17
 men*age |                 .12                              .21**
      SW |   .35*          .34*                .25          .24
      SE |  -.50***       -.50***             -.51***      -.50***
   stump |  1.28***       1.27***
TVspeech |   .80***        .79***              .42***       .44***
   TVads |   .15           .14                 .33***       .33***
TVdebate |                                     .94***       .90***
      YS |   .20***        .18***
      DJ |   .22***        .21***             1.07***      1.08***
     Lee |                                     .35***       .35***
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   _cut1 |   .33 (.53)    -.24 (.41)           .82 (.45)    .19 (.29)
   _cut2 |  2.46 (.53)    1.92 (.41)          2.83 (.46)   2.21 (.30)
============================================================================




Goodness of Fit: Ordinal Logit Model of Interest in the Korean Presidential
Elections
=======================================================================
                                 1992                      1997
                         Basic Model        Full Model       Basic Model         Full Model
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
N                          922         922          1117        1117
X2                    (10)=111.20 (13)=123.96  (10)=235.50  (13)=239.06
Prob> X2                      .00         .00          .00          .00
Initial Log Likelihood    -889.41     -889.41      -968.61      -968.61
Final Log Likelihood      -832.81     -827.43      -850.85      -849.08




Joint Wald Tests of Sociological Variables and their Interaction Terms
==============================================================
                age      men      men      age       age*edu     age*edu  age
                edu      edu      age      edu       men*edu     men*edu  edu
                                           men       men*age     men*age  men
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992
Basic Model   18.48***  7.95***  3.35*    21.53***
Full  Model    8.72***  3.96*    2.83     10.97***   10.74***      32.25***
1997
Basic Model   31.81***  0.55    21.00***  32.42***
Full  Model   30.09***  0.53    19.80***  30.43***    3.52         35.96***
==============================================================
Note: *p<.10, **p<.50, and ***p<.01.  All t-tests are one-tail tests.
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Table 13
Conditional Predicted Probabilities of Stump Campaign (1992) and of Television
Debate (1997) on Electoral Interest (%)
===============================================================
                           Not much     | Somewhat    | Very
                           Interested   | Interested  | Interested
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Stump       Not Watched        13             44            43
(1992)      Watched             4             23            73
TV debate   Not Viewed         28             47            26
(1997)      Viewed             13             41            46
===============================================================




Turnout Rate of Korean Presidential Elections



























































                       Note: Source of the map is D. Shin (1999, xxi).  This study divides Korea into five regions:        
            1) the Southwest (Honam) includes Cholla Pukdo, Chonju, Cholla Namdo, and Kwangju,  
                       2) the Southeast (Youngnam) includes Kyongsang Pukdo, Taegu, Kyongsang Namdo and  
                       Pusan, 3) the Central area includes Choongchung Pukdo, Choongchung  Namdo, and Taejon 
                       4) Seoul area includes Seoul, Kyonggi Do and Inchon and finally 5) Kwangwon Do.  
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Figure 3
Hypothesized Model of Candidate Choice, the 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Elections













































Candidate Choice by Region, 1992
               Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3
               represents Chung Joo-Young (Chung).  The Southwest indicates Honam, the Southeast

















Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992
Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung
Joo-Young (Chung).  The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.
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Figure 5b
Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992
                Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung
                Joo-Young (Chung).
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Figure 6
Effects of Electoral Interest on Voter Turnout


























Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1987 Presidential
Election on the 1992 Presidential Election
Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992
multinomial logit regression.  YS represents Kim Young-Sam, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung,
and Chung represents Chung Joo-Young.






Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 Presidential Election
on the 1992 Presidential Election
Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992
multinomial logit regression.  YS represents Kim Young-Sam, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung,







Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 Presidential
Election on the 1997 Presidential Election
Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1997
multinomial logit regression.  Lee represents Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and
Rhee represents Rhee In-Je.






Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 Presidential Election
on the 1997 Presidential Election
Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1997
multinomial logit regression.  Lee represents Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and







Candidate Choice by Region, 1997
              Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3
             represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee). The Southwest indicates Honam, the Southeast indicates

















Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997
     Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Rhee
     In-Je (Rhee).  The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.
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Figure 10b
Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997
 Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Rhee
 In-Je (Rhee).  The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.
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Figure 11a
Economic Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992
       Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents
       Chung-Joo-Young (Chung).
 Factor Change Scale Relative to


























Economic Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997
           Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents
           Represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee).
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ROC Curve of the 1992 Turnout Model


















ROC Curve of the 1997 Turnout Model


















Turnout as a Function of Education in the 1992 Presidential Election
























Turnout as a Function of Education in the 1997 Presidential Election
























Probabilities of Turnout in terms of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election
Note: These probabilities were obtained from covariates of the logit model shown in Table 6a, while
controlling interest in the election.  For example, the effect of electoral interest on High-Prob
Respondents" is plotted by employing voters who would have high probabilities of voting: those who
regard the CEC fair, age 30 and over voters and Southwesterners and all other variables constant.  The
effect of electoral interest on Low-Prob Respondents is plotted by using those who regard the CEC
unfair, voters in their twenties, voters living in other than the Southwest and all other variables at their
mean.  Finally, the effect of electoral interest on Average-Prob Respondents is plotted by holding all







































































           Note: These probabilities were obtained from covariates of the logit model shown in Table 6b, while    
           controlling interest in the election.  For instance, the effect of electoral interest on High-Prob       
           Respondents is plotted by using those who would have high probabilities of voting: voters who    
           have higher efficacy, those who regard the CEC fair, voters over 30, those who have party  
orientations, those living in the Southeast and the Southwest, and all other variables constant.  The     
effect of electoral interest on Low-Prob Respondents is plotted by using those who have lower  
efficacy, those who regard the CEC not fair, voters in their twenties, Independents, those living other   
than in the Southeast and the Southwest, and all other variables constant.  Finally, the interest effect  
on Average-Prob Respondents is plotted by holding all independent variables at their mean and  



























Turnout as a Function of Evaluation of National Economy in the 1992
Presidential Election
























Turnout as a Function of Evaluation of Living Standards in the 1992
Presidential Election
























Bivariate Relationship between Age, Education and Gender, and Interest (%)
in the 1992 and 1997 Presidential Elections
    Note: X2 = 49.44***   Gamma = -.05                           Note: X2 = 70.01***  Gamma = .28
    Note: X2 = 59.45***  Gamma = .15                             Note: X2 = 18.01***  Gamma = -.16
    Note: X2 = 12.84***  Cramers V = .10                       Note: X2 = 4.31











































































Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election in terms of
Different Age Levels among Those Who Did Not Experience Stump Campaigns
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Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election in terms of
Different Age Levels among Those Who Experienced Stump Campaign
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Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1997 Presidential Election in terms of
Different Age Levels among Those Who Did Not View Presidential Debates
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Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1997 Presidential Election in terms of
Different Age Levels among Those Who Viewed Presidential Debates
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CODING AND VARIALBE DESCRIPTIONS OF CANDIDATE CHOICE MODEL
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1)  Vote: Dependent variable.  Nominal variable. 1 for Kim Young-Sam (YS) , 2 for Kim
     Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 for Chung Joo-Young (Chung) for 1992 election.  1 for Lee Hoi-
     Chang (Lee), 2 for Kim Dae Jung (DJ) and 3 for Rhee In-Je (Rhee) for 1997 election.
2)  Party Orientation: Political orientation on whether voters are toward the governing
party or opposition party.  1 for leaning to governing party, 2 for neither
(independent), and 3 for leaning to the opposition party.
3)  Merger (United candidacy): Whether the merger of the three parties is a good decision
or not in 1992 election, and 1 for bad decision, 2 for dont know, and 3 for good
decision.  Whether the united candidacy in 1997 election is agreeable or not, and 1 for
disagree, 2 for dont know, and 3 for agree.
4)  Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election.  1 for not at all, 2 for not much
interested, 3 for somewhat interested, and 4 for very interested.
5)  Prior vote for the 1992 model: There are three dummy variables that indicate previous
candidate supporters.  Prior vote for Roh: 1 if voters voted for Roh in the 1987
presidential election, and 0 for else, prior vote for YS: 1 if voters voted for YS in the
1987 presidential election, and 0 for else, and prior vote for DJ: 1 if voters voted for
DJ in the 1987 presidential election, and 0 for else.
6)  Prior vote for the 1997 model: There are three dummy variables that indicate previous
candidate supporters.  Prior vote for YS: 1 if voters voted for YS in the 1992 election,
and 0 for else, prior vote for DJ: 1 if voters voted for DJ in the 1992 election, and 0
for else, and prior vote for Chung: 1 if voters voted for Chung in the 1992 election,
and 0 for else.
7)  Southwest: Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southwestern area
(Honam) and 0 for else.
8)  Southeast: Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southeastern area
(Youngnam) and 0 for else.
9)  Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s and over.
10) National Economy: Whether Korean economy has been stronger or weaker in the last
one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same and 4
for a little stronger.  Available only in 1992.
11) Living standard: 1 for poor, 2 for middle, and 3 for rich.
12) Family Economy: Whether family economy has been stronger or weaker in the last
one or two years.  1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same.
Available only in 1997.
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A7          Who did you vote for in the election?
79 6.6 6.8 6.8
544 45.3 46.5 53.2
327 27.3 27.9 81.2
115 9.6 9.8 91.0
2 .2 .2 91.2
91 7.6 7.8 99.0
1 .1 .1 99.1





















Mean  1.80 Median  1.00 Std Dev  1.36
A22          The merger of these three partiesDJP, DP & RP?
69 5.8 5.8 5.8
313 26.1 26.1 31.9
298 24.8 24.9 56.8
175 14.6 14.6 71.4




















Mean  3.34 Median  3.00 Std Dev  1.29
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A14          Who did you vote for in the 1987 (13th) Presidential election?
426 35.5 35.9 35.9
261 21.8 22.0 57.9
257 21.4 21.7 79.6
70 5.8 5.9 85.5
7 .6 .6 86.1
61 5.1 5.1 91.2





















Mean  2.64 Median  2.00 Std Dev  1.86
A35          What is your political party orientation?
213 17.8 17.9 17.9
247 20.6 20.7 38.6
325 27.1 27.3 65.9
279 23.3 23.4 89.3




















Mean  2.88 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
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A1          Interest in election
584 48.7 48.7 48.7
468 39.0 39.1 87.8
124 10.3 10.4 98.2

















Mean  1.65 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
Q1          Residency of Respondents
308 25.7 25.7 25.7
106 8.8 8.8 34.5
64 5.3 5.3 39.8
54 4.5 4.5 44.3
33 2.8 2.8 47.1
29 2.4 2.4 49.5
174 14.5 14.5 64.0
43 3.6 3.6 67.6
38 3.2 3.2 70.8
53 4.4 4.4 75.2
57 4.8 4.8 79.9
58 4.8 4.8 84.8
81 6.8 6.8 91.5























Mean  6.25 Median  7.00 Std Dev  4.63
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S56          Age
17 1.4 1.4 1.4
36 3.0 3.0 4.4
23 1.9 1.9 6.3
20 1.7 1.7 8.0
36 3.0 3.0 11.0
33 2.8 2.8 13.8
31 2.6 2.6 16.3
32 2.7 2.7 19.0
40 3.3 3.3 22.3
35 2.9 2.9 25.3
32 2.7 2.7 27.9
30 2.5 2.5 30.4
34 2.8 2.8 33.3
33 2.8 2.8 36.0
41 3.4 3.4 39.4
39 3.3 3.3 42.7
46 3.8 3.8 46.5
28 2.3 2.3 48.8
29 2.4 2.4 51.3
25 2.1 2.1 53.3
33 2.8 2.8 56.1
25 2.1 2.1 58.2
27 2.3 2.3 60.4
18 1.5 1.5 61.9
22 1.8 1.8 63.8
32 2.7 2.7 66.4
19 1.6 1.6 68.0
21 1.8 1.8 69.8
16 1.3 1.3 71.1
17 1.4 1.4 72.5
19 1.6 1.6 74.1
16 1.3 1.3 75.4
17 1.4 1.4 76.8
22 1.8 1.8 78.7
20 1.7 1.7 80.3












































S56 continued          Age
20 1.7 1.7 83.0
16 1.3 1.3 84.3
14 1.2 1.2 85.5
16 1.3 1.3 86.8
14 1.2 1.2 88.0
13 1.1 1.1 89.1
7 .6 .6 89.7
6 .5 .5 90.2
6 .5 .5 90.7
12 1.0 1.0 91.7
6 .5 .5 92.2
9 .8 .8 92.9
9 .8 .8 93.7
10 .8 .8 94.5
9 .8 .8 95.2
4 .3 .3 95.6
8 .7 .7 96.2
3 .3 .3 96.5
4 .3 .3 96.8
3 .3 .3 97.1
5 .4 .4 97.5
8 .7 .7 98.2
6 .5 .5 98.7
1 .1 .1 98.7
3 .3 .3 99.0
5 .4 .4 99.4
2 .2 .2 99.6
2 .2 .2 99.8
2 .2 .2 99.9







































Mean  41.28 Median  38.00 Std Dev  14.89
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       A 21.        S Korea's economy strong or weak in the past one to two years?
25 2.1 2.1 2.1
91 7.6 7.6 9.7
325 27.1 27.2 36.9
363 30.3 30.4 67.3




 Much stronger (1)
A little stronger (2)
About the same (3)











   Mean 3.84 Median 4.00 Std. Dev 1.03
                 S52.          Level of living
6 .5 .5 .5
67 5.6 5.6 6.1
836 69.7 69.7 75.8
241 20.1 20.1 95.8














  Mean 3.22 Median 3.00 Std. Dev .63
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Q2X1          (If Voted) Who did you vote for in the election?
404 33.5 37.1 37.1
447 37.0 41.0 78.1
189 15.7 17.3 95.4
44 3.6 4.0 99.4
3 .2 .3 99.7
2 .2 .2 99.9




















Mean  1.91 Median  1.91 Std Dev  .90
                       Q17          Do you agree with the DJP single candidacy (byetwee
DJ and JP)?
390 32.3 32.4 32.4
454 37.6 37.7 70.0
350 29.0 29.0 99.1
1 .1 .1 99.2


















Mean  1.99 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .83
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Q4          Who did you vote for in the 1992 presidential election?
472 39.1 39.5 39.5
308 25.5 25.8 65.2
77 6.4 6.4 71.7
14 1.2 1.2 72.8
68 5.6 5.7 78.5
4 .3 .3 78.8
3 .2 .3 79.1
63 5.2 5.3 84.4
40 3.3 3.3 87.7
136 11.3 11.4 99.1
1 .1 .1 99.2
1 .1 .1 99.2
1 .1 .1 99.3
1 .1 .1 99.4
3 .2 .3 99.7
1 .1 .1 99.7
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.9

































Mean  3.53 Median  2.00 Std Dev  3.71
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Q1          Interest in election
747 61.9 61.9 61.9
336 27.8 27.9 89.8
104 8.6 8.6 98.4

















Mean  1.50 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .72
Q14          How do you describe your political party orientation?
311 25.8 25.9 25.9
510 42.3 42.4 68.3
373 30.9 31.0 99.3



















Mean  2.07 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .79
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id15          Residency of Respondents
273 22.6 22.6 22.6
102 8.5 8.5 31.1
68 5.6 5.6 36.7
67 5.6 5.6 42.3
33 2.7 2.7 45.0
33 2.7 2.7 47.7
25 2.1 2.1 49.8
213 17.6 17.6 67.4
43 3.6 3.6 71.0
38 3.1 3.1 74.2
50 4.1 4.1 78.3
52 4.3 4.3 82.6
56 4.6 4.6 87.2
75 6.2 6.2 93.5
























Mean  6.71 Median  8.00 Std Dev  4.79
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age          Age
2 .2 .2 .2
37 3.1 3.1 3.2
23 1.9 1.9 5.1
25 2.1 2.1 7.2
39 3.2 3.2 10.4
28 2.3 2.3 12.8
46 3.8 3.8 16.6
34 2.8 2.8 19.4
40 3.3 3.3 22.7
34 2.8 2.8 25.5
33 2.7 2.7 28.3
31 2.6 2.6 30.8
27 2.2 2.2 33.1
28 2.3 2.3 35.4
25 2.1 2.1 37.4
39 3.2 3.2 40.7
41 3.4 3.4 44.1
35 2.9 2.9 47.0
28 2.3 2.3 49.3
30 2.5 2.5 51.8
25 2.1 2.1 53.9
39 3.2 3.2 57.1
28 2.3 2.3 59.4
17 1.4 1.4 60.8
28 2.3 2.3 63.1
16 1.3 1.3 64.5
24 2.0 2.0 66.4
20 1.7 1.7 68.1
17 1.4 1.4 69.5
26 2.2 2.2 71.7
11 .9 .9 72.6
43 3.6 3.6 76.1
21 1.7 1.7 77.9
22 1.8 1.8 79.7
25 2.1 2.1 81.8
18 1.5 1.5 83.3













































age continued          Age
16 1.3 1.3 85.8
17 1.4 1.4 87.2
10 .8 .8 88.1
21 1.7 1.7 89.8
12 1.0 1.0 90.8
6 .5 .5 91.3
11 .9 .9 92.2
11 .9 .9 93.1
8 .7 .7 93.8
14 1.2 1.2 94.9
10 .8 .8 95.8
8 .7 .7 96.4
5 .4 .4 96.9
7 .6 .6 97.4
7 .6 .6 98.0
4 .3 .3 98.3
2 .2 .2 98.5
3 .2 .2 98.8
4 .3 .3 99.1
1 .1 .1 99.2
2 .2 .2 99.3
4 .3 .3 99.7
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.9



































Mean  40.04 Median  38.00 Std Dev  13.98
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       Q27.   Would you say that your family's economy has been stronger or weaker
due                     to  the national economic policies?
20 1.7 1.7 1.7
31 2.6 2.6 4.2
309 25.6 25.7 29.9
407 33.7 33.8 63.7
374 31.0 31.1 94.8





A little stronger (2)
About the same (3)












  Mean 4.06 Median 4.00 Std. Dev 1.01
                Q29.     Level of living
8 .7 .7 .7
73 6.0 6.0 6.7
969 80.3 80.3 87.0
128 10.6 10.6 97.6














  Mean 3.08 Median 3.00 Std. Dev .53
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CODING AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS OF TURNOUT MODEL
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1) Turnout: Dependent variable.  Dichotomous variable.  0 for not voted and 1 for voted.
2) Party Orientation: Political orientation on whether voters are toward the governing
party or opposition party.  Recoded as 1 + 2 = 1, and 3 = 0.  0 for neither
(Independent) and 1 for leaning to the ruling party or opposition parties.
3)  Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election.  Recoded as 1 = 3, 2 = 2, 3 + 4 =
1.  1 for not much interested, 2 for somewhat interested, and 3 for very interested.
4)  Southwest: Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southwestern area
(Honam) and 0 for else.
5)  Southeast: Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southeastern area
(Youngnam) and 0 for else.
6)  Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s or over.
7)  Education: 1 for elementary school,  2 for middle school,  3 for high school, and 4 for
college or over
8)  Fairness of CEMC: evaluation of how much the Central Election Management
Commission is fair.  Recoded as 1 + 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3.  1 for unfair, 2 for fair, and 3
for very fair.
9)  Democracy: evaluation of general level of democratization.  Recoded as 3 + 4 = 0,
and 1 + 2 = 1.  0 for undemocratic and 1 for democratic.  Available only in 1992.
10)  Efficacy: indicating whether respondents vote is important or not.  Recoded as 1 + 2
       = 1, 3 = 2, and 4 = 3.  1 for agree, 2 for disagree, and 3 for disagree totally.
Available only in 1997.  Since the question has a negative expression, the order of the
choices was not changed.
11)  Rural area: whether voters live in rural area or city.  Recoded as 1 + 2 = 0, and 3 = 1.
       0 for big and medium cities and 1 for rural area.
12) National Economy: Whether Korean economy has been stronger or weaker in the last
one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same and 4
for a little stronger.   Available only in 1992.
13) Living standard: 1 for poor, 2 for middle, and 3 for rich.
14) Family Economy: Whether family economy has been stronger or weaker in the last
one or two years.  1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same.
Available only in 1997.
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A6          Did you vote in the election?
1121 93.4 93.4 93.4











Mean  1.07 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .25
A28          What do you think of Korean politics?
31 2.6 2.6 2.6
636 53.0 53.6 56.2
439 36.6 37.0 93.3

















Mean  2.48 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .66
A48          How fair was the Central Election Commission during the election?
104 8.7 8.8 8.8
834 69.5 70.3 79.1
230 19.2 19.4 98.5

















Mean  2.14 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .57
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A35          What is your political party orientation?
213 17.8 17.9 17.9
247 20.6 20.7 38.6
325 27.1 27.3 65.9
279 23.3 23.4 89.3




















Mean  2.88 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
                               A1             Interest in election
584 48.7 48.7 48.7
468 39.0 39.1 87.8
124 10.3 10.4 98.2

















Mean  1.65 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
Q3          Size of your residence
594 49.5 49.5 49.5
322 26.8 26.8 76.3













Mean  1.74 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .82
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S51          Education
236 19.7 19.7 19.7
205 17.1 17.1 36.8
439 36.6 36.6 73.3














Mean  2.70 Median  3.00 Std Dev  1.07
Q1          Residency of Respondents
308 25.7 25.7 25.7
106 8.8 8.8 34.5
64 5.3 5.3 39.8
54 4.5 4.5 44.3
33 2.8 2.8 47.1
29 2.4 2.4 49.5
174 14.5 14.5 64.0
43 3.6 3.6 67.6
38 3.2 3.2 70.8
53 4.4 4.4 75.2
57 4.8 4.8 79.9
58 4.8 4.8 84.8
81 6.8 6.8 91.5























Mean  6.25 Median  7.00 Std Dev  4.63
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S56          Age
17 1.4 1.4 1.4
36 3.0 3.0 4.4
23 1.9 1.9 6.3
20 1.7 1.7 8.0
36 3.0 3.0 11.0
33 2.8 2.8 13.8
31 2.6 2.6 16.3
32 2.7 2.7 19.0
40 3.3 3.3 22.3
35 2.9 2.9 25.3
32 2.7 2.7 27.9
30 2.5 2.5 30.4
34 2.8 2.8 33.3
33 2.8 2.8 36.0
41 3.4 3.4 39.4
39 3.3 3.3 42.7
46 3.8 3.8 46.5
28 2.3 2.3 48.8
29 2.4 2.4 51.3
25 2.1 2.1 53.3
33 2.8 2.8 56.1
25 2.1 2.1 58.2
27 2.3 2.3 60.4
18 1.5 1.5 61.9
22 1.8 1.8 63.8
32 2.7 2.7 66.4
19 1.6 1.6 68.0
21 1.8 1.8 69.8
16 1.3 1.3 71.1
17 1.4 1.4 72.5
19 1.6 1.6 74.1
16 1.3 1.3 75.4
17 1.4 1.4 76.8
22 1.8 1.8 78.7
20 1.7 1.7 80.3












































S56 continued          Age
20 1.7 1.7 83.0
16 1.3 1.3 84.3
14 1.2 1.2 85.5
16 1.3 1.3 86.8
14 1.2 1.2 88.0
13 1.1 1.1 89.1
7 .6 .6 89.7
6 .5 .5 90.2
6 .5 .5 90.7
12 1.0 1.0 91.7
6 .5 .5 92.2
9 .8 .8 92.9
9 .8 .8 93.7
10 .8 .8 94.5
9 .8 .8 95.2
4 .3 .3 95.6
8 .7 .7 96.2
3 .3 .3 96.5
4 .3 .3 96.8
3 .3 .3 97.1
5 .4 .4 97.5
8 .7 .7 98.2
6 .5 .5 98.7
1 .1 .1 98.7
3 .3 .3 99.0
5 .4 .4 99.4
2 .2 .2 99.6
2 .2 .2 99.8
2 .2 .2 99.9







































Mean  41.28 Median  38.00 Std Dev  14.89
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       A 21.        S Korea's economy strong or weak in the past one to two years?
25 2.1 2.1 2.1
91 7.6 7.6 9.7
325 27.1 27.2 36.9
363 30.3 30.4 67.3




 Much stronger (1)
A little stronger (2)
About the same (3)











   Mean 3.84 Median 4.00 Std. Dev 1.03
                 S52.          Level of living
6 .5 .5 .5
67 5.6 5.6 6.1
836 69.7 69.7 75.8
241 20.1 20.1 95.8














  Mean 3.22 Median 3.00 Std. Dev .63
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Q2          Did you vote in the election?
1116 92.5 92.5 92.5











Mean  1.08 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .26
Q30x7          Whether I vote or not is not important since too many people are voting.
28 2.3 2.3 2.3
112 9.3 9.4 11.7
369 30.6 30.8 42.5

















Mean  3.43 Median  4.00 Std Dev  .76
                         Q1          Interest in election
747 61.9 61.9 61.9
336 27.8 27.9 89.8
104 8.6 8.6 98.4

















Mean  1.50 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .72
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Q44          How fair do you think was the Central Election Commission during the
election?
202 16.7 17.0 17.0
866 71.7 72.8 89.7
110 9.1 9.2 99.0

















Mean  1.94 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .55
Q14          How do you describe your political party orientation?
311 25.8 25.9 25.9
510 42.3 42.4 68.3
373 30.9 31.0 99.3



















Mean  2.07 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .79
area          Size of your residence
601 49.8 49.8 49.8
431 35.7 35.7 85.5













Mean  1.65 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .72
266
id15          Residency of Respondents
273 22.6 22.6 22.6
102 8.5 8.5 31.1
68 5.6 5.6 36.7
67 5.6 5.6 42.3
33 2.7 2.7 45.0
33 2.7 2.7 47.7
25 2.1 2.1 49.8
213 17.6 17.6 67.4
43 3.6 3.6 71.0
38 3.1 3.1 74.2
50 4.1 4.1 78.3
52 4.3 4.3 82.6
56 4.6 4.6 87.2
75 6.2 6.2 93.5
























Mean  6.71 Median  8.00 Std Dev  4.79
edu          Education
140 11.6 11.7 11.7
125 10.4 10.4 22.1
450 37.3 37.5 59.6



















Mean  3.07 Median  3.00 Std Dev  .99
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age          Age
2 .2 .2 .2
37 3.1 3.1 3.2
23 1.9 1.9 5.1
25 2.1 2.1 7.2
39 3.2 3.2 10.4
28 2.3 2.3 12.8
46 3.8 3.8 16.6
34 2.8 2.8 19.4
40 3.3 3.3 22.7
34 2.8 2.8 25.5
33 2.7 2.7 28.3
31 2.6 2.6 30.8
27 2.2 2.2 33.1
28 2.3 2.3 35.4
25 2.1 2.1 37.4
39 3.2 3.2 40.7
41 3.4 3.4 44.1
35 2.9 2.9 47.0
28 2.3 2.3 49.3
30 2.5 2.5 51.8
25 2.1 2.1 53.9
39 3.2 3.2 57.1
28 2.3 2.3 59.4
17 1.4 1.4 60.8
28 2.3 2.3 63.1
16 1.3 1.3 64.5
24 2.0 2.0 66.4
20 1.7 1.7 68.1
17 1.4 1.4 69.5
26 2.2 2.2 71.7
11 .9 .9 72.6
43 3.6 3.6 76.1
21 1.7 1.7 77.9
22 1.8 1.8 79.7
25 2.1 2.1 81.8
18 1.5 1.5 83.3













































age continued          Age
16 1.3 1.3 85.8
17 1.4 1.4 87.2
10 .8 .8 88.1
21 1.7 1.7 89.8
12 1.0 1.0 90.8
6 .5 .5 91.3
11 .9 .9 92.2
11 .9 .9 93.1
8 .7 .7 93.8
14 1.2 1.2 94.9
10 .8 .8 95.8
8 .7 .7 96.4
5 .4 .4 96.9
7 .6 .6 97.4
7 .6 .6 98.0
4 .3 .3 98.3
2 .2 .2 98.5
3 .2 .2 98.8
4 .3 .3 99.1
1 .1 .1 99.2
2 .2 .2 99.3
4 .3 .3 99.7
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.9



































Mean  40.04 Median  38.00 Std Dev  13.98
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       Q27.   Would you say that your family's economy has been stronger or weaker
due                     to  the national economic policies?
20 1.7 1.7 1.7
31 2.6 2.6 4.2
309 25.6 25.7 29.9
407 33.7 33.8 63.7
374 31.0 31.1 94.8





A little stronger (2)
About the same (3)












  Mean 4.06 Median 4.00 Std. Dev 1.01
                Q29.     Level of living
8 .7 .7 .7
73 6.0 6.0 6.7
969 80.3 80.3 87.0
128 10.6 10.6 97.6














  Mean 3.08 Median 3.00 Std. Dev .53
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APPENDIX 5
CODING AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS OF POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL
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1) Interest: Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election.  Recoded as 1 = 3, 2 =
2, 3 + 4 = 1.  1 for not much interested, 2 for somewhat interested, and 3 for very
interested.
2)  Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s or over.
3)  Education (edu): 1 for elementary school,  2 for middle school,  3 for high school, and
4 for college or over
4) Gender: Dichotomous variable.  1 for men and 0 for women.
5) Ageedu: Interaction term for age and education.
6) Menedu: Interaction term for gender and education.
7) Menage: Interaction term for gender and age.
8)  Southwest (SW): Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southwestern area
(Honam) and 0 for else.
9)  Southeast (SE): Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters living in the Southeastern area
(Youngnam) and 0 for else.
10)  Stump: Dichotomous variable.  1 for voters who watched stump campaigning, and 0
for voters who did not.  Available only in 1992.
11)  TVdbt: Presidential debates on television. 1 for voters who viewed debates on
television, and 0 for voters who did not.  Available only in 1997.
12)  TVspeech: For 1992 model, this variable is dichotomous: 1 for those who watched
candidate speeches on television and 0 for those who did not.  For 1997 model, this
variable is ordinal: 1 for almost never, 2 for almost all the speeches, and 3 for all the
speeches.
13)  TVads: For 1992 model, this variable is dichotomous.  1 for those who viewed
campaign ads on television and 0 for those who did not.  For 1997 model, this
variable is ordinal.  1 for almost never, 2 for almost all the speeches, and 3 for all the
speeches.
14) YS: indicating how much voters like Kim Young-Sam (YS).  1 for dislike, 2 for not
very much, 3 for fairly and 4 very much.  Available only in 1992.
15) DJ: indicating how much voters like Kim Dae-Jung (DJ).  For 1992 model, this
variable is ordinal: 1 for dislike, 2 for not very much, 3 for fairly and 4 very much.
Available only in 1992.  For 1997 model, this variable is dichotomous: 1 for those
who like Kim Dae-Jung most and 0 for else.
16) Lee: indicating how much voters like Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee).  1 for those who like Lee
Hoi-Chang most and 0 for else.  Available only in 1997.
272
APPENDIX 6A
VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL, 1992
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                               A1             Interest in election
584 48.7 48.7 48.7
468 39.0 39.1 87.8
124 10.3 10.4 98.2

















Mean  1.65 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
S51          Education
236 19.7 19.7 19.7
205 17.1 17.1 36.8
439 36.6 36.6 73.3














Mean  2.70 Median  3.00 Std Dev  1.07
Q4          Gender
582 48.5 48.5 48.5











Mean  1.52 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .50
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Q1          Residency of Respondents
308 25.7 25.7 25.7
106 8.8 8.8 34.5
64 5.3 5.3 39.8
54 4.5 4.5 44.3
33 2.8 2.8 47.1
29 2.4 2.4 49.5
174 14.5 14.5 64.0
43 3.6 3.6 67.6
38 3.2 3.2 70.8
53 4.4 4.4 75.2
57 4.8 4.8 79.9
58 4.8 4.8 84.8
81 6.8 6.8 91.5























Mean  6.25 Median  7.00 Std Dev  4.63
A301          Speeches on the street?
266 22.2 22.2 22.2











Mean  1.78 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .42
A302          Speeches on TV?
1084 90.3 90.3 90.3











Mean  1.10 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .30
275
A303          Campaign ads on TV?
854 71.2 71.2 71.2











Mean  1.29 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .45
A171          How much did you like Kim Young-Sam?
329 27.4 28.0 28.0
382 31.8 32.5 60.6
161 13.4 13.7 74.3
164 13.7 14.0 88.2



















Mean  2.49 Median  2.00 Std Dev  1.34
A172          How much did you like Kim Dae-Joong?
235 19.6 20.1 20.1
278 23.2 23.7 43.8
266 22.2 22.7 66.5
214 17.8 18.3 84.8


















Mean  2.85 Median  3.00 Std Dev  1.35
276
S56          Age
17 1.4 1.4 1.4
36 3.0 3.0 4.4
23 1.9 1.9 6.3
20 1.7 1.7 8.0
36 3.0 3.0 11.0
33 2.8 2.8 13.8
31 2.6 2.6 16.3
32 2.7 2.7 19.0
40 3.3 3.3 22.3
35 2.9 2.9 25.3
32 2.7 2.7 27.9
30 2.5 2.5 30.4
34 2.8 2.8 33.3
33 2.8 2.8 36.0
41 3.4 3.4 39.4
39 3.3 3.3 42.7
46 3.8 3.8 46.5
28 2.3 2.3 48.8
29 2.4 2.4 51.3
25 2.1 2.1 53.3
33 2.8 2.8 56.1
25 2.1 2.1 58.2
27 2.3 2.3 60.4
18 1.5 1.5 61.9
22 1.8 1.8 63.8
32 2.7 2.7 66.4
19 1.6 1.6 68.0
21 1.8 1.8 69.8
16 1.3 1.3 71.1
17 1.4 1.4 72.5
19 1.6 1.6 74.1
16 1.3 1.3 75.4
17 1.4 1.4 76.8
22 1.8 1.8 78.7
20 1.7 1.7 80.3












































S56 continued          Age
20 1.7 1.7 83.0
16 1.3 1.3 84.3
14 1.2 1.2 85.5
16 1.3 1.3 86.8
14 1.2 1.2 88.0
13 1.1 1.1 89.1
7 .6 .6 89.7
6 .5 .5 90.2
6 .5 .5 90.7
12 1.0 1.0 91.7
6 .5 .5 92.2
9 .8 .8 92.9
9 .8 .8 93.7
10 .8 .8 94.5
9 .8 .8 95.2
4 .3 .3 95.6
8 .7 .7 96.2
3 .3 .3 96.5
4 .3 .3 96.8
3 .3 .3 97.1
5 .4 .4 97.5
8 .7 .7 98.2
6 .5 .5 98.7
1 .1 .1 98.7
3 .3 .3 99.0
5 .4 .4 99.4
2 .2 .2 99.6
2 .2 .2 99.8
2 .2 .2 99.9







































Mean  41.28 Median  38.00 Std Dev  14.89
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APPENDIX 6B
VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL, 1997
279
                         Q1          Interest in election
747 61.9 61.9 61.9
336 27.8 27.9 89.8
104 8.6 8.6 98.4

















Mean  1.50 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .72
edu          Education
140 11.6 11.7 11.7
125 10.4 10.4 22.1
450 37.3 37.5 59.6



















Mean  3.07 Median  3.00 Std Dev  .99
sex          Your gender
614 50.9 50.9 50.9











Mean  1.49 Median  1.00 Std Dev  .50
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Q13X1          Candidates' discussions on TV?
333 27.6 27.6 27.6
684 56.7 56.8 84.4
167 13.8 13.9 98.3
18 1.5 1.5 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.9




















Mean  1.90 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .71
Q13X2          Candidates' speeches on TV?
397 32.9 32.9 32.9
629 52.1 52.2 85.1
136 11.3 11.3 96.4
43 3.6 3.6 99.9


















Mean  1.86 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .76
Q13X3          Candidates' ads on TV?
428 35.5 35.5 35.5
616 51.0 51.1 86.6
124 10.3 10.3 96.9

















Mean  1.81 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .74
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Q8          Which candidate do you like most?
359 29.7 31.6 31.6
437 36.2 38.4 70.0
263 21.8 23.1 93.1
72 6.0 6.3 99.5
3 .2 .3 99.7
2 .2 .2 99.9




















Mean  2.06 Median  2.00 Std Dev  .94
id15          Residency of Respondents
273 22.6 22.6 22.6
102 8.5 8.5 31.1
68 5.6 5.6 36.7
67 5.6 5.6 42.3
33 2.7 2.7 45.0
33 2.7 2.7 47.7
25 2.1 2.1 49.8
213 17.6 17.6 67.4
43 3.6 3.6 71.0
38 3.1 3.1 74.2
50 4.1 4.1 78.3
52 4.3 4.3 82.6
56 4.6 4.6 87.2
75 6.2 6.2 93.5
























Mean  6.71 Median  8.00 Std Dev  4.79
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age          Age
2 .2 .2 .2
37 3.1 3.1 3.2
23 1.9 1.9 5.1
25 2.1 2.1 7.2
39 3.2 3.2 10.4
28 2.3 2.3 12.8
46 3.8 3.8 16.6
34 2.8 2.8 19.4
40 3.3 3.3 22.7
34 2.8 2.8 25.5
33 2.7 2.7 28.3
31 2.6 2.6 30.8
27 2.2 2.2 33.1
28 2.3 2.3 35.4
25 2.1 2.1 37.4
39 3.2 3.2 40.7
41 3.4 3.4 44.1
35 2.9 2.9 47.0
28 2.3 2.3 49.3
30 2.5 2.5 51.8
25 2.1 2.1 53.9
39 3.2 3.2 57.1
28 2.3 2.3 59.4
17 1.4 1.4 60.8
28 2.3 2.3 63.1
16 1.3 1.3 64.5
24 2.0 2.0 66.4
20 1.7 1.7 68.1
17 1.4 1.4 69.5
26 2.2 2.2 71.7
11 .9 .9 72.6
43 3.6 3.6 76.1
21 1.7 1.7 77.9
22 1.8 1.8 79.7
25 2.1 2.1 81.8
18 1.5 1.5 83.3













































age continued          Age
16 1.3 1.3 85.8
17 1.4 1.4 87.2
10 .8 .8 88.1
21 1.7 1.7 89.8
12 1.0 1.0 90.8
6 .5 .5 91.3
11 .9 .9 92.2
11 .9 .9 93.1
8 .7 .7 93.8
14 1.2 1.2 94.9
10 .8 .8 95.8
8 .7 .7 96.4
5 .4 .4 96.9
7 .6 .6 97.4
7 .6 .6 98.0
4 .3 .3 98.3
2 .2 .2 98.5
3 .2 .2 98.8
4 .3 .3 99.1
1 .1 .1 99.2
2 .2 .2 99.3
4 .3 .3 99.7
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.8
1 .1 .1 99.9



































Mean  40.04 Median  38.00 Std Dev  13.98
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